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This thesis defends the view that the role of applied mathematics is a representational 
one, and develops a mapping account of the applicability of mathematics that does 
justice to this representational conception. The first chapter outlines some 
philosophical problems of applicability and some of its history. In the second chapter I 
explain in detail what the mapping account is, examining mappings, and representation 
theorems, and give any account how mathematics can represent derived attributes and 
laws. In chapter three I argue against the possibility of genuine platonistic explanations 
of physical phenomena. This is necessary as if there were such explanations they would 
entail that platonistic mathematics is not extrinsic to what actually goes on in the 
physical world, and that a purely representational conception of the applicability of 
mathematics is either straightforwardly false or radically incomplete. In chapter four a 
positive proposal, based largely upon the work of Hartry Field, is given for showing how 
it is that we can state scientific theories in such a way that platonistic mathematics does 
not appear as part of scientific theories. This is essential, since although the previous 
chapter argued that such genuine explanations are impossible, it did not show 
positively how we could dispense with platonistic mathematics in scientific 
explanations. Chapter five concerns a philosophical problem of applicability, the 
‘descriptive problem of applicability’ which, it has been argued, goes beyond mere 
‘representational’ issues and poses a problem for the mapping account of applicability. I 
identify three species of descriptive problems and reject the possibility of 
anthropocentrism as a solution to the descriptive problem. I then provide a solution to 
each of the three species of descriptive problem, concluding that the descriptive 
problem is not an issue for the mapping account of applicability. In chapter six I explore 
some implications of the mapping account for wider issues in the philosophy of 
mathematics. These issues include the indispensability argument for mathematical 
platonism; whether the mapping account is committed to abstract mathematical objects; 
the extent to which the account can be nominalised; and whether idealisations pose any 
problems for the mapping account. I argue that the account is prima facie committed to 
abstract objects but that there are construals of the account which are both acceptable 
and useful to a nominalist. Turning then to the issue of idealisations, I argue that neither 
physical nor so-called mathematical idealisations pose any problem for the mapping 
account, in the former case because they do not, properly understood, go beyond 
representation, and in the latter case because such idealisations, if they exist, are not 
part of the actual explanations of empirical phenomena. I conclude therefore that the 
role of applied mathematics is a purely representational one, and that the mapping 
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The miracle of the appropriateness of 
the language of mathematics for the 
formulation of the laws of physics is a 
wonderful gift which we neither 
understand nor deserve. 








The purpose of this chapter is to orientate the reader with the questions in the 
philosophy of applied mathematics; with some of its historical background; with 
the debates which will prove central to the development of the overall thesis; 
and with the direction the thesis will take. Section 1.1 introduces the need for a 
robust philosophy of applied mathematics and explains that the philosophical 
account developed will be the mapping account. Section 1.2 discusses 
philosophical problems of applicability, drawing on the work of Mark Steiner, a 
key contributor to this area, and specifies which philosophical problems of 
applicability in particular I shall be focusing on. I then consider how the 
applicability of abstract mathematics became a philosophical issue in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, providing the reader with an overview of 
what has led to the current debate. The final section, 1.3. outlines what I shall be 








1.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
In this thesis I shall construct a representational account of the applicability of 
mathematics to empirical phenomena, and argue that this account, the mapping 
account, explains all of the empirical applications of mathematics. That is, I shall 
develop the mapping account and claim that the applicability of mathematics to 
empirical descriptions, predictions and explanations, is purely a matter of the 
representational capacities of mathematics. If I am successful then negative claims 
about our ability to explain applicability, similar to those expressed by Wigner in the 
epigram above, will be refuted. Mathematics is important to science because it is so 
useful in precisely representing magnitudes of attributes of empirical objects, and 
the relations of these attributes, with a large amount of abstraction, ignoring 
features of those objects that are not relevant to the attributes being described. The 
account I defend holds that mathematics is able to exercise such a representational 
role because of mappings from empirical to mathematical structures. Constructing 
an account of applicability is not an easy task, although many of the elements of such 
an account may appear to be a matter of common sense once the problems involved 
are fully elucidated.  
The philosophy of mathematics has an ancient provenance, with 
contributions from figures as venerable as Plato, Aristotle and Pythagoras, and it is 
therefore hardly surprising that a great deal of philosophy of mathematics is 
described as Platonist, that Aristotelian discussions concerning abstraction should 
abound, or that Pythagorean concerns such as the nature and role of mathematical 
objects are fiercely debated. For the most part the debates in such areas have 
centred on issues of mathematical ontology, mathematical knowledge and 
mathematical truth – to the extent that the philosophy of applied mathematics has 
been comparatively neglected, especially where questions of applicability as sui 
generis philosophical questions have been concerned. Why should this be so? I think 
one very important reason is that it was felt that if mathematical knowledge could 




that if applications such as counting were then philosophically unproblematic there 
would be no good reason to think that other applications of mathematics should not 
be so. This broaches the issue of how concerns with applicability relate to 
traditional questions in the philosophy of mathematics, questions of ontology and 
epistemology. But to focus overly much on ontological concerns in the development 
of an account of applicability will only mean that one ends up focusing more on the 
question of what mathematical objects are at the expense of how it is they can be 
usefully applied. This is not to say that such traditional questions are irrelevant to 
applicability insofar as they concern how mathematical knowledge is possible, and 
what the nature of mathematical structures is, but that we have mathematical 
knowledge and that there are mathematical structures of some sort is assumed by 
the applicability theorist at the outset.  
Applicability is a problem for both the platonist and the nominalist. This is 
evidently the case for the platonist – he has to explain how abstract mathematical 
structures can be applied to the concrete world. But the problem of applicability 
exists for the nominalist as well. For him the usefulness of mathematics stills need to 
be explained, even though as such he does not believe in the existence of abstract 
mathematical objects. But as I said above, a philosopher accounting for applicability 
does not need to explain what our mathematical knowledge is knowledge of, or how 
we have it, as he can to a large degree take this for granted, given that the practice of 
mathematics, and its successes, whatever its true subject matter, would challenge 
anyone to suggest otherwise. Thus, for the purposes of developing the mapping 
account I shall assume we have mathematical knowledge, but I will discuss some 
ontological concerns in chapter six however, concerning whether the mapping 
account is committed to any particular mathematical ontology; the indispensability 
argument for mathematical platonism; and the degree to which a nominalist can 
make use of the mapping account. Additionally some ontological issues are 
discussed passim in chapters three and four, e.g. whether certain mathematical 
concepts and scientific theories containing references to seemingly abstract 




clarifying what the mapping account needs to explain, rather than ascertaining and 
endorsing a general metaphysics of mathematics.  
The neglect of genuine questions of applicability in favour of questions of 
epistemology and metaphysics is surely due, at least in part, to the ubiquity and 
familiarity of many paradigmatic examples of the applicability of mathematics, with 
simple measurement, and especially counting, being amongst the most mundane. 
This way of thinking is very easy to fall into and so the philosopher of applied 
mathematics has to make a very detailed study of his subject matter in order to 
ensure that he does not mistake everyday familiarity for philosophical clarity. This 
is nowhere more often the case than with the mapping account of applicability. For 
once this theory is exposited to both the philosopher and the layman the response is 
frequently ‘that’s obvious’ or ‘that’s just common sense’, partly due to prior 
acquaintance with the construction of, and everyday engagement with, scales and 
measurements of various kinds. Unfortunately that it is not so obvious is 
substantiated by the facts that only recently has the mapping account emerged as a 
distinct and articulated philosophy, and that the elucidation of this account requires 
both a large quantity of complex theory to be engaged with, and tangled issues to be 
separated. This project is one aim of the thesis, but first I want to say a few words 
about the philosophical problems facing the philosopher of applied mathematics, 
and trace some of the recent history of attempts to address these philosophical 
problems. I shall then explain how this thesis fits together.  
 
 
1.2 What are the Philosophical Problems of Applicability? 
 
Intuitively the philosophical problem of applicability can be stated very simply: 
‘how is it that we can usefully apply mathematics to the empirical world?’. This 
breaks down into two sub-questions, the two fundamental questions with which the 
philosophy of applicability is concerned: (1) how can mathematics be applied to the 
world at all? (2) how and why is it that mathematics can be applied usefully? I shall 




mapping account of applicability. One philosopher to recognize the fact that there is 
not just a single philosophical problem of applicability is Mark Steiner, arguing (in a 
recent monograph, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem) that 
there are in fact three such problems: the semantic, metaphysical, and descriptive 
problems. Although I believe, and argue in chapter five, that Steiner proceeds in a 
manner which is quite misleading as far as the fundamental questions of 
applicability are concerned, I shall present Steiner’s taxonomy in this section 
because it has now entered the literature and become a relatively accepted way of 
classifying the philosophical problems of applicability. I shall indicate in what 
follows where I disagree from Steiner however, and hold that Steiner’s metaphysical 
and descriptive problems are really just instances of the more general questions (1) 
and (2).  
 
 
1.2.1 The Semantic Problem of Applicability.  
 
As Steiner sees it, the semantic problem of applicability is the problem of how we 
can use mathematical language in applied mathematics, specifically whether 
number words are singular terms or predicates. He focuses on natural number 
words, although evidently the problem extends to real number words as well. The 
reason that we must get clear on the semantic problem before we can go further is 
because if we are making any sort of deduction our terms must be used consistently 
or else the deduction will not be valid. That the problem exists is evidenced by the 
different uses of number words, e.g. ‘there are ten pens on my desk’ and ‘ten is a 
prime number’. The problem can be illustrated via a simple deduction:1  
 
a. There are ten pens on my desk   
b. There are five books on my desk  
c. No pen is a book  
d. There is nothing else on my desk  
                                                 




e. 10 + 5 = 15  
f. There are fifteen items on my desk.  
 
The problem is that in a, b, f numbers appear as predicates like ‘the pens on my 
desk are ten’, yet in e the numbers appear as singular terms.2 This is troubling since 
all the premises are needed for the conclusion to be derived but we cannot simply 
move across from predicates to singular terms and back again – this is analogous to 
allocating different values to the same variable in the scope of a single sub-proof 
before that sub-proof is discharged, we cannot treat ‘fifteen’ as a predicate one 
moment and a singular term the next and then move back to ‘fifteen’ as a predicate. 
So the derivation a-f appears to be invalid.3 Fortunately the semantic problem of 
applicability can be fairly easily resolved, at least in the case of arithmetic. To 
resolve the ambiguity a decision needs to be made about approach we shall adopt, 
namely treating number words as singular terms or as predicates. The first option 
has been pursued fairly extensively and so I shall consider it here. There are two 
strategies in particular I wish to consider, the Fregean strategy and the set-theoretic 
strategy. 
Frege’s idea was that we talk about numbers belonging to various concepts. 
For instance “If I say ‘the King’s carriage is drawn by four horses’ then I assign the 
number four to the concept ‘horse that draws the King’s carriage’” (Frege 1884, 
p.59). The deduction a-f can be formalised in second-order logic using the following 
formula: 
 
[(NxFx = m) ∧ (NxGx = n) ∧ (~∃x(Fx ∧ Gx))] ⊃ (Nx(Fx ∨ Gx) = m + n) 
 
                                                 
2 Note that at this stage the issue is not ontological – the use of singular terms is not supposed to 
suggest platonism in mathematics, the reference could equally well be to a nominalistically 
acceptable surrogate for an abstract object, or to a useful fiction that is part of the ‘story’ of 
mathematics.  
3 The problem would remain even if we were talking about predicates of mathematical objects, since 




With appropriate substitutions for variables and predicates, such that Nx means ‘the 
number of x’s such that’, Px means ‘x is a pen’ and Bx means ‘x is a book’, a-f 
becomes: 
 
[(NxPx = 10) ∧ (NxBx = 5 ) ∧ (~∃x(Px ∧ Bx))] ⊃ (Nx(Px ∨ Bx) = 10 + 5) 
 
Frege’s strategy was guided by his metaphysics of concepts and objects, where 
monadic predicates denote concepts which objects may instantiate, or in Fregean 
terminology, ‘saturate’. Frege was very emphatic that 
 
…we should not be deterred by the fact that in the language of everyday life number 
appears also in attributive [i.e. as a predicate] constructions. That can always be got 
round. For example, the proposition that ‘Jupiter has four moons’ can be converted 
into ‘the number of Jupiter’s moons is four’. Here the word ‘is’ should not be taken 
as a mere copula, as in the proposition ‘the sky is blue’. This is shown by the fact that 
we can say ‘the number of Jupiter’s moons is the number 4, or four’. Here ‘is’ has the 
sense of ‘is identical with’ or ‘is the same as’. So that what we have is an identity, 
stating that the expression ‘the number of Jupiter’s moons’ signifies the same object 
as the word ‘four’. (Frege 1884, p.69) 
 
The set-theoretic approach is not dissimilar to Frege’s in many of its essentials.  It 
would be endorsed by those who distrust intensional entities such as concepts and 
their attendant unfamiliar properties of saturatedness and unsaturatedness, and 
prefer sets with their clear-cut identity conditions. Rather than referring to 
numbers that belong to concepts we talk about numbers that are the cardinalities of 
sets (cardinal numbers). So we would for instance say that the cardinality of the set 
of horses that draw the king’s carriage is 4. That is |{x : x draws the King’s carriage}| 
= 4. The members of set x will be in a 1:1 correspondence with all other 4-
membered sets. Thus in formalising the above inference, we would say 
 
 
[X = {x : Px} ∧ Y = {y : Bx} ∧ (|X| = 10) ∧ (|Y| = 5) ∧ (~∃z(z ∈ X ∧ z ∈ Y))] ⊃ 
|{X ∪ Y}| = 10 + 5 
 
That is, if X is the set of pens and Y is the set of books and the cardinality of X is 10 




of those sets will be 10 + 5, i.e. 15. It is therefore clear that the possession of a 
robust method for construing all statements of cardinal number as involving 
singular terms rather than predicates is effective at removing the ambiguity that 
may be associated with statements of number, and that there a variety of solutions 
to the semantic problem which we may endorse, depending on our inclinations. 
There are other more nominalistically acceptable approaches as well, but due to the 
tangential nature of the semantic problem with respect to this thesis I shall not 
pursue them here. Will the metaphysical problem of applicability be as easily 
solvable as the semantic problem? 
 
 
1.2.2. The Metaphysical Problem of Applicability 
 
Steiner explains that “to go by recent philosophical literature…the chief problems 
about mathematical applicability are what we can call the ‘metaphysical problems’” 
(Steiner 1998, p.19). These problems are explained as “stem[ing] from a gap 
between mathematics and the world” (ibid.). Many philosophers and 
philosophically-inclined mathematicians treat the objects of mathematics as 
distinctly non-concrete, even to the point of denying them a location in space and 
time, and any causal powers whatsoever, which would suggest that mathematics 
isn’t about the physical world. Others, disinclined to believe in this view of 
mathematical objects, prefer to think of mathematics as being about objects which 
may not be so abstract, such as possible structures or sentence tokens. The point is 
that both of these groups of philosophers  will require an account of how we apply 
mathematics, a point I made in the chapter introduction. To focus on there being a 
gap between mathematics and the world is to make the metaphysical problem a 
problem for the platonist, and obscures the fact that the question of how 
mathematics can be applied is a problem for both the mathematical platonist and 
the mathematical nominalist. Additionally, to introduce ontological concerns at this 
juncture only clouds the issues, and introduces epistemological problems that are 




the question is ‘given we have mathematical knowledge, how can we apply it?’ 
rather than ‘what is mathematical knowledge actually knowledge of, how can we 
have this knowledge, and if it is knowledge of abstract objects how can we apply it?’.  
However, because Steiner speaks of a gap between mathematics and reality it 
is clear that he takes this to be an especial problem for the platonistically inclined 
philosopher, an instance of the general question ‘how can mathematics be applied to 
the physical world?’, the ‘first question’ of applicability. Thus the metaphysical 
problem concerns how it is that if mathematics is the study of non-spatial, non-
temporal, and acausal objects, how can we apply it to the spatial, temporal, causal 
world? This problem has been the focus of much philosophical thinking, and Steiner 
believes that Frege solved the problem of how mathematics can be applied for the 
platonist. (I shall only mention this briefly here as my concern is with the mapping 
account and not with Frege). Frege’s idea is that concepts are the bridge between 
abstract and concrete objects. Objects, including concrete objects, satisfy, or in 
Frege’s terminology, saturate, first level concepts. Numbers are the (abstract) 
objects that are the extensions of certain second-level concepts, which are concepts 
saturated by lower-level concepts, which are in turn satisfied by objects. Specifically 
numbers are the extensions of number, or numerosity, concepts such as the concept 
‘equinumerous with the concept ‘pen in the pot’’. So numbers are related to concrete 
objects in virtue of being the extensions of second-level concepts which are 
saturated by first-level concepts whose extensions contain concrete objects.4 
My own approach is very different to that of Frege as I argue that 
mathematics is applicable not because mathematical and concrete objects are 
related via concepts, but rather because the mathematical can represent, through 
mappings, the empirical, appealing to a fair amount of measurement theory to 
explain in detail how these representations obtain, since measurement theory 
concerns the properties that empirical structures must possess in order for a 
mapping to be possible. At this stage the mapping account is not obviously any more 
pro-platonist than anti-platonist, and as I have said, I am largely silent on 
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ontological matters until chapter six. In chapter two I try to do justice to the 
mapping account of applicability but suffice it to say that if the mapping account is 
successful it will solve the first fundamental problem of applicability, and, a fortiori, 
that instance of it that is the metaphysical problem of applicability.  
 
 
1.2.3.  The Descriptive Problem of Applicability  
 
The descriptive problem of applicability concerns the fact that mathematics, the 
subject matter of which is commonly taken to be abstract and causally impotent, 
plays a major role in the description and discovery of seemingly true physical 
theories, and the prediction of novel physical phenomena. As such it is plainly an 
instance of the second problem of applicability as outlined above, namely ‘how and 
why can mathematics be usefully applied?’ since to account for the role of 
mathematics in discovery and novel prediction is to account for (part of) its use. 
Steiner feels that the problem is that our mathematical knowledge enables us to 
gain natural-scientific knowledge in a way which appears to go beyond any 
explanation of applicability as just a matter of the utilisation of the representational 
capacities of mathematical structures to greatly simplify the making of physical 
predictions and statement of physical theories. Steiner argues that the descriptive 
problem primarily arises from Pythagorean reasoning, a form of reasoning that 
derives novel or unexpected empirical results from purely mathematical results. 
The most prevalent example of this is claimed to be Pythagorean analogy, which 
occurs when we have an… 
 
…equation E [which] has been derived under assumptions A [and] the equation has 
solutions for A which are no longer valid; but just because they are solutions of E, one 
looks for them in nature…the analogy becomes Pythagorean if [two solutions] are 
physically disanalogous, so that only the equation links them. (Steiner 1998, p.76).     
 
Another form of analogy identified is ‘formalist analogy’, although Steiner argues 
that formalist analogy itself is properly a species of reasoning that falls under the 




formalisms and extend them, subject to certain formal restrictions, hoping that the 
formal restrictions will cash out empirically and that the extension of a previously 
successful formalism will yield an equally successful formalism in a new case. 
Putative examples of Pythagorean analogy include Maxwell’s prediction of 
electromagnetism as a result of his modification of Ampere’s laws, and 
Schrödinger’s discovery of wave mechanics. In opposition to this, I shall argue in 
chapter five that Steiner is wrong, that the problems of surprising predictions and 
novel discoveries, among others, are not categorially different to the problem of 
explaining how mathematics assists in making more mundane predictions and 
discoveries, a role I argue is fully explained by the mapping account. 
 
 
1.2.4. The Historical Awareness of the Problems of Applicability 
 
In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries the problems raised by mathematical 
applicability began to be recognized, where they had earlier been obscured by the 
lack of a principled distinction between pure and applied mathematics. The 
problems of applicability as I consider them in this thesis were not really discussed 
before this time, for although Aristotle, Kant and Frege did consider some issues of 
applicability, they were much more concerned with geometry, cardinal arithmetic 
and metaphysics than with measurement and representation. The philosophy of 
mathematics in the first half of the twentieth century was distinguished by its 
almost exclusive focus on issues in the philosophical foundations of mathematics, 
specifically with the avoidance of the various set-theoretic paradoxes, the problems 
posed by the concept of infinity, and the nature of mathematical knowledge. 
However work on applicability did take place, although any history of applicability 
in the twentieth century has to largely bypass the three great schools, with the 
exception that  in the Principles of Mathematics, Russell does make some mention of 
measurement, a concern not followed through to a great extent in Principia 





In the late nineteenth century, however, concern with the applicability of 
mathematics and the representational conception of mathematical applicability – 
the conception with which I am concerned here – was manifested in early work on 
the theory of measurement.  A significant amount of contemporary work concerning 
the application of mathematics to empirical phenomena, and certainly a large part of 
this thesis, involves the theory of measurement, and it is in this mathematical 
discipline rather than in the philosophical schools that much work necessary to 
arriving at a proper theory of the applicability of mathematics was carried out. Much 
measurement theory is concerned with what is known as ‘representational 
measurement’, namely how mathematics can represent empirical attributes so that 
these attributes can be measured. Representational measurement is therefore 
concerned with the properties that empirical systems need to possess in order to be 
measurable in a certain way by a mathematical or numerical system. Who was 
responsible for the development of the theory of representational measurement? 
David Hand explains: 
 
The approach began its formal development around the end of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century with the work of Helmholtz 
(1887), Holder (1901) and Russell (1903), although the ideas can be traced to 
Euclid and beyond. Helmholtz gave conditions of order and combination which 
objects must satisfy for these relationships to be represented by order and addition 
of positive real numbers…and Holder developed these ideas further. (Hand 2004, 
p.26). 
 
There was some discussion of measurement-related issues in ancient Greek 
philosophy, and Eudoxus’ Theory of Proportions, which appears in Euclid’s Elements, 
is often taken to be the core of that discussion. However it was not really until the 
last century that mathematicians and physicists became interested in issues of 
measurement in their own right, when Hermann von Helmholtz published his 
‘Epistemological Analysis of Counting and Measurement’ and Otto Holder his 
‘Axioms of Quantity and the Theory of Measurement’, the theorems of which were 
crucial to the development of measurement theory as its own branch of 
mathematics, culminating in the three volume Foundations of Measurement in 1971. 




amount of material for this thesis. At any rate, the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century has been the scene of a huge amount of work concerning the 
theory of measurement in general and representational measurement in particular, 
with the task of really clarifying how measurement is possible, how it is that 
mathematical structures can represent empirical structures. (I am not going to say 
any more about representational measurement here as it is discussed in detail in the 
next chapter).  
 So we see that in the twentieth century rigorous mathematical 
characterisations of measurement became widely available, characterisations very 
useful to a philosopher thinking about philosophical issues of applicability. This 
brings us to contemporary philosophy of applicability, for I have hitherto only 
mentioned the mathematical theories of measurement. It is by no means an 
exaggeration to say that philosophy was, by and large, unconcerned with how 
mathematics could be applied until relatively recently. A quote from Hartry Field 
will substantiate this view: 
 
Most of the literature in the philosophy of mathematics takes the following three 
questions as central: (a) how much of standard mathematics is true?…(b) what entities 
do we have to postulate for the truth of…mathematics…? (c) what sort of account can 
we give of our knowledge of these truths? A fourth question is also sometimes 
discussed, though usually quite cursorily: (d) what sort of account is possible of how 
mathematics is applied to the physical world? (Field 1980 p.vii). 
 
This quote is apt, since there is a view that it is the work of Field that inaugurated 
the philosophical concern with applicability that has arisen over the past thirty or so 
years, a view I to some degree share, and so it is only natural Field’s work should 
play a significant role in this thesis. That Field’s work has engendered so much 
activity around the topic of applicability is slightly ironic, since his primary concern 
was not to develop a theory of applicability but rather to convince platonists of the 
dispensability of mathematics to science and to thereby motivate nominalism. Much 
of the work on the philosophy of applicability from the past decade has used an 
approach similar to that of Field, making measurement-theoretic concerns quite 




Field, and I agree with Michael Friedman that “future discussions of this area must 
take up where Field leaves off” (1981). 
 
 
1.3 Thesis Contents 
 
After this introduction, the thesis proper opens in chapter two with a thorough 
discussion of the mapping account of the applicability of mathematics. The first part 
of that chapter describes in detail what the account is, explaining how mathematical 
structures are able to represent empirical phenomena and discussing one example 
of the representational applicability of mathematics, measurement, in some detail. I 
look at the two main approaches to measurement, viz. measurement procedures 
and representation theorems, and outline the different types of measurement, 
before going on to explore what is meant by the empirical operation of 
concatenation, which is so important in measurement. I then examine the several 
types of mapping which the mapping account might claim is the ground of 
applicability, and the conditions under which an empirical structure can be 
extensively measured. The second part of the chapter moves away from 
measurement specifically, looking more generally at the role of mathematics in 
natural science, and giving a speculative illustration of how the applicability of 
mathematics in Newton’s law of universal gravitation can be fully accommodated by 
the mapping account, and clarifying the notions of fundamental and derived 
attribute, and the relations of the concepts of derived attribute and law, along the 
way. Finally I consider a representational account of the applicability of 
mathematics that claims to go beyond the version of the mapping account 
developed in this thesis, the inferential account, comparing the two accounts and 
isolating several flaws in the argument that the inferential account is an advance 
over the mapping account.  
Chapter three is concerned with arguing against the possibility of genuine 




this thesis is to justify the purely representational character of applied mathematics, 
a contention undermined if there are such genuine explanations. I give an outline of 
Alan Baker’s example of a genuine explanation of a physical phenomenon involving 
platonistic mathematics, the cicada example, arguing that it does survive many of 
the arguments that have been developed to criticise it. I argue however that the 
platonistic concepts used in the example can be satisfactorily nominalised and so 
the example need  not be a platonistic one, i.e. we need not think that the 
mathematics involved relies on abstract objects.  
Chapter four is primarily an extended engagement with some of the methods 
of Hartry Field, in order to show how it is that we can state scientific theories with 
no reference to abstract mathematical objects, coordinate systems, or any other 
ontologically questionable or in-principle arbitrary entities. In order to do this I give 
a comprehensive account of Field’s nominalisation of Newtonian gravitational 
theory, and show how Mark Balaguer tries to extend this to Quantum Mechanics. 
The work of this chapter is necessary in order to support the mapping account, for it 
is crucial to that account that the relation of mathematics to empirical phenomena 
be a representational one, and this chapter shows in detail how platonistic 
mathematics can be treated as merely a representational tool – though one which is 
nevertheless very useful, perhaps practically indispensable, for scientists.   
Chapter five discusses a problem of applicability concerning applied 
mathematics putatively having a role which goes beyond representation, referred to 
above as the descriptive problem. Recall, this problem is that mathematics allegedly 
allows us to describe or predict empirical phenomena in ways we would not expect, 
and suggests there is a closer fit between mathematics and the world than merely 
that mathematics can usefully represent attributes of that world. The chapter covers 
the sort of reasoning that is central to the descriptive problem, namely Pythagorean 
reasoning, and gives examples of such reasoning. I reject the possibility of 
anthropocentrism as a solution to the descriptive problem, maintaining that there 
are actually three species of descriptive problem, and I consider solutions to the 
descriptive problems of the first, second and third category respectively, arguing 




the mapping account – or that the putative problematicity arises from a 
misunderstanding. I claim therefore that the descriptive problem of applicability 
does not pose a challenge to a representational conception of applied mathematics.   
In chapter six I explore some implications of the mapping account for wider 
issues in the philosophy of mathematics including whether the mapping account is 
committed to abstract objects, and its relation to the indispensability argument. I 
argue that the mapping account is prima facie committed to abstract objects, but 
that there are construals of the account which are both acceptable and useful to a 
nominalist. I look at both Field’s fictionalism and the nominalist views of Davide 
Rizza and Geoffrey Hellman which try to provide surrogates for abstract 
mathematical objects by reinterpreting parts of it. I argue that if a nominalist wants 
to keep the mapping account in some form he had better opt for the reinterpretation 
since in the fictionalist case the mapping account’s only real use it to undermine the 
indispensability argument for platonism. In the surrogate-nominalist case however 
we try to explain the applicability to the empirical world of some nominalistically 
acceptable substitutes for parts of platonistic mathematics. Turning then to the 
issue of idealisations, I argue that idealisations do not pose any problem for the 
mapping account. This is because physical idealisations can be fully explained by the 
mapping account, or at least their solution is consistent with that account, and 
because there are no such things, or at least no extant examples of such things, as 
non-physical idealisations which play a genuine role in empirical explanations.  I 
claim that the best known such example, Batterman’s, fails for a variety of reasons. 
I conclude that if platonism is true then the mapping account is an excellent 
explanation of the applicability of mathematics, but that if abstract objects don’t 
exist (and thus that platonism is false), then suitably reinterpreted the mapping 
account will provide an excellent account of some nominalistically acceptable 
platonistic-object surrogate to empirical phenomena. If however fictionalism is true 
then the mapping account’s use is a negative one, undermining platonism – although 
the fictionalist is free to admit that if, counterfactually, there were abstract 
mathematical objects, the mapping account could explain their applicability. But 




contribution. The development of a robust account of applicability is a vital and 









…mapping accounts seek to explain 
the utility of mathematics…by 
demonstrating the existence of the 
right kind of map from a 
mathematical structure to some 
appropriate physical structure.  




Towards the Mapping Account: Representation, 




This chapter is concerned with explaining in detail exactly what the mapping 
account is. Many philosophers have alluded briefly to such an account, but only 
recently have any more detailed versions emerged. The first part of this chapter 
focuses on explicating the account, and how it relates to measurement. The 
second part is concerned with how the mapping account meshes with natural 
science, specifically the measurement of  initial conditions and the description of 
natural laws. I argue that the mapping account shows clearly both how 
mathematical structures can represent empirical phenomena, and why the role 
of mathematics in science need only be a representational one. In the third part 
of the chapter I discuss and confront an account that claims to go beyond the 








2.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
The mapping account is an account of the applicability of mathematics to empirical 
phenomena. It has been invoked or discussed by a variety of philosophers and 
consists minimally in the view that applicability can be explained by an appeal to 
structure-preserving mappings between mathematical and empirical structures.5 
The origins of the account lie in Field’s Science without Numbers, where many details 
of such an account are developed, although, as noted previously, Field’s concern was 
not really to develop a theory of applicability, but to convince platonists of the 
indispensability argument’s failure to establish platonism. That was thirty years ago, 
and the mapping account has recently received a quite comprehensive statement at 
the hands of Christopher Pincock in his (2004b) paper ‘A New Perspective on the 
Problem of Applying Mathematics’, where it is called the ‘structuralist account’.6 
‘Structuralist account’ here does not refer to the metaphysics of mathematics 
defended, in various guises, by Hellman (1989), Resnik (1997), and Shapiro (1997), 
but is rather another name for the mapping account itself insofar as that account is 
concerned with mappings between mathematical structures and structural features 
of the empirical world.  
In section 2.2 I describe the account in some detail, specifically in connection 
with measurement theory. There is a close connection between measurement 
theory and the mapping account, indeed measurement theory might be viewed as a 
rigorous development of the idea that is the germ of the mapping account. This is 
because measurement theory is concerned with investigating the structural 
properties that empirical structures need to possess in order to be mapped into, or 
represented by, mathematical structures, and serves to provide many examples of 
mappings between such structures. Therefore no comprehensive discussion of the 
mapping account is going to be possible without a substantial amount of 
measurement theory, and if measurement theory did not already exist it would be 
                                                 
5 Cf. Pincock (2004a), (2004b); Bueno and Colyvan (2011).  




necessary for the mapping account theorist to invent it. Fortunately since 
measurement theory is an independent branch of mathematics in its own right, 
predating contemporary philosophical concerns with applicability, the mapping 
account theorist is spared this onerous task. In section 2.3. I consider how the 
mapping account can explain how and why mathematics is useful not just in 
representing and measuring magnitudes of fundamental empirical attributes, but in 
describing the natural laws the search for which forms an important part, if not the 
most important part, of the business of science. In this section I look at an example 
of a scientific law, viz. Newton’s law of universal gravitation, and present a 
speculative illustration to support my view that nowhere in either the development 
or statement of that law does mathematics play any role other than a 
representational one, which can be fully explained by the mapping account. This 
conclusion also supports the view that the mapping account is sufficient for 
explaining the applicability of mathematics to natural science in general. In section 
2.4. I consider a rival theory of applicability, Otavio Bueno and Mark Colyvan’s 
‘inferential conception’. This, they claim, is a significant extension and modification 
of the mapping account which is able to handle challenges putatively beyond the 
mapping account’s reach, and which therefore comprises a challenge to the 
adequacy of that account. I argue below in 2.4 that the inferential conception is not a 
threat to the mapping account as outlined in this thesis, and that some of the 
reasons proffered for preferring the inferential conception are in fact reasons that 




2.2 The Mapping Account 
 
The key idea of the mapping account is very simple to state, as I did above in 2.1. It 
is that mathematics is applicable to the empirical world in virtue of structure-
preserving mappings between empirical structures and mathematical structures. 




such structures, and the mappings between the structures allow mathematics to 
represent magnitudes of empirical attributes. In many cases the existence of such 
mappings is taken for granted, and indeed is so familiar that the mapping may be 
considered to hide in plain sight. For instance, every time a thermometer is used to 
take a temperature, or cooking scales are used to weigh pasta, the existence of a 
mapping of some sort is presupposed, since such a mapping is presupposed when a 
scale is constructed, indeed the scale will be formed from the mathematical 
structure into which the empirical structure is mapped.  
In effect, the existence of mappings between the empirical and the 
mathematical enables us to ascend to the level of the mathematical, represent 
magnitudes of empirical attributes or phenomena, perform mathematical 
operations on these mathematical representations, and then descend back down to 
the level of the empirical with an empirical result, enabling us to obtain certain facts 
about the empirical world much faster, or more reliably, than we could have done 
without using the mathematics. This, together with the fact there are no limits on 
the size of the empirical units of magnitude which mathematics can represent, is 
why mathematics is so useful. The question of why mathematics is useful in science 
is however not really the focus of the mapping account, but more for the philosophy 
of science, although the mapping account is, qua theory of applicability, extremely 
concerned with how it is that this application is useful. That is to say, a theory of 
applicability must not just account for why and how mathematics can be applied, 
but how it can be usefully applied. I could perhaps, with a suitable interpretation, 
apply the metaphysics of Thales of Miletus to Quantum Mechanics, but it is highly 
doubtful that this would be in any way useful.   
In many cases the domain of mathematical structures for the representation 
of magnitudes of empirical attributes will be the real numbers, and the attributes 
measured will be scalar, but by no means is this generally the case. Indeed the 
mathematics used in physics frequently involves vectors, matrices, Hilbert spaces, 
and a great variety of other abstract mathematical objects. Because the subject 
matter of mathematics is all possible (i.e. self consistent) structures, if more exotic 




mathematics is in principle able to provide them. However the paradigm I shall 
focus upon in this chapter will be that of the real numbers as the required 
mathematical structure, partly because of the ubiquity of that paradigm, and partly 
because examples involving the real numbers are reasonably simple and sufficiently 
illustrative of the representational role of mathematics generally. The question of 
which properties an empirical structure needs to possess in order to be mapped 
into a chosen mathematical structure, and what extra properties it needs to possess 
to be measured in a certain way, is, as has been said, the subject of measurement 
theory.  
Measurement is an important and vital part of the mathematical description 
of empirical phenomena, which is essential if laws are to be discovered, knowledge 
of them refined and their accuracy tested. As I said above, since the mapping 
account is about mappings between structures, and so is measurement theory, the 
mapping account draws heavily upon the resources of measurement theory. Indeed 
it would not be an exaggeration to say that measurement theory can be considered a 
proper part of the mapping account of applicability despite the fact the former 
predates the latter. I shall begin by outlining the two major approaches to 
measurement (2.2.2) and go into some detail about concatenation (2.2.3). I then 
move on to the second of these approaches, the representation-theoretic approach, 
and consider what sorts of mappings it is that we want to prove the existence of and 
what it is that we are mapping from (2.2.4). I then discuss which axioms are 
required to prove such a mapping exists (2.2.5). Finally I consider a philosophical 
issue concerning the empirical interpretation of the results of measurement (2.2.6).  
 
 
2.2.1. Measurement Types, Procedures and Representation Theorems.  
 
Measurement theory explains how a mathematical structure can measure an 
empirical structure, which involves, inter alia, showing that a mathematical 




some of the properties of the empirical structure, that is, on the properties of the 
attributes (length, mass, temperature, etc.) which we wish to measure.  
 
Measurement Types. There are different types of measurement depending on the 
properties of the empirical attributes in question and how they are to be related. 
Specifically there are three main types of measurement, at least in the natural 
sciences: ordinal measurement, extensive measurement and difference 
measurement. Showing that an empirical structure can be ordinally measured 
simply involves showing that an empirical domain with a comparison relation can 
be represented by the real numbers ordered under ‘>’, that for all attributes a and b 
in the empirical domain, a ÷ b iff  φ(a) > φ(b), where φ  is a function taking 
magnitudes of empirical attributes to real numbers. Extensive measurement is more 
complicated, because showing that an empirical structure is extensive involves 
showing that the real numbers ordered under > with addition can represent a 
domain of empirical attributes not merely ordered by a comparison relation, but 
also involving an operation of concatenation ◦, the connecting together of attributes 
with additive, that is, addition-like, properties. This is to say that to show an 
empirical structure is extensive is to show that it is ordered and that it is additive.7 A 
simple example of an extensive attribute is length with concatenation. Finally, to 
show that the attributes of an empirical structure can be measured using difference 
measurement involves showing that pairs of pairs of magnitudes of a given attribute 
(a,b), (c,d) – an example would be a pair of pairs of temperatures – have the 
property that for all elements in the empirical domain, abDcd iff                                   
|φ(a) − φ(b)| > |φ(c) − φ(d)|, where D is the has-a-greater-range-of-magnitude relation 
of two pairs of magnitudes of a given (differential) attribute.  
In what follows I shall primarily discuss extensive measurement, as it 
provides many measurement examples, whereas ordinal measurement is really too 
basic to be very interesting here. Evidently there are significant differences between 
extensive and difference measurement, but there is no need to go into them in this 
                                                 
7 For an operation to be additive is for it to satisfy the property φ(a ◦ b)  = φ(a) + φ(b), about which 




thesis – a thorough example of extensive measurement should be sufficient to show 
how it is that mathematics can represent and measure magnitudes of empirical 
attributes. To reiterate, I have just discussed the three basic types of measurement: 
ordinal, extensive, and difference, and mentioned what properties attributes in the 
empirical domain of the empirical structure must have if they are to be measureable 
by one of these types of measurement. There are two main ways of showing that an 
empirical structure has such properties. The first of these ways is to use a 
measurement procedure for “assigning numbers to objects or events on the basis of 
qualitative observations of attributes” (Krantz et al 1971 p.2). The second, which I 
shall be more concerned with here, is to prove a representation theorem. No 
discussion of measurement is complete without an account of measurement 
procedures however, so I shall briefly provide this.  
 
Measurement Procedures. There are two important measurement procedures, the 
latter more complex than the former insofar as the first only shows that an 
empirical structure can be ordinally measured, the second by contrast shows that it 
can be extensively measured. These procedures are the ordinal measurement 
procedure, and the procedure of counting units. In the examples that follow I am 
going to discuss assigning numbers to rods in virtue of the magnitude of the 
attribute of length that the rods possess. To assign numbers to rods using the 
ordinal measurement procedure we take some real number, it doesn’t matter what 
it is, and assign it to that rod. Then we take the next rod. If that rod is longer than the 
first rod, we assign it a larger number, otherwise a smaller. We do this until all the 
rods have numbers, and we won’t run out of real numbers to assign in this manner 
as the reals are dense – between any two there is always another one. It is clear that 
this method of assigning will satisfy the following restriction, that is, it will form an 
ordinal measure: for any two rods a and b,  a ÷ b iff  φ(a) > φ(b).  
The method of assigning numbers by counting units is more complex insofar 
as it pertains to extensive measurement, concerning both ordering and 
concatenating. The concatenation of rods involves laying the rods end-to-end in as 




u, by selecting one of the rods as the unit rod u. (Krantz et al use the example of a 
metre stick, which contains a standard sequence of a thousand millimetres). Assume 
we have copies of rod u (u', u'', etc). By concatenating the copies to each other we 
get the following sequence: 1u = u, 2u = u ◦ u', 3u = 2u ◦ u''… We need to assign a 
number (a ‘length’) to each concatenation. Thus we will get φ(u) = 1, φ( u ◦ u') = 2 and 
so on. Any other rod, call it b, that is not a concatenation of u and which is longer 
than nu but shorter than (n+1)u, b will be assigned a length φ(b) between the length 
nφ(u) of nu and the length (n+1)φ(u) of (n+1)u, similar to how numbers were 
assigned to rods in the case of ordinal measurement. This assignment guarantees 
that the rods and their concatenations form an ordinal measure. Additionally it is 
clear that the numbers assigned to the rods are additive with respect to 
concatenation, that they satisfy φ(a ◦ b)  = φ(a) + φ(b), since if we have to concatenate 
n copies of u to get a rod the same length as a and n' copies to get a concatenation 
the same length as b, then we must concatenate n + n' copies of u to get a 
concatenation the same length as the concatenation of a and b. A more detailed 
investigation of this measurement procedure will need to explore the axioms that 
such an extensive empirical structure will need to satisfy in order for the 
measurement procedure to be carried out. 
 
Representation Theorems. However, as I mentioned several paragraphs ago, the 
second approach to measurement is the approach that is more directly relevant to 
the mapping account of applicability, as it involves proving that there is a mapping 
between the empirical and mathematical structures. Rather than using a 
measurement procedure to allocate magnitudes of empirical attributes to numbers 
we can “look at the properties of the numerical assignment” (Ibid. p.9). Krantz et al 
succinctly summarise the second approach: “[f]rom this standpoint, measurement 
may be regarded as the construction of homomorphisms (scales) from empirical 
relational structures of interest into numerical relational structures that are useful” 
(Ibid. p.9). Krantz et al say more about what the second approach involves when 





…we may pose the following question: Given a set of rods, the comparison relation ÷, 
and concatenation ◦, what assumptions concerning ÷ and ◦ are necessary and/or 
sufficient to construct a real-valued function φ  that is order preserving and 
additive…[t]his question still asks for axiomatization [i.e. just as the procedure 
does]…however the conclusion aimed for is not that a certain procedure is possible, 
but rather that a numerical function φ satisfying certain properties exists. (Krantz et al 
1971, p.8).   
 
That is, not that it is possible to construct such a mapping, but that such a mapping 
exists. Let’s restate what is required in the representation-theoretic approach to 
showing that a set of e.g. rods can have their length measured extensively: we begin 
with a set A of the rods, and their copies, and their (finite) concatenations, together 
with the comparison relation and concatenation operator, that is, we begin with the 
empirical relational structure 〈A, ÷, ◦〉.8 We need to know what has to be the case 
about  〈A, ÷, ◦〉 in order for 〈A, ÷, ◦〉 to be mapped, with its structure preserved, into 
a numerical relational structure, say 〈R, >, +〉, by the mapping function φ.  
A representation theorem says for a given empirical relational structure, if it 
satisfies certain axioms, there is a mapping, which preserves structure, of the 
empirical structure into a given numerical relational structure. So in other words 
what we need to know is which axioms the empirical relational structure has to 
satisfy in order for the appropriate representation theorem to follow, and thus for 
us to prove that there is such-and-such a mapping. Different numerical relational 
structures can do the job of representing empirical relational structures equally well, 
but of course some structures may seem more ‘natural’ than others. That different 
structures can do the job is established formally by a uniqueness theorem, proved 
after the representation theorem, which states that the representation is unique up 
to some sort of transformation. i.e. is invariant under that transformation. Thus one 
mathematical structure will be transformable into another mathematical structure 
that will represent the empirical relational structure equally well, at least from a 
purely formal perspective. Unlike the mathematical structure, which so long as the 
uniqueness theorem holds can be any of a variety of possible structures, the 
                                                 
8 Concatenation is discussed in detail in the next subsection, 2.2.2, Until it is discussed, please allow 




empirical structure must be fixed, and obey very specific axioms, in order to be 
extensively (or ordinally, or differentially) measured: 
 
What is invariant [i.e. unlike the numerical structure]…is the empirical relational 
structure and its empirical properties, some of which are formulated as axioms. A set 
of axioms leading to representation and uniqueness theorems of fundamental 
measurement may be regarded as a set of qualitative (that is, non-numerical) empirical 
laws. In some cases, as in the measurement of length, these laws are rather trivial...[i]n 
other empirical contexts the axioms can be quite interesting and non-obvious. (Krantz 
et al, 1971 p.13) 
 
We must shortly turn in 2.2.4 to the issue of which axioms are required to prove 
which homomorphisms exist. This is not as straightforward as it may seem as there 
are many axioms to choose from, and several different types of homomorphism 
which can be established by such axioms. We look at this in 2.2.3. But first a word or 





The nature of the comparison relation is quite clear, but I feel I am overdue to say a 
little more about the concatenation operation ◦ and some of the issues associated 
with it. Concatenation is represented in the mathematical relational structure, at 
least as far as extensive measurement is concerned, by the operation of addition. 
This expressed by requiring that the following condition (which we saw above also 
in the counting-of-units measurement procedure) holds: φ(a ◦ b)  = φ(a) + φ(b).9 That 
is to say, the concatenation operator has addition-like, or additive, properties. A 
minimal restriction of what counts as a concatenation, even more general then any 
restrictions arising out of particular measurement types, is that a concatenation 
operator is a binary operator that takes members of the Cartesian product A×A of a 
set A to members of A. This may be regarded as a formal restriction on what counts 
                                                 
9
 You can see that this condition holds for both metres and diagonal metres. The number representing the 
concatenation of two diagonal metres will be the sum of the numbers representing those diagonal metres, 




as concatenation. If an operation does not take members of the Cartesian product of 
a set A to members of A then it is not a concatenation operation. Thus, for instance, 
the act of holding hands with a person does not make two people into one person, so 
holding hands is not an operation of concatenation.  
This restriction, though delimiting the set of concatenations, still permits a 
broad range of operations to count as concatenations. For we will not want to say 
that every binary operation meeting this restriction will count as a concatenation, 
indeed for the most part there will be one intended operation, with perhaps some 
other operations satisfying the formal restrictions of concatenation and yielding 
non-intended but formally-acceptable interpretations. For instance when talking 
about the concatenation of rods we usually mean placing them end to end so they 
form a straight line. Technically, to take two rods a and b to A, we would need to 
weld them end to end if they were metal, but for the sake of the discussion of 
measurement such specifics are largely ignored, and in this case it is clear that 
welding end-to-end for instance is a good example of concatenation. Thus we can 
see that generally speaking concatenation is a fairly idealised operation, since 
although (as in the welding example) there might be ways we can physically carry 
out a concatenation and take members of the Cartesian product of A to A, this is not 
normally done. Rather we tend to assume that concatenation makes sense and don’t 
worry about the physical details. This should not cause any philosophical issues 
since if pressed we can attempt to find a genuine empirical operation that the 
concatenation operation is a placeholder for, as in the welding of metal rods case.  
One possible response is that despite its generality, the Cartesian product 
restriction is too restrictive, as it does seem to result in the issues just outlined, the 
difficulty in finding a suitable empirical operation. On the other hand though, 
dropping the restriction allows too many possible candidates for concatenation, the 
‘holding hands’ case above being an example. I think though that it is better to have 
a stronger conception of concatenation that may need further work to be applied on 
a case-by-case basis, rather than an overly weak conception that allows as 
concatenations operations that don’t seem to even prima facie have the character 




operations to all and only those operations that we want to actually refer to as 
concatenation, without being either too weak or too strong. The search for such a 
restriction would be a fascinating research project in measurement theory, in its 
own right, but whether successful or not the result of such a project would be a 
detail of only passing relevance to the mapping account of applicability.10  
There are examples of operations that satisfy the Cartesian product 
restriction above but which are not usually intended. For instance ‘crazy plumbing’ 
or ‘crazy welding’, whilst resulting in a rod or tube with a definite length, and whilst 
taking members of the Cartesian product of A to A, is clearly not what we usually 
mean by ‘concatenation’. I do not know if crazy plumbing will satisfy the axioms of 
extensive measurement even though it does meet the Cartesian product 
restriction.11 There is however at least one non-standard form of concatenation that 
does satisfy these axioms. This is Ellis’ conception of concatenation based on right-
angled addition, which rather than giving the usual interpretation of concatenation 
as length(a) + length(b) = length (c) – we might call this ‘linear’ concatenation - 
gives rise to instead the interpretation length(a) + length(b) = square root of 
(length(a)2 + length(b)2). Karel Berka explains that “it can be geometrically shown 
that [this] satisfies all axioms put down for length measurement with a linear 
interpretation of the operation of concatenation” (Berka 1983, p.156). The units of 
this orthogonal concatenation are not meters but rather ‘diagonal meters’, where 
the length of a diagonal meter is equal to the square root of the length of a metre.  
In the case of length we see there is a plenitude of potentially eligible 
concatenation operations, some more natural than others. Other attributes seem to 
have only one plausible operation of concatenation: the concatenation of electric 
cells so that current can flow involves circuits being physically connected, positive 
terminal to negative terminal, but it is not required that this connection form a 
straight line. Mass (or a certain range of masses at least) also possesses a clear 
concept of concatenation, at least for the operationalist, namely the placing of two 
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 Assuming that such a project did not show that the very concept of ‘concatenation’ is incoherent! I have 
no more space to go into any more detail on this here however. 
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objects in the same balance pan. For other attributes we may struggle to find an 
operation of concatenation at all, in the case of temperature for example. It is 
temperature differences and not temperatures per se that are measured, that is, 
abDcd iff |φ(a) − φ(b)| > |φ(c) − φ(d)|. Difference measurement axioms systems can 
have additive properties, and indeed one axiom of difference measurement is 
φ(ac) = φ(ab) + φ(bc), but as Krantz explains “…we cannot concatenate ab with cd 
except by mapping ab, cd onto equivalent intervals such that the lower endpoint of 
one interval coincides with the upper end point of the other…” (Krantz et al, p.147). 
But whatever sort of concatenation operations find application, the formal theory of 
measurement can accommodate them.  
Once we arrive at a particular concatenation operation we also have to 
recognize that there is the question of what concatenations are physically possible 
given our conception of that operation. This is because not every concatenation 
capable of being represented by a mathematical structure is physically possible. 
Now it might be thought that there is a potential problem here for speaking of the 
results of some concatenations. The problem runs as follows: although formally 
speaking even a finite set of elements exhibiting some magnitude of the empirical 
attribute in question is closed under the operation of concatenation - because the 
object that results from concatenating two elements of the set of objects with 
extensively measureable attribute P is also an element of the set of objects with P – 
it might be physically impossible to concatenate some elements. Perhaps, as Krantz 
et al point out in their (1971, p.82), there may simply be no adequate space. Or 
amount of substance After all, we can physically concatenate one mass of hydrogen 
with another by say, placing them in some machine that measures mass down to the 
subatomic level, but we cannot iterate this concatenation beyond a certain point 
(say 10×10100 times)12 because regardless of the size of the machine, there will come 
a time when, laws of physics and feasibility aside, this is more concatenation 
operations that there are hydrogen atoms in the universe. Moreover the opposite 
case might occur – we may concatenate two masses of uranium and a nuclear 
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 The operationalist overtones here are not intended to suggest any operationalism in this thesis, the 




reaction occur, with much of the mass being converted into energy. In this case it 
would seem that φ(a ◦ b)  ≠ φ(a) + φ(b) despite the fact that mass is an extensive 
magnitude. There are, as I see it, two responses to this problem.  
The first is to design more restrictive axioms that can be added to the axioms 
of extensive measurement and which are sensitive to the context of measurement, 
restricting the operation of concatenation. This response however would mean 
extra axioms would need to provided for every context of measurement, and depend 
on the attribute in question. Whilst this is acceptable, in the sense it would not 
prevent the representation theorem being proved (assuming the new axioms don’t 
affect the consequences of the older axioms) it is somewhat against the spirit of the 
mapping account. The mapping account qua theory of the applicability of 
mathematics to scientific theories appreciates that the axiom systems for measuring 
particular extensive attributes will likely need to supplemented by additional 
axioms depending on what attribute is being measured, and indeed to deny this 
would make the mapping account insensitive to specific theories, and deprive it of 
much of its explanatory value, but to add axioms even for the specific context of 
measurement as well as the specific attribute would make the mapping account 
extremely unwieldy and unworkable as a general theory of applicability. It is an 
open question whether the authors of Foundations of Measurement intend to go this 
far when they promise the reader that further into that work they will “develop an 
alternative theory that embodies these limitations and provides a more realistic 
account of length and mass measurement” (Krantz et al. p.82), but I think it doubtful.  
The second, and superior, response is to follow Pincock (2004b, p.148) and 
drop the operationalism that seems to be the methodology for many measurement 
theorists, and allow the result of anything that can in principle be concatenated 
without paying attention to spatial or temporal or material considerations. Can the 
mapping-account theorist get away with this? It seems so, since he can say 
counterfactually ‘such and such a concatenation is impossible, but if it were possible, 
the concatenated property would have magnitude x’. This is compatible with the 




which are being measured. Thus although there are actual physical concatenations, 
we can recognize that not all concatenations permitted by the formal theory of 
measurement are physically possible, and there will of course be some sorts of 
concatenations we currently have no reason to think should not be physically 
possible which are impossible, just as in the past there have been concatenations 
that have not been thought impossible but turned out to be so. Let us define the 
concatenation of two gas giants as the merging of those gas giants. Before nuclear 
fusion was understood, there would have been no reason to think that the mass of 
the result of concatenating 75 Jupiters in the above sense would not be the same as 
the sum of the mass of each Jupiter. But at the same time, if we wish, so long as we 
are clear, we can say “if it wasn’t for fusion, the mass of 75 merged Jupiters would be 
x”. This does not affect the mapping account, as whilst accepting that not every 
concatenation will be possible, it would be unreasonable to expect the formal theory 
of measurement to tell us a priori which concatenation operations will or will not 
find application or are or are not possible, and we would not expect a formal theory 
of measurement, or indeed a philosophy of applied mathematics, to give us this 
information. We accept that physically possible concatenations are only a subset of 
formally acceptable concatenations, and we can talk about idealised, or 
counterfactual, cases of concatenation when we need to.  
 
 
2.2.3. What Needs to Be Mapped? Choosing a Domain and a Mapping.  
 
The selection of structure-preserving mapping, or homomorphism, will be guided 
by the empirical structure we are mapping from. Types of homomorphism include 
monomorphism, an injective or ‘into’ mapping, epimorphism, a surjective, or ‘onto’, 
mapping, and isomorphism, a bijective, or 1:1 mapping (note this does not exhaust 
the category of homomorphisms but is sufficient for our discussion). In cases where 
the mapping is an isomorphism the inverse of the isomorphism will easily take us 
from the mathematical structure back to the empirical structure, but if the mapping 




mathematical, and one from the mathematical back to the empirical, will be 
required, because of the structural differences between the empirical and 
mathematical structures. For instance, suppose we want to map the masses of some 
chemical compounds into the real numbers. Given that some compounds have the 
same mass, in this instance more than one compound will be mapped to a real 
number, a many-one mapping, or epimorphism. This mapping that would be 
required to handle this would be complicated and the situation messy. Fortunately 
there is a natural way to avoid this, using equivalence classes. This method is to 
prove an isomorphism between a disjoint set A of equivalence classes of the 
empirical objects forming domain A, and the real numbers.  
An equivalence class is a set of objects which are related by an equivalence 
relation, where an equivalence relation is any relation that is reflexive (aRa), 
symmetric (if aRb then bRa) and transitive (if aRb and bRc then aRc). An example of 
such a relation is ‘being the same length’, or ‘having the same mass’. Using 
equivalence classes means we avoid the many-one complexity of there being more 
than one compound a with the same mass, for instance, by mapping the equivalence 
class a of objects that share (as far as experiment can determine) the same mass, to 
a real number. Thus there will only be one real number associated with each actual 
mass. Moreover there will be no need for a new mapping every time a compound is 
added to one of the classes since sets and classes are determined only by their 
members and repetitions in membership don’t lead to set-theoretic differences. 
However unless we hold the view that a unique equivalence class containing 
actual compounds corresponds to every real number (a highly dubious empirical 
claim) this will still only give us a partial isomorphism, since although each class will 
correspond to some unique real number, some real numbers will not correspond to 
any class of actual objects sharing the mass, since there may be no such objects 
existing in the universe in order to form such a class.13 One possible issue here is 
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 The Bueno and Colyvan paper gives a clear account of partial isomorphism in terms of partial relations 
which I will paraphrase here. First we define a partial relation R – this is relation which is not defined for 
all members of the domain D. Formally R is an ordered triple of disjoint sets R1 R2 R3 which together make 
up the domain. R1 consists of the n-tuples elements of the domain satisfying R, R2 consists of the n-tuples 




that there will be a different mapping coming into and out of existence every time a 
compound with a new unique mass, and a fortiori a new equivalence class, is added 
to the empirical domain. For every a time a compound with a new mass came into 
existence it would engender a new equivalence class that had not been mapped 
previously to a real number, and every time the only compound with a particular 
mass went out of existence, the equivalence class whose only member it was would 
be destroyed, since the existence of an equivalence class depends on the existence of 
its members.  
This might be thought to pose the problem that a new partial mapping will 
need to be proved every time the domain of equivalence classes changes, and so the 
mapping account theorist would, in order to explain applicability, need to prove a 
representation theorem for each case, something that could be avoided if there was 
a full isomorphism. This is however untrue, since it is provable that an empirical 
structure satisfies the axioms of extensive measurement iff there is some 
representation theorem showing the existence of a structure-preserving mapping 
from that structure to the real numbers (Krantz et al p.74 – Theorem 1). Thus 
regardless of the changes to the empirical domain, so long as the changes to the 
domain don’t affect whether or not the structure satisfies the axioms of extensive 
measurement there will still exist such a mapping, without it having to be manually 
reproven. The next subsection (2.2.4) discusses the axioms of extensive 
measurement in more detail. If the mapping account theorist is happy to accept 
partial isomorphisms that is absolutely fine. If he does not like the idea of partial 
mappings, perhaps for some ideological reason, and wants a full isomorphism, then 
there is another approach, at the cost of introducing possibilia, which the mapping 
account theorist may have independent reasons for wishing to avoid.  
                                                                                                                                                 
not.  A partial structure is an ordered pair of a domain D and a partial relation. A partial isomorphism is a 
function φ from one partial structure ‹D,R› to another ‹D’,R’› such that (1) φ is bijective and (2) for all 
members x and y of D, xR1y iff φ(x)R’1φ(y) and xR2y iff φ(x)R’2φ(y). If R3 is empty we have a standard 
isomorphism, if it nonempty then this means some components of D that are in R3 are not actually mapped 
by φ. (Bueno and Colyvan 2011, pp. 358-359). Put simply, a partial isomorphism is an isomorphism where 
not all the elements of a domain are mapped into another domain. If we define the domain D as all possible 
values of some empirical attribute then we can stipulate that R3 contains those values that have not been 
actualised – so only the values that have resulted from some concrete measuring act, for example, are 




We can get a full isomorphism in the chemical compound/mass case if we 
allow equivalence classes of not just actual, but actual and logically possible, 
compounds. So we want a mapping between equivalence classes of actual and 
possible compounds with the same mass, and the real numbers. Assuming that mass 
is a property that is continuous like the reals, there will be an uncountable amount 
of such equivalence classes, and thus it will be possible to prove a full isomorphism 
between them.14 In the rest of this chapter however nothing much rides on whether 
the partial isomorphism approach, or full isomorphism plus modal apparatus 
approach, is selected, apart from where indicated, and my language will be neutral.  
Since both approaches utilise equivalence classes there is one issue with 
these classes that I want to address, namely the issue  of how you concatenate a 
class. It sounds artificial to say classes can be concatenated. But this is easily got 
around – Krantz et al explain that we can interpret the concatenation a o b  of two 
equivalence classes a and b, as being equivalence class c formed by the 
concatenation a ◦ b of an object a and an object b from each class. (Ibid. p.87). We 
are thus really talking about the concatenation of empirical objects rather than the 
concatenation of classes, though it is convenient to refer to the concatenation of 
classes nevertheless. The concatenation of an actual compound a in a with another 
actual compound b in b will result in an object c that will then become a member of 
a different equivalence class, c. This may present a problem for the full isomorphism 
+ possibilia theorist however since we cannot talk about the concatenation of an 
actual compound and a possible compound (or indeed any possible object) as 
concatenation is intended, at least in principle, as an actual empirical operation. It 
thus only makes sense to say that actual objects and not possible objects can be 
concatenated, though we can speak counterfactually about what the resulting value 
of some attribute of two possible objects would be if they were in fact actual and 
concatenated. This restriction is easily observed and so causes no difficulties.   
 
                                                 
14 If it turns out there is some such thing as the smallest possible mass, or equivalently, smallest 





2.2.4. Selecting the Axioms for Extensive Measurement.  
 
So we know what the structures involved in the mapping will be, and what sort of 
mapping we want. Now we need to know what axioms the empirical structure needs 
to satisfy in order that the representation theorem for extensive measurement can 
be proven, that is, that 〈A, ÷, o〉 can be represented by 〈R, >, +〉, or in other words 
that an isomorphism function φ taking members of A to members of R exists. The 
Representation Theorem for Extensive Measurement is as follows: 
 
Representation Theorem for Extensive Measurement  
 
There is a real-valued function φ  on A from the empirical relational structure     
〈A, ÷, o〉 to the numerical structure 〈R, >, +〉 such that  
(i) for all a, b ∈ A, a ÷ b iff φ(a) > φ(b), and  
(ii) for all a, b ∈ A, φ(a o b)  = φ(a) + φ(b). 
 
if and only if  
 
〈A, ÷, o〉 is an extensive structure (That is, if and only if 〈A, ÷, o〉  satisfies the 
axioms of extensive measurement).  
 
 
This real-valued function is the mapping function in question. If we want to get a 
representation theorem for e.g. the mass of chemical compounds we can stipulate 
that A is the set of equivalence classes a, b of chemical compounds a, b of A the set of 
chemical compounds, and the equivalence relation on the members of the classes is 
‘having the same mass’, i.e. ‘a ~m b’ ; ÷ is the comparison relation ‘x has a greater 
mass than y’ between equivalence classes (which depends on the empirical 
comparison relation ÷ between their members a and b); and o is the concatenation 
of the equivalence classes) standing for the concatenation ◦ of a and b, that is, the 




The proof proceeds by deriving the existence of such a function from the 
axioms for extensive measurement which are given below, and by deriving the 
axioms of extensive measurement from the existence of such a function. The proof is 
generally given by reducing the above theorem to its analogue for strictly ordered 
groups, that is, Holder’s Theorem. (Krantz et al 1971, p.75).  I do not repeat this 
proof here, as it has been discussed (ad nauseam) in the literature, and so merely 
adds needless technicality to this thesis. However if the reader is in any doubt as to 
the sufficiency of the axioms of extensive measurement to prove the existence of the 
function, I refer them to Krantz et al, p.81. As Fred Roberts explains, “a direct proof 
of the sufficiency of the conditions can be found in Krantz et al. [1971, Theorem 3.1]” 
(Roberts 1979, p.128). Other versions of the proof can be located in Roberts and 
Luce (1968) and Holman (1969). The interested reader may also consult Krantz et 
al 1971, pp.15-16 for the corresponding proof for the representation theorem for 
ordinal measurement. I shall look now at whether the axioms are necessary, since 
this relates to the interesting issue of which axioms the empirical structure needs to 
satisfy if it is to both be extensively measured and not be made subject to axioms 
stronger than those actually required.  
Sets of axioms that are sufficient for extensive measurement have been 
known for a very long time, the first axiom set being given by the mathematician 
Otto Holder in 1901 for mass measurement, based on even earlier work by 
Hermann von Helmholtz. Holder provided four axioms for extensive measurement 
(although the first is really three axioms in one):15 
 
(1h) 〈A, ◦〉 is a group (i.e. it is associative, with an identity element and inverse) 
(2h) 〈A, ÷〉 is a strict simple order 
(3h) Monotonicity: (∀a)(∀b)((a ÷ b) iff (∀c)(((a ◦ c) ÷ (b ◦ c)) iff ((c ◦ a) ÷ (c ◦ b)))) 
(4h) Archimedean Axiom: For all a, b in A, if a ÷ e where e is the identity for 〈A, ◦〉, 
then there is (∃n)((n ∈ Z+) & (na ÷ b)). 
 
                                                 




It is well known in the literature (Roberts 1979, p.127) that although Holder’s 
axioms were  sufficient for proving the representation theorem for the extensive 
measurement of mass, but they were not all necessary, indeed three of them can be 
weakened considerably and extensive measurement still hold. For instance, it is not 
necessary that 〈A, ◦〉 is a group, or even that ◦ be associative, in fact it need only be 
weakly associative. Furthermore the order condition does not need to be as strong 
as a strict simple order, a weak order (a transitive and connected order) will 
suffice.16 Finally, Holder’s formulation of the Archimedean axiom must be altered 
since it relies on the assumption that there is an identity element, i.e. that 〈A, ◦〉 is a 
group, and we have already said that is not a necessary assumption. Roberts, and 
Hand (2004, p.35), provide the following alternative axiom set, which is both 
necessary and sufficient for extensive measurement:17  
 
1. Concatenation is weakly associative: (∀a)(∀b)(∀c)((a ◦ (b ◦ c)) ~ ((a ◦ b) ◦ c)) 
2. 〈A, ÷〉 is a weak order: (empirical relation ÷ is transitive and connected)  
3. Monotonicity: (∀a)(∀b)((a ÷ b) iff (∀c)(((a ◦ c) ÷ (b ◦ c)) iff ((c ◦ a) ÷ (c ◦ b)))) 
4. Archimedean axiom: (∀a,∀b,∀c,∀d)((a ÷ b) ⊃(∃n)((n ∈ Z+) & (na ◦ c) ÷ (nb ◦ d)))  
 
I shall begin with a consideration of axiom 4. We know that some sort of 
Archimedean axiom is required, since it is this axiom that says that we can always 
compare magnitudes of attributes of empirical objects, and magnitudes of attributes 
of concatenations of empirical objects, which is something we definitely want. The 
fact the positive real numbers satisfy a version of the Archimedean axiom is what 
makes them so useful for comparing the magnitudes of the attributes that they 
represent, as well as merely representing them. We know that for any positive real 
number x which is less than a real number y, x can be made greater than y by 
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 This is explored in more detail in three pages time.  
17 This will deliver an isomorphism only if no a and b are mapped to the same real number. To prove 
our representation theorem and get an isomorphism we would replace A, a , b and c with the set and 
equivalence classes A, a, b, c, and discuss the comparison and concatenation of such classes rather 
than the empirical objects. However I have already explained how these equivalence classes can be 
interpreted as having extensive properties, arising directly from the empirical properties of their 




multiplying it n times, where n is a positive integer, that is, that (∀x, ∀y)((( x, y ∈ R+) 
& (y > x)) ⊃ (∃n)((n ∈ Z+) & (nx > y))).  This is just part of what it is to be a positive 
real number, and means that we can compare all positive real numbers. The 
question is, does the empirical structure which the positive reals are representing 
also have Archimedean properties, i.e. satisfy some empirical version of the 
Archimedean axiom? The first thing is to ascertain what na means if a is some 
empirical attribute of a given magnitude. This is easy to specify, inductively, given 
concatenation:  
 
1a = a  
2a = 1a ◦ a 
, … ,  
(n+1)a = na ◦ a 
 
And we know, since concatenation is (weakly associative) that ((a ◦ a) ◦ a) is the 
same as (a ◦ (a ◦ a)), i.e. that we can drop the brackets and just say a ◦ a ◦ a. In 
practice, when measuring an attribute we choose one exemplar a of that attribute, 
such as the standard metre in Paris, to be the standard unit of that attribute. This 
choice is fairly arbitrary but will in practice be guided by considerations of ease of 
use, ability to convey what is meant by the unit, and so on. This is why in the early 
history of measurement, before the development of sophisticated measuring devices, 
many units were based on human body magnitudes (feet, hand-spans etc). After the 
unit is chosen, questions such as how long an object is will usually be answered (in 
the natural sciences at least, though not in everyday usage) by saying how many 
units it is, rather than how it relates to other (perhaps nearby) empirical objects 
with the attribute (and trivially, which are not copies of the exemplar in question).  
Given that we can give an inductive definition of na using concatenation, is 
that enough to say that an empirical structure with concatenation has the 
Archimedean property? It will do if the empirical domain A is sufficiently rich, as it 
would be if we adopted the possible equivalence classes approach. It we go down 




al 1971 for more on this topic, I have no space to pursue it here. The inductive 
definition of na does not however tell us the specific form the Archimedean axiom 
describing the Archimedean property will need to have. We know that Holder’s 
version of the axiom was sufficient, but not necessary, since there was no need to 
assume that 〈A, ◦〉 was a group. This leaves open the possibility that Holder’s axiom, 
minus the part of it that discusses groups, is the necessary axiom, i.e.   
(∀a,∀b)(∃n)(na ÷ b). However, the substitution of this axiom yields an axiom set that is 
necessary but not sufficient for extensive measurement, the converse of the Holder case, 
since the axiom set is too weak to yield all and only extensive structures. In order for the 
axiom set to be necessary and sufficient the Archimedean axiom needs to be strengthened. 
The stronger form is (∀a,∀b,∀c,∀d)((a ÷ b) ⊃ (∃n)((n ∈ Z+) & (na ◦ c) ÷ (nb ◦ d))). 
Mathematicians are very concerned with which axioms are essential for proving 
which theorems for there are a myriad of sufficient axioms systems but only one 
axiom system which is necessary and sufficient for proving a given theorem or set of 
theorems, the theorem in this instance being the representation theorem for 
extensive measurement. Roberts explains why this stronger formulation of the 
axiom is necessary:  
 
To see that Axiom [4] is indeed an Archimedean axiom (that is, that it reflects the 
Archimedean properties of the reals) and that it is necessary, let us observe that (a ÷ b) 
implies φ(a) > φ(b), so φ(a) − φ(b) > 0. Thus, by the Archimedean property for the 
reals, there is a positive integer n such that n[φ(a) − φ(b)] > φ(d) − φ(c), that is        
nφ(a) + φ(c) > nφ(b) + φ(d).18 From this, since φ is additive, it follows that φ(na ◦ c) > 
φ(nb ◦ d), or [by the fact that for ordinal measurement that for all a, b ∈ A, a ÷ b iff 
φ(a) > φ(b)] (na ◦ c) ÷  (nb ◦ d). (Roberts 1979, p.128, I have replaced Roberts’ 
symbols with those used in this thesis for clarity).  
 
Thus the stronger formulation of the axiom, as well as conveying that all physical 
magnitudes of an extensive attribute are comparable, also explicitly accommodates 
a fact that follows from the Archimedean property of the reals, namely that 
n[φ(a) − φ(b)] > φ(d) − φ(c), which the intuitive formulation did not. I trust this settles 
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the issue of why the unusual form of the Archimedean axiom is necessary in the 
axiom system for extensive measurement.  
Hitherto I have neglected to discuss the first three axioms and I shall now 
remedy this. As regards axiom 1, the weak order axiom, evidently some sort of order 
constraint must be satisfied if the structure is to be measured, since order is a 
precondition of measurement. But why a weak order rather than another sort of 
order such a strict simple order? Because a weak order is sufficient for ordinal 
measurement, and extensive measurement is really ordinal measurement plus 
additivity. Since considerations about concatenation have no bearing on the order 
generated by ÷ there is no reason to think that anything stronger than a weak order 
is required. I realise I have so far said nothing to explain what a weak or simple 
order is, so perhaps a small digression is required.  
There are many ways in which the elements of an empirical structure can be 
ordered. Two of the orderings most commonly found in measurement theory are 
weak orders and simple orders. Weak orders are those where the ordering relation 
R is transitive19 and connected20, for example a collection of rods of any length all 
ordered under the ‘equal-to or longer-than relation’ or a collection of rods of 
different sizes ordered under the ‘longer-than’ relation to each other.21 It is evident 
that the ‘equal-to or longer-than’ relation is transitive, and that any rod is equal-to 
or longer-than itself insofar as it is equal to itself, that is, the relation is also reflexive. 
Weak orders are the basis for other types of stronger order, e.g. the simple order 
(also called a total order) is a weak order that is also asymmetric (the ordering 
relation R is transitive, asymmetric22 and connected), an example of which is the 
second case involving rods above, which clearly preserves the asymmetry 
requirement of the simple order, since necessarily if a is longer than b then b is not 
longer than a. We thus see that these order concepts really are quite easy to grasp 
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20 Connectedness: R is connected iff for all a, b, aRb or bRa  
21 In this example if the rods were of the same length connectedness would be violated since there 
would at least two rods not standing in the ‘longer-than relation’.  





and that examples of them are very easy to find, since any attribute that can be 
extensively measured could be substituted for length in the examples above.  
 Next we turn to the weak associativity axiom and the monotonicity axiom for 
concatenation. I shall consider these together as both are essential for guaranteeing 
the additivity property of concatenation, since two crucial properties of addition are 
that it is associative and monotonic. It is by no means uncontentious that 
concatenation is associative however, since the associativity of additions of real 
numbers involves identity whereas all we can say about concatenations of empirical 
objects is that they have the same degree of attribute as some other concatenation 
up to our ability to discriminate this sameness. Thus we cannot say    
(∀a)(∀b)(∀c)((a ◦ (b ◦ c)) = ((a ◦ b) ◦ c)) but only (∀a)(∀b)(∀c)((a ◦ (b ◦ c)) ~ ((a ◦ b) ◦ c)). 
This latter is weak associativity, but it still gets the job done, as we are only 
concerned about the additivity of concatenation insofar as we are able to 
discriminate it, or insofar as the degree to we need to discriminate it is concerned. 
Monotonicity of concatenation is straightforward however, since it is evident that if 
a is, say, equal to or longer than b, then concatenating an object c first to a and then 
to b will entail that (a ◦ c) ÷ (b ◦ c)), since the act of concatenation does not change 
the length of rod a or b, and the length of rods a, b and c are (we assume) constant. 
Moreover it is evident that the concatenation of length is commutative, that a rod a 
concatenated with a rod b has the same length as a rod b concatenated with a rod a, 
and so ((a ◦ c) ÷ (b ◦ c)) iff ((c ◦ a) ÷ (c ◦ b)). Thus monotonicity of concatenation 
holds.  
I submit then, that the axiom system 1-4 is necessary and sufficient for the 
extensive measurement of extensive attributes e.g. the lengths of rods, the 
resistances of resistors in series or the masses of chemical compounds. We have 
seen how a standard unit of an attribute may be easily defined, and how different 




standard unit. In essence then, we have seen how mathematics enables us to 
measure attributes, at least for the case of extensive measurement.23  
 
 
2.2.5. Concluding the Mapping Account.  
 
I have given only one example of measurement in any detail, an example of 
extensive measurement. Measurement theory is very complex, and deals with all 
sorts of other structures and procedures including not only the aforementioned 
difference measurement, but also probability representations and the like, and 
involves proving representation theorems and finding necessary and sufficient sets 
of axioms for empirical structures containing objects with attributes much less 
straightforward than extensive attributes, such as the attributes measured by the 
social sciences. To go into such detail here is beyond my expertise, though more 
importantly surplus to the gist of the philosophical theory at issue, the mapping 
account of applicability. Naturally it is very important that measurement theory be 
developed to cover all the different sorts of applications of measurement that there 
are, but I believe we can leave that in the capable hands of the mathematicians. As 
the three volumes of Foundations of Measurement and the extensive literature show, 
much work has already been done.   
I do want briefly to address one final issue: we have shown that 
mathematical structures can represent empirical structures, and that operations on 
mathematical structures can model operations on empirical structures, but it might 
be wondered ‘how do we know that the results we get at the mathematical level can 
be translated back into accurate results at the physical level?’. This is essential to the 
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 The claim may be made that there are many other sorts of things that are measurable, e.g. twisting  roads 
and snakes. But these are measured indirectly and reduce down to simpler or more fundamental forms of 
measurement. To measure a snake or a wheel on a meter-wheel we may take a piece of string, bend it round 
the shape, mark where it meets the snake’s tail or where the end of the string meets the beginning of the 
wheel, and the extensively measure the string. In the twisting road case the measurer will count clicks. The 
first click is one meter, the second the concatenation of the first metre with a second metre, and so on, as 
characterised inductively above. So these seeming difficulties do reduce to extensive measurement. This is 
possible because the radius of the wheel is sufficiently invariant, so continued use, up to a point, will not 




mapping account of applicability, since we want to say not just that mathematical 
structures can measure empirical structures, but that operations on mathematical 
structures can tell us things about empirical structures that we would not have 
known (or at least that it would have been less easy to have known – see chapters 
three and four) without the mathematics.  
What I specifically want to consider here is that given that we know that 
mathematical structures can represent empirical structures in such a way that we 
can use mathematical structures to measure the empirical structures, how do we 
know that our measurements will be accurate? For instance we know from the 
representation theorem for extensive measurement that if rod a is measured as φ(a) 
and rod b is measured as φ(b) then the measure φ(a ◦ b) of the concatenation of a 
and b will be φ(a) + φ(b). But how do we know this is actually the length of the 
concatenation, without measuring the concatenation directly? And even if the 
measurement does agree with the data, we want to know with certainty that this 
result will hold even for cases which we do not check. If we could not guarantee this, 
then measurement theory (and a fortiori the mapping account) would be little more 
than an intellectual exercise with little practical value. Fortunately this is very easy 
to explain. I have suggested we use equivalence classes of bearers of extensive 
attributes, which will ensure the mapping from the set of such classes to [some 
interval] of the set of positive real numbers will be an (at least partial) isomorphism. 
As such to get from the mathematical back to the empirical we need only take the 
inverse of the isomorphism, we don’t need to prove the existence of any other 
mappings. Let me illustrate this: 
 
We have rods a and b.  
a and b are members of the equivalence classes a and b respectively.  
Assuming part (i) of our representation theorem is proved, we have a 
homomorphism φ taking a to φ(a) and b to φ(b)  
We concatenate  a and b, giving a ◦ b, that is, a o b. 




By part (ii) of the representation theorem, this is φ(a) + φ(b). Let us call the number 
that is the result of the addition φ(c). 
Equivalence class c contains the object c resulting from the concatenation of  a ◦ b.  
But is φ(c) the length of c?  
The answer is that it has to be, since the inverse of φ is an isomorphism φ-1 from φ(c)  
to  c, that is, a o b, and since c is a member of equivalence class c, φ(c) will be φ(c) , 
the length of c.  
 
I trust this settles the issue. We have thus seen how it is that measurement theory 
explains, among other things, what properties an empirical structure has to possess 
in order to be represented accurately, and measured, by a mathematical structure. 
Since the mapping account is concerned with explaining applicability in terms of 
mathematical representations of empirical structures, we see that measurement 
theory (though a branch of mathematics in its own right) can be viewed as a proper 
part of the mapping account. It is an essential part of the mapping account as it 
shows which representations are possible and how, and also shows how one class of 
mathematical descriptions of empirical phenomena works, viz. measurements. The 
mapping account can explain more than just how mathematics can be used in the 
measurement of magnitudes of empirical attributes however, as I shall shortly show 
in section 2.3, where I consider how mathematical structures can also represent 




2.3 Mathematics in Natural Science 
 
In this section I look at whether the mapping account’s claim that the role of 
mathematics in science is a representational one, that mathematics is applicable to 
natural science because mathematical objects and operations can represent 
magnitudes of empirical attributes and their relations, suffices to show how 




The role of natural scientists is to measure empirical phenomena and to discover 
laws concerning the relations of these phenomena. One application of such laws is 
the making of predictions, though these are more important in the applied than the 
theoretical sciences (engineering, astronomy and the like). Predictions do have a 
very important role in theoretical science though, as when a prediction is made, if it 
is borne out, the best explanation of this fact may be that the law is correct. At least, 
correct predictions serve to confirm the truth of laws, even though no empirical law 
can receive total verification.  
There may be more to natural science than the measuring of attributes and 
the discovery of laws, but these are very central to the scientific enterprise, and it 
would be difficult for anyone to deny this, even granting Cicero’s quip that 
philosophers occasionally like to say silly things. Fortunately analytical philosophy 
of science is on somewhat firmer grounds than peripateticism. In this section I shall 
indulge a brief digression on the subject of predictions, and then look at the 
measurement of attributes and what are called initial conditions (2.3.1). I will then 
get down to the business of the role of mathematics in the description of empirical 
laws (2.3.2), which will be fleshed out by a speculative section (2.3.3) that will 
illustrate the role of mathematics in Newton’s law of universal gravitation. I 
conclude that the role of mathematics in natural science is transparent, and that no 
use of mathematics has been uncovered in this chapter that the mapping account is 
not fully able to deal with. The subject of whether there are examples of applied 
mathematics to which the mapping account does not do justice is answered in the 
negative in chapter five. But first a quick discussion about prediction, and the 
clarification of some terminology.  
Natural laws not only describe how various empirical attributes are related, 
but once they are given a mathematical form in which such attributes’ magnitudes 
are represented by mathematical objects they tell us very precisely what the 
magnitude of an attribute will be if the magnitudes of certain other attributes are 
known and related in the way the laws says. The magnitudes of these prior 
attributes are called the initial conditions, and the magnitude that the law tells us a 




are what we think, or suppose, they are, is the prediction that the law enables us to 
make. I just said that much concern with predictions involves the applied natural 
sciences.24 Part of the reason such sciences exist is to make accurate empirical 
predictions, to ensure the safety of diverse artefacts, and the success of various 
endeavours. For instance, if we couldn’t predict how much fuel an airplane needs to 
reach its destination it may never make it, and if we couldn’t predict the weather we 
wouldn’t know whether to take an umbrella or a sunhat on a given day.  
These all are judgements arising from the application of science, the making 
of predictions. And as I mentioned briefly above, predictions are also useful for 
theoretical science in their own right – they are one way that scientists can test 
whether the initial conditions and the laws they are using are complete or correct, 
by comparing what they allow them to predict with what actually happens. If a 
scientist knows with a significant degree of certainty that the initial conditions are 
accurately determined but the prediction does not in fact obtain then he knows that 
there must be some issue with his putative law or other laws upon which it depends 
If his lawlike statement, his putative law, might be wrong, that what he thought was 
a law may not in fact be a law, or at least not the whole story about a law. But before 
laws can be accurately described, or indeed in many cases even approximately 
guessed, a scientist needs decent information about the magnitudes of the empirical 
attributes that a law relates, the initial conditions. The mapping account of 
applicability is vital to explaining how mathematics is useful in this regard. This is 





                                                 
24 Note there is no such thing as a totally pure science – the more sophisticated the measurements  
needed for the theoretical science to be verified, the more advanced the technology will need to be, 
and this technology will of course rely on applied science. But by this distinction I really mean to 
separate the purposes of these sciences, one the business of measuring attributes, discovering laws, 
and making predictions, the other the business of applying these laws and making further 




2.3.1 Initial Conditions, Empirical Units and Fundamental and Derived 
Attributes.  
 
The identification and description of empirical attributes is necessarily the 
beginning of science, since attributes are what are related by scientific laws, the 
discovery of which is the business of science, and the more exact the law the more 
important it is to be clear about what the magnitude of a given attribute is. Many 
experiments have one of two aims, to enable the measurement of some empirical 
attribute, or to permit a natural law to be observed ‘in action’. In order for the 
experiment to proceed at all, the magnitudes of the relevant empirical attributes 
involved in the experiment must be known. There is no need to rehash here how 
and why mathematical structures can represent magnitudes of empirical attributes, 
that is, how and why measurement is possible, for this was shown in some detail in 
the preceding section, 2.2. The example there considered was that of the 
measurement of an extensive attribute, mass, and illustrated the need for a unit of 
measurement and an operation of concatenation, if anything more useful than 
ordinal measurement is to be possible. The unit of measurement of some attribute is 
what the magnitude of that attribute is described in terms of.  Historically a great 
variety of units of attributes have been used in science, with different units being 
known by multiple names, and the same attribute being measured in terms of 
different units. Naturally this would be quite confusing, and in order to facilitate the 
sharing of results and scientific cooperation it is evident that some unified system of 
units would be required. Just such a system was adopted by the scientific 
community in 1960, the système international d’unités.  
Over one hundred units are recognised in the SI system, with each unit 
denoting a (fundamental or derived) attribute. All the attributes (and a fortiori their 
units) were defined in terms of ‘fundamental’ attributes (and the units of those 
fundamental attributes). Fundamental attributes are those which are not described 
in terms of other attributes. The SI system recognised seven attributes as 
fundamental: charge, temperature, length, time, amount of substance, angle, and 




(s), mole (mol), radian (rad) and kilogram (kg). Although “…it is surely wrong to 
think that there is only one fundamental system of properties adequate to lead to 
numerical measurement” (Krantz et al 1971 p.1), and the choice of unit is a semi-
arbitrary25  matter of convention, some attributes need to be recognized as 
fundamental in order to prevent circularity, the defining of all attributes in terms of 
each other. Most attributes are defined in terms of relations of other attributes and 
are therefore not fundamental, but eventually this definition will bottom out at the 
level of the fundamental attributes. For instance force is defined in terms of mass (a 
fundamental attribute) and acceleration (itself a derived attribute of the 
fundamental attributes of length and time). So we see that force can be defined in 
terms of a relation of mass, length and time, and the unit of force is therefore defined 
in terms of the units of mass, length and time: kgms-2, known for convenience as a 
Newton.  
Whatever the level of complexity of an attribute, that is, to whatever degree it 
is a derived attribute, it will be the case that if the attribute is derived it is defined in 
terms of some empirical relation of other attributes, which will be represented by a 
mathematical relation or operation the relata of which, mathematical objects, 
represent the magnitudes of various attributes. So for instance the attribute of force 
is a derived attribute given by  F = ma. This says that force is the product of mass 
and acceleration. Once mass and acceleration have been measured (in the case of 
acceleration this will often depend on prior extensive measurements of length and 
time, mass is of course extensively measurable), the product of the numbers that are 
the results of measurement represents the magnitude of the attribute of force. Note 
that product here represents an empirical relationship, it is not itself an empirical 
relationship. The empirical relationship is, to use Karel Berka’s terminology (Berka 
1983 p.59), a functional one, a relationship of ‘empirical proportionality’ if you will. 
The relationship in question is that between the component attributes of a 
derived attribute, and is the relationship of (assuming for the sake of the example 
that the derived magnitude is derived from only two components) one of the 
                                                 
25 In principle completely arbitrary, but in practice units chosen reflect the needs and faculties of 




component attributes needing to be halved if the other doubles in magnitude, if the 
magnitude of the derived attribute is to remain the same. As such F = ma as stated 
really means φ(F) = φ(m)φ(a), and if we want to convey a purely empirical 
relationship by F = ma we would be better to say F =e mRa where R means ‘m is 
empirically proportional to a’. Since F =e mRa iff φ(F) = φ(m)φ(a), product, or 
multiplication, can represent this empirical relationship of (empirical) 
proportionality.  
Of course, product also occurs in impure products of empirical magnitudes 
and numbers. In this instance however what is really going on is repeated addition 
of some unit, or fraction of that unit, and so the use of multiplication is a shorthand 
for iterated concatenation of units and fractions of units, rather than generally 
representative of a distinct relation: to say ‘the length of a is three times the length 
of b’ is simply to say that if b were concatenated to copies of itself two times (in the 
sense that there is a copy b’ of b, another copy b’’ of b, the copies are not numerically 
identical, and the copies are concatenated with each other) and a and b ◦ b’ ◦ b’’ were 
placed parallel to each other their ends would coincide. Likewise for any rational 
magnitudes of attributes, e.g. ‘a is 1.5 times the length of b’ means that b 
concatenated with half a copy of b will be as long as a. Things like halves (and 
indeed any fraction) of units can be defined using congruence: e.g. a unit x is half of y 
when if an y is divided into two y’ and y’’, x is congruent to both y’ and y’’.  And so on 
for more complicated rational fractions of empirical magnitudes and units of them 
e.g. a mass is 1.567 kg if it has the same mass as (1 kg) ◦ (0.5 kg) ◦ (0.06 kg) ◦ (0.007 
kg). However irrational magnitudes cannot be so treated, since irrational numbers 
have infinite non-recurring decimal expansions. Kyburg points out that “[i]rrational 
magnitudes present a problem in general. They are clearly included among the 
values that are talked about in the equations of physics, yet no measurement can 
yield an irrational value” (Kyburg 1997, p.389). I acknowledge this problem here, 
but this thesis is not the place to discuss the issue, which as a general problem in the 
philosophy of science does not pose a particular problem for the mapping account of 




As well as products, ratios are also used to represent empirical relationships, 
and are described as quotient relationships. The relation here is similar to product, 
but crucially different. Take for instance the derived attribute of electrical resistance 
of a circuit, defined in terms of a relation of the voltage across a circuit to the 
current flowing through that circuit. The empirical relationship is one, you might 
say, of ‘empirical ratio’ or ‘empirical inverse proportion’. It is that for resistance to 
remain the same if the voltage or current doubles then the other magnitude must 
double as well, and if the voltage or current halves then the other magnitude must 
also halve. Again note that the ratio represents an empirical relationship, it is not an 
empirical relationship, although common usage might disguise this fact: we are used 
to saying that resistance is the ratio of voltage to current, where properly speaking 
we should say that the number representing resistance is the ratio of the number 
representing voltage to the number representing current, if numerical ratio is what 
is meant.  
Thus we see (from 2.2.) how useful mathematics is in representing 
fundamental empirical attributes, assuming a robust unit of measurement is 
provided, and we also see from this subsection the importance of mathematics in 
representing derived empirical attributes, depending on relations between 
fundamental attributes. In neither case is there any problem for the mapping 
account. So long as there is a representation theorem showing that, subject to 
empirical structures satisfying certain empirical axioms there is a structure-
preserving mapping from the ordered empirical domain plus some empirical 
relation to a domain of mathematical objects and an operation on them, such as 
addition, subtraction, multiplication or division and so on, it is clear that the role of 
mathematics here need only be representational and that the mapping account is 
sufficient to explain this. We will soon see that this sufficiency extends, fairly 








2.3.2 Derived Attributes and Natural Laws. 
 
This business about derived attributes is all very well, the reader may think, but 
what of scientific, or natural, laws, the real subject matter of science? It may seem 
initially surprising, but once we have an account of magnitudes of derived attributes, 
there is very little remaining to be done in the case of laws. For ‘laws’, as we shall 
see, are just how we refer to more complicated definitions of derived magnitudes. 
Once we have the concept of a derived attribute of some object as a functional 
relationship between other attributes of that object, we can generalise to a concept 
of a derived attribute of multiple objects as a functional relationship between the 
other attributes of multiple objects. This is not to deny that a sort of distinction is 
often made between derived attributes and laws, but it is to deny that such a 
distinction is well-grounded.  
So what is the perceived, though actually non-obtaining, difference between 
calculating the magnitude of a derived attribute, and making a prediction using a 
law? Or, in other words, what is the difference between a definition of a derived 
attribute and a law, since both have the form a = b R c (or some more complex form)? 
The answer is that definitions of derived attributes usually concern attributes of the 
same object (e.g. the force acting on an object a is a relation between the mass of a 
and the acceleration of a) but laws, by contrast, relate attributes of different objects. 
The law of universal gravitation for example relates two massive objects a and b. 
The attributes that are related are the mass of a, the mass of b, the length (the 
distance) between a and b, and G, the universal gravitational constant. The relation 
in question is ‘gravitational attraction’, which is a derived attribute defined as a 
relation between attributes of diverse objects, not just attributes of the same object.  
So we see that the distinction between derived attribute and law is not really 
a difference in kind but is rather a purely psychological distinction and moreover 
one that may be fluid over time. Thus there is no fundamental difference between 
the  application of a law to yield the prediction of a magnitude and the calculation of 
the magnitude of a derived attribute. Furthermore, if it is accepted that the primary 




a philosopher may claim that the definitions of derived attributes, insofar as they 
state relationships between attributes of the same object are as much laws as those 
statements we consider to be laws which also state relations between attributes, 
albeit of multiple objects. This point must be granted, but since the use of the term 
‘law’ for a certain class of functional relationships is widespread in the literature, I 
shall retain it in what follows.  
 One important role of mathematics in relation to science is that because 
mathematics enables us to state the magnitudes of empirical attributes accurately 
and concisely it gives a very clear indication of the magnitudes of the relata of 
empirical relationships generally and laws in particular, making it much easier for a 
scientist to perceive and test putative laws than would be the case without clear 
measurement of such magnitudes, a key step in the discovery of a law. In many 
cases, certainly those examples from before the development of modern 
mathematical physics, the basis, the impetus, of such laws is observation of some 
sort of regularity. In modern theoretical physics it may be that some sort of 
mathematical analogy as well as observation can motivate a suspicion of the 
existence of a law – I will say more on this, and its ramifications for the philosophy 
of applied mathematics, in chapter five. When scientists have reason to believe that 
laws exist they investigate, partly through making predictions (which usually 
involve some sort of experiment) to see whether the putative laws are consistent 
with the known and observed empirical data.26 What is important is that whatever 
reason a scientist has for suspecting the existence of a law, his putative law decides 
                                                 
26 The laws of nature themselves are not just vague regularities, but are in fact very precise, and it is 
part of the business of science to make statements of laws as precise as possible. Of course the 
scientist may well, and indeed should, be sceptical about his ability to state a law of nature in full, 
that is genuine, detail. But this will not discourage him however from attempting to get ever closer to 
the law through more detailed measurement, more fine-grained statements of relationships between 
the empirical attributes with which the law is concerned, and so on. It is just this detail that ensures 
that putative laws can be discriminated adequately and rejected if they fail ever more stringent tests. 
For instance, both General Relativity and Newtonian Mechanics hold that it is a law of nature is that 
gravitational attraction is proportional to mass. But they disagree over exactly what that 
proportionality consists in, and so although the rough informal statement may be a statement of the 
law on some level, it is not adequate as it is consistent with misstatements of the law and cannot 




an empirical relationship between empirical attributes. Thus the content of the law 
will be empirical content.  
However our usual empirical vocabulary is too clumsy and impossible to use 
without getting bogged down in unnecessary details to describe relationships 
clearly and precisely. Instead some more precise language is required, such as the 
language of classical mathematics. The subject matter of this language does not have 
to be abstract objects in the usual platonistic sense, though that is the standard view 
of the semantics of mathematics. Some sort of nominalistic language will be 
perfectly acceptable, as will nominalistic values of measurement, so long as they are 
able to provide the precision that is required, to something like the level of the 
precision provided by classical mathematics. In chapter four I look at ways that 
references to abstract mathematical objects can be removed from science, but that is 
not important at present.  
For now I want to avoid the issue of mathematical ontology, and will for 
convenience treat mathematics in its classical sense. So mathematics is useful partly 
because it is more precise than non-mathematical language. The mathematical form 
of a law relates various numbers or other mathematical objects, which represent the 
previously measured magnitudes of the attributes the law relates and the 
magnitudes that are to be compared with the empirical data, with reality, when the 
law is used to make a prediction. We have seen above, at the risk of being repetitive, 
how the mapping account (and measurement theory) shows that mathematics can 
represent these magnitudes, and that its precision here arises partly from the fact 
that it can represent any physical unit, no matter how small, even if physical objects 
get smaller and smaller all the way down, past quarks and so on, ad infinitum, 
because the real numbers, for instance, are dense.  
The more pressing question is ‘why is mathematics so useful in stating the 
relationships of attributes, and how does it do so?’. The reason for this at least is 
straightforward. Mathematics is designed to focus exclusively on only certain 
features of objects or structures, to abstract from many of their specifics. For 
instance applied geometry concerns (partly) angles of empirical phenomena, but 




not any of the other properties of whatever it is that happens to be instantiating the 
angle. When counting how many objects there are in a discrete collection we are 
concerned with how many of them there are, not with what their colour, shape, etc 
happens to be. In order to be precise laws have to focus on some aspects and not 
others. Specifically they want to ignore all attributes of any objects or relations the 
law concerns that are not relevant to the phenomena being described. And 
mathematics, designed as it is to abstract from objects and structures, is perfect for 
this descriptive and representational task, as it is able to focus precisely on only 
certain, frequently functional, relations of phenomena. I shall now illustrate a 
particular example of this, Newton’s law of universal gravitation. I shall sketch 
tentatively and speculatively how the knowledge of such a law came about, how 
mathematics was used in its description, why this was important, and why the role 
of this mathematics need only be viewed a representational one.  
 
 
2.3.3 A Speculative Illustration  of Mathematics Applied to a Law. 
 
The example in question is Newton’s discovery of the law of gravitation. In order to 
avoid being bogged down in extensive biographical and historical details I am going 
to sketch how this may have happened. This sketch is an illustration, to motivate 
this idea that there is no a priori reason to think that the mathematics involved in 
the discovery of laws plays anything more than a representational role. The 
illustration is therefore not exactly rigorous, but I do think it informative, once its 
limitations are borne in mind. Let us assume that through observation, either 
informal observation, or through a study of measured magnitudes, Newton noticed 
that ‘attraction between two bodies seems stronger the more massive they are and 
weaker the further away they are’. His interest was piqued, and he believed that 
there may be a law at work here concerning this attractive force. It is clear for the 
moment what the objects interacting with the force seem to be, and what their 
relevant attributes are, namely mass and distance. Assuming that there is such a 




distance it must be the case that it is inversely proportional to the distance (this 
simply means its strength 
 
. 
. decreases with an increase in distance). So far so good, no mathematics has been 
required except to measure what is being observed, an application of mathematics 
which the mapping account has already accounted for. At the moment Newton 
thinks his law is that ‘gravitational attraction increases with the mass of the objects 
and decreases with the increase in their distance’, or put somewhat more precisely 
‘gravitational attraction is proportional to the mass of the objects and inversely 
proportional to their distance’. Newton believes that this has a good claim to be a 
law, and although it may be that a significant amount of general observation 
establishes the plausible lawfulness of this statement, or at least makes it a serious 
contender for being a law, in order to confirm it to within standards of scientific 
rigour Newton needs to test it by making predictions. However in order to make a 
clear and unambiguous prediction Newton has first to get it into a form that can  
handle the precise measurements he has made of the initial conditions. That is, he 
needs to get the law into a mathematical form.  
How does he go about this? Well, obviously he needs symbols for the masses 
of the two objects and their distance apart. Given that the masses are not being in 
any way concatenated, Newton cannot represent their relation additively, and he 
does want to convey the fact that strength of gravitational attraction is directly 
proportional to the masses. This empirical relationship of the two masses can be 
represented mathematically using  multiplication,   m1 × m2. To express the direct 
proportionality therefore Newton writes F ∂ m1 × m2. But this cannot be the whole 
story for the distance between the masses has not yet been taken into account, and 
must be so if an accurate prediction is to be made. Now, Newton has already 
observed that the effect of increasing the distance between two masses reduces the 
gravitational attraction between them. This is easily represented by dividing the 
product by the distance, as the denominator gets larger the result of the division 




Once he has brought distance in, the only other variable that seems to affect 
gravitational force, Newton thinks he has the entire story about what is going on, 
that by allowing distance to alter the proportion of gravitational force to mass he 
can now account exactly for the relationship between gravitational force and mass. 
In other words, he believes that empirical relationship between gravitational 
attraction, masses m1 and m2, and distance r can be represented mathematically by 
the following equation: 
 
F = m 	× 	mr  
 
Now, suppose Newton uses this lawlike statement to make some predictions. The 
observed and measured empirical data do not agree with his predictions, and he 
realises that there must be something his law has not accounted for, something else 
affecting the proportionality of gravitational force to mass.  
Reflecting on what this could be, perhaps with or without further empirical 
observation, it occurs to him that maybe the force does not connect the two masses 
like a line, but rather that force spreads out from each mass, each affecting the other. 
That is to say, as the force spreads out over a greater distance from its source, it 
affects a larger and larger area more and more weakly. Thus it is not just the 
distance of the force that affects its strength, but the area it covers, which is itself 
dependent on that distance. Drawing upon his knowledge of geometry as the science 
of space, Newton recalls that any mathematical expression of the area that a plane 
covers, in terms of dimensions given in some unit, involves the square of those 
dimensions in terms of that unit.27 If his law is to account for the weakening of force 
over an area the mathematical representation of this must involve the square of 
some dimension. The question is, what is this dimension? Well, the force spreads 
                                                 
27 Here I am treating geometry as a physical science of physical space, albeit a heavily formalised one, 
that originally had a purely empirical treatment, before the development of formal (analytic) 
methods. To a degree this is true, and was the accepted view in Newton’s day. Nowadays of course 
geometry is a branch of mathematics not a physical science, it is at best applied mathematics, but this 
does not affect the mapping account as the relation of geometrical objects to physical objects is easily 
explicable in terms of instantiation.   
  
out uniformly as the distance increases, so to some extent the area affected will 
depend on the distance travelled. If the distance travelled is one unit of length, the 
area affected will be (partly) accounted for in terms of that 
force decreases not just with the length of the distance, but with its square, that is r
This image conveys that perhaps more clearly than my statement:
 
 
The mathematical form of his law is now:
 
 
This means that say e.g. the two masses are 4 and 5 kg respectively, and the distance 
is 3 metres, then the gravitational force will be 2.2 something. Naming the derived 
unit of gravitational force the Newton, Newton can say the gravitational force i
Newtons. By his former statement of the law 
In other words by his new law, gravitational attraction is much weaker than his old 
law had suggested. Newton again makes his predictions and discovers that the new 
predictions agree much more closely with the data. Although the agreement is not 
exact the difference is extremely small. This suggests that the law is nearly correct, 
but since it is not completely confirmed something must be missing. Newton tries to 
consider what but is at a loss 
However he notices additionally that all his predictions are off by the 
proportion, suggesting that there is one 
proportionality of gravitational force to mass which he has not taken into account. 
 
64 
length. Thus we say the 
 
 
image source: en.wikipedia.org 
 
F = m 	× 	mr  
it would have been calculated as 6.6 N. 
– he seems to have accounted for all the variables. 







Calculating its value in relation to the observed data, Newton introduces it as a 
constant of proportionality to correct his predictions, arriving at a refined version of 






At this stage this is nothing more than an instrumental way of getting his laws to 
deliver correct predictions, but it is itself a promissory note – it says that something 
needs to be explained, something we know the magnitude of, but not what it is. This 
would not have concerned Newton who took himself to be describing rather than 
explaining phenomena, and so as long a law yielded correct predictions that would 
have been enough for him. What is important to note is that the universal 
gravitational constant is not an abstract mathematical object, but a physical 
phenomenon. It is not that an abstract mathematical object is interacting with the 
physical world to affect gravitational force, but that we can measure the magnitude 
of the attribute without being able to point to its source.  
We see therefore that the role of mathematics in the discovery and statement 
of laws in this sketch did not go beyond anything merely representational – at no 
point had mathematics done anything more than represent the magnitudes of 
empirical attributes, and represent the relations of those attributes’ magnitudes. 
Insofar as the mapping account says that the applicability of mathematics consists in 
its ability to represent empirical attributes and their relations (that is, functional 
empirical relationships) and that this representation obtains because of various 
mappings between empirical objects (or collections of them) and mathematical 
objects, it is clear that the mapping account can explain the role of mathematics in 
the discovery and description of laws, if those laws are at all as I have described. In 
chapter five I confront an attempt to show that this representational role of 
mathematics does not extend to all laws, but I hope I have done enough to benefit 
from the reader’s tentative agreement that this is not the case. With this settled, I 








2.4 The Inferential Account  
 
2.4.1.  What is the Inferential Account? 
 
I explained at the beginning of this chapter, and indeed earlier in the thesis, that 
until very recently no fully worked out mapping account of the applicability of 
mathematics has appeared in the literature, rather there have been a flurry of 
papers containing a brief account of the applicability of mathematics in terms of 
mappings and involving one or two simple examples generally drawn from 
measurement theory, thereby leaving a fully worked out mapping account as a task 
to be undertaken in the future. It is certainly the case that a full length treatment of 
the account is required, and into this vacuum, with their recent paper ‘An Inferential 
Conception of the Application of Mathematics’ (2011), have stepped Otavio Bueno 
and Mark Colyvan, who have argued that the mapping account does not go far 
enough to account for the diverse applications of mathematics.  
Insofar as the account has not really been hitherto adequately developed this 
is difficult to argue with, and so the point would have to be granted, though it would 
be somewhat vacuous. However, since a key part of my thesis is just such a 
development of the mapping account, as given in this chapter, and in chapters five 
(examining the role of mathematics in the making of novel empirical discoveries) 
and six (looking at, among other things, the role of idealisations), I shall interpret 
Bueno’s and Colyvan’s remarks in the context of this thesis. This may seem unfair – 
after all their paper was published before my thesis was even finished – but it is 
important to see if the mapping account can stand up to the criticisms that Bueno 
and Colyvan make of it, in order to see whether those criticisms apply to the 




mapping account in that state, which is what I shall argue, then it is clear that the 
criticisms are of little import. So what is the inferential conception of the 
applicability of mathematics?  
The primary claim of the inferential account is that the fundamental role of 
mathematics is inferential. But what does this mean? Bueno and Colyvan suggest the 
following: “by embedding certain features of the empirical world into a 
mathematical structure, it is possible to obtain inferences that would otherwise be 
extremely hard…to obtain” (Bueno and Colyvan 2011, p.352). Thus applicability is 
to be explained in terms of inferential roles between mathematical and empirical 
structures. Even though there are diverse roles of applied mathematics – the 
unification of scientific theories, the making of empirical predictions, etc, Bueno and 
Colyvan maintain that “all of these roles…are ultimately tied to the ability to 
establish inferential relations between empirical phenomena and mathematical 
structures, or among mathematical structures themselves” (Ibid.) The inferential 
account is described as consisting of three stages: 
 
i) Immersion. Establish a mapping from the empirical to the mathematical. 
Several mappings may do the job so we choose the best one contextually.  
 
ii) Derivation. Draw consequences from the mathematical formalism and the 
structure into which the empirical phenomena have been mapped.  
 
iii) Interpretation. Interpret the mathematical consequences in terms of the 
initial empirical set up. This requires a mapping from the mathematical to the 
empirical which likely will not be (unless it is an isomorphism) the inverse of 








2.4.2. Putative Advantages of the Inferential Account over the Mapping 
Account.  
 
Bueno and Colyvan are emphatic that the inferential account offers many 
advantages over the standard mapping account, and in both section three of their 
paper, and passim, they list various such advantages. I have so far said nothing to 
suggest that the inferential conception may not be to some degree an important 
account of applicability in its own right, as a rival to the mapping account. I do not 
think that can be the case. For the inferential account is not, and nor is it intended to 
be, an entirely new account of the applicability of mathematics - rather Bueno and 
Colyvan wish to significantly extend or modify the mapping account of the 
applicability of mathematics.   
Straightaway this raises some issues, for if Bueno and Colyvan are extending 
the mapping account they must believe it stands in need of development, that is, is 
underdeveloped. Thus they would be wrong to present their ‘inferential conception’ 
as rival to the mapping account, and would be better to present it as one way of 
developing it, for no philosopher remotely familiar with the account would hold that 
the mapping account has received an adequate treatment in the literature thus far. 
As I said briefly above, if the ‘standard’ mapping account is the account that has 
been presented somewhat scantily in the literature then some of Bueno and 
Colyvan’s criticisms of it, or claims to have advantages over it, are uncontroversial. 
However if the mapping account developed in this thesis is a more refined version of 
the standard account, then (I argue) Bueno and Colyvan’s criticisms fall short of 
their target, and that the advantages they claim for the inferential account are by no 
means unique to it. I shall consider these criticisms and putative advantages in turn.  
 
Claim 1: The mapping account says very little. “According to the mapping 
account of mathematical application…the idea is that there is some sort of structure-
preserving mapping between the world and the mathematical structure…and that is 




notion of mapping is clarified, the account is little more than a gesture…” (Bueno 
and Colyvan 2011, p.348).  
 
I have argued above that the best way to view the mapping is as an isomorphism 
(partial or otherwise) between equivalence classes of empirical objects and the real 
numbers, for example. Moreover, insofar as measurement theory can be taken to be 
an important part of the mapping account, Bueno and Colyvan’s claim can be seen to 
be false, as measurement theory pays great attention to what sort of mapping, what 
sort of homomorphism, is required between an empirical relational structure and a 
mathematical structure.  
 
Claim 2: The mapping account is incomplete. “…crucial information required to 
solve [a] physical problem is not part of the mapping between a mathematical 
structure and a physical structure. In short, the mapping account…is incomplete”. 
(Bueno and Colyvan 2011, p.349).  
 
Bueno and Colyvan explain that one important example of what they mean by this 
alleged incompleteness is that the mapping account does not tell us which solutions 
of an equation will be physically real. The only case that Bueno and Colyvan give in 
any detail to substantiate this claim is the using of a quadratic equation to calculate 
(that is, predict) the displacement of a projectile.28 The quadratic has two solutions, 
but only one is physically real. Applied mathematicians and military engineers use 
such an equation to calculate e.g. a shell’s position, but they use background 
information not contained in the equation to discriminate between the true and the 
false prediction, the physically real and the non-physically real solution. However 
that is no reason to expect philosophers to be able to say a priori what solutions will 
and will not be physically real, especially as what is and  is not viewed as physically 
real in physics changes as science progresses. Rather it is trivial that not all of the 
information required to solve a physical problem is part of the mapping account, 
                                                 
28
 This does not undermine their argument, as there are clearly a great many examples where it is not clear 
which solutions are physically real. As we will see, this is not a fact I am taking issue with, but rather the 




and indeed we would not expect that account to contain the information required to 
solve all the physical problems insofar as there are a great many different 
applications of mathematics to physical science, each individual application 
depending on the circumstances in which it is being made. One would not expect of 
the mapping account that it should be able to specify each specific case: it says that 
once the relevant empirical attributes have been identified, it is possible to map 
these into a mathematical structure, plug these values into the mathematical form of 
a law, and obtain a mathematical result with a clear interpretation in terms of the 
attributes the law relates.  
For the mapping account and measurement theory tell us in general what 
sort of axioms an empirical structure has to satisfy in order for the mathematics to 
be applied, and the answer obtained. But questions about what attributes are to be 
identified or what sort of additional restrictions (whether formulated as axioms or 
not) are to be imposed on the empirical structures is a matter left to scientists, not 
philosophers of mathematics. What is important is that there are empirical 
attributes, that these do have a structure, and that this can be mapped into a 
mathematical structure if certain axioms are satisfied, and that we can classify these 
structures, mappings and axioms and discuss their philosophical implications. It 
would be unreasonable to expect a philosophical account to tell us how to solve 
specific physical problems, and any account that could do so would be extremely 
large and unwieldy, not because it contained a great deal of philosophy, but because 
it would have to contain a great quantity of empirical data and material not properly 
belonging to philosophy. As such the mapping account cannot be considered 
incomplete for the reason given above.  
 
Claim 3: The mapping account cannot deal with novel predictions or 
discoveries. “The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics…the mapping account 
of applied mathematics provides no solution [to this question…but the inferential 





I do not address this ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ until chapter five so I must ask the 
reader’s indulgence until then, though the reader may turn to chapter five now if she 
wishes, as it stands more or less alone. However I will give a brief summary of my 
position in that chapter, where I classify three categories of (descriptive) problems 
of such ‘unreasonable’ effectiveness, and argue that each of them can be treated by 
the mapping account. (Please note that the majority of what is discussed where is 
merely a skeletal framework into which material is inserted in chapter five). A 
descriptive problem of the first category is generated when we take an equation 
describing one phenomenon, manipulate it mathematically, and obtain another 
equation describing another phenomenon, which makes it look like mathematics 
has some power to give us knowledge of the world by non-trivially transforming our 
existing descriptions of the world into other descriptions of different parts of the 
world. Descriptive problems of the second category are generated when a scientist 
finds a solution to his equation that normal science rules is unlikely. The descriptive 
problems of the third category are generated by the pre-existence of mathematical 
theories which are vital to the statement of a given theory, or to the prediction of a 
given phenomenon, but which are taken ‘off the shelf’ as it were, in that they were 
not created by the scientist for the purposes of science, but rather by the pure 
mathematician for the purposes of mathematics.  
My response in brief to these categories is that first category problems occur 
when describing similar phenomena, and we ought not be surprised if an equation 
(that is, formalised law) describing one phenomenon were similar to another 
equation (formalised law) describing a similar phenomenon. There is nothing here 
that suggests the role of mathematics is anything more than representational, and I 
challenge the advocates of the inferential account to say otherwise. As far as second 
category problems are concerned, this is explicable in terms of the physical intuition 
of scientists, honed by years of training. Finally, third category problems can also be 
easily met: since both mathematicians and physicists spend all their time looking at 
very abstract structures, and mathematicians prove thousands and thousands of 
theorems about mathematical structures every year, it would be more surprising if 




him’. It seems then that in the case of second and third category descriptive 
problems there is no case for the mapping account, or indeed any other account of 
applicability, to answer.  
To avoid the charge of being overly dismissive however I do want to look at 
the one example that Bueno and Colyvan actually give – time dilation. They say 
 
Consider, for example, time dilation in Lorentz’s (1904) pre-special relativity theory 
of length contraction. Lorentz seemed to take the time-dilation effect as a mere 
artefact of the mathematics—that is, not physically significant—presumably because 
of rather natural (pre-relativistic) intuitions about the nature of time. As we now know, 
Lorentz was wrong about this feature of the mathematics being an artefact. (Bueno 
and Colyvan, p.350) 
 
Lorentz wanted to explain the failure of the Michelson-Morley experiment, and 
appealed to length contraction to do so. He hypothesised in 1895 that when an 
object is moving its length appears to contract in the direction of motion relative to 
the observer in an inertial frame, specifically that contraction will be inversely 
proportional to the Lorentz factor γ, thus (L= ) where L0 is length of the object 




This factor is also vital in the description of time dilation, which occurs when  time 
of by a moving object ‘slows down’ relative to the observer. Time dilation was 
described as (T= T0γ), and has been experimentally verified in the motion of muons. 
However what Bueno and Colyvan are taking issue with is not that the Lorentz 
factor appears in both equations, indeed given that both time dilation and length 
contraction are relativistic phenomena involving a change to an object relative to an 
inertial frame at high velocity, we would expect them to be described similarly. 
Rather Bueno and Colyvan are expressing surprise at the fact that the time-dilation 
that is a consequence of Lorentz’s theory, because his inclusion of the so-called ‘local 
time’  =  −    to make it easier to calculate processes for moving frames turned 




simplicity and the fact that at the time Lorentz did not believe in time dilation. 
Lorentz wanted to ensure the speed of light would be invariant across different 
inertial frames. This is why time dilation appears to be a mere artefact. Of course 
post-Einstein we know that time dilation is not just an artefact, but formulating his 
transformations that would enable the speed of light to be viewed as invariant even 
as late as 1904 , Loretnz could not have known this. So how do we explain that this 
happened?  
 In the classification above, this is characterised as a ‘second category 
problem’ – something a theory suggested existed but which we had reason to 
disbelieve in turned out to exist. I have no wish to explain chapter five in too much 
detail here, to avoid repetition, but I do think that this is explicable in terms of the 
fact that the reason the addition of the local time in this instance made the 
calculations simpler is because the local time, and the time-dilation that fell out of it, 
was, unbeknownst to Lorentz, a physically real phenomenon. Lorentz had to involve 
something he disbelieved in in his calculations to make them work, but the fact that 
he had to describe such a thing to make the rest of the theory work suggested that 
thing actually existed. There is nothing irredeemably non-representational going on 
here, since the equations in question directly describe empirical phenomena. The 
local time may have appeared to be an artefact, but insofar as it talked about time, 
velocities and the speed of light it was an empirical artefact, a ‘heuristic working 
hypothesis’29 and one that Lorentz would have hoped to at some point remove. 
Bueno and Colyvan do not go into much more detail about the ‘unreasonable 
effectiveness’, so there is little more to say here.  
 
Claim 4: The mapping account cannot handle structural mismatches. “Another 
related problem with the mapping account occurs in cases when there is known 
mismatch between the empirical structure and the mathematical structure” (Bueno 
and Colyvan 2011, p.351).  
 






This is the problem that idealisations pose for the mapping account, or indeed any 
account of applicability. Bueno and Colyvan suggest the inferential account can deal 
with this the following way, by invoking ‘partial mappings’, between the empirical 
and mathematical – these partial mappings are the idealisations, “in contexts where 
idealisations are employed, the existence of a partial mapping…explains in which 
respects the idealisations work. The latter capture certain elements of the actual 
world, but not all of them”. (Bueno and Colyvan 2011, p.358). If idealisations do 
pose a problem for the mapping account then this is serious. I address this issue in 
chapter six, section 6.3. As with chapter five, this section stands largely alone, so the 
curious reader can turn if they wish to that section now to glance at it briefly. But to 
forestall the need for this I shall again provide a brief summary of my position. In 
chapter six I consider two putative sorts of idealisation, mathematical and physical. I 
argue that although if mathematical idealisations existed they would be damaging to 
the mapping account, there is in fact no evidence of such idealisations, and argue 
against Batterman’s (2010) paper promoting belief in such idealisations. Regarding 
physical idealisations, I claim that physical idealisations are simplifying assumptions 
that describe an empirical structure that strictly speaking does not exist, but about 
which it is easier to perform calculations whilst delivering a result sufficiently close 
to the observed magnitude to be useful. The mapping account has only to say how 
the ideal structure is mapped into the real numbers for example, and that is the 
same as any other empirical structure that is so mapped, in the manner described 
above in section 2.2. The advocate of the mapping account does not need to say how 
idealisations are possible, as this is an enquiry belonging to the philosophy of 
science. This is not to say that a treatment of idealisations in terms of partial 
mappings could not be an interesting or even potentially useful exercise, but it is to 
say that it is not an essential one for the advocate of the mapping account.  
 
Claim 5: The mapping account cannot handle genuine mathematical 
explanations. “If mathematics is genuinely explanatory…this will present a 





I assume by this Bueno and Colyvan mean ‘genuine mathematical explanations of 
empirical phenomena’ in the sense of ‘genuine platonistic explanations of empirical 
phenomena’ and in the next chapter (three) I will argue against the existence of such 
explanations.30 Given this, I would argue that the inability of the mapping account to 
account for genuine platonistic explanations of physical phenomena is a bonus as it 
means that there is no way to support this false supposition from the mapping 
account. If instead Bueno and Colyvan refer to mathematical explanations of 
mathematical facts, then this issue passes the mapping account, and any other 
theory of the applicability of mathematics to empirical phenomena, by.  
 
Claim 6: The mapping account lacks an interpretation step. “There is one major 
and obvious difference [between the mapping and inferential accounts], and that is 
step three. There is nothing that resembles this step in the mapping account”. 
(Bueno and Colyvan 2011, p.354).  
 
This is simply untrue: if the mapping account did not have some sort of an 
interpretation step it would be useless as an account of applicability, since it would 
not have a step for moving from the mathematical structure back to the empirical 
structure, with meaningful empirical results. However the mapping account’s 
interpretation step does not need as much freedom as that of the inferential 
conception since for the standard mapping account the use of equivalence classes 
means the mapping is an isomorphism (partial or full), so there is no need to decide 
at the interpretation stage which ‘downward’ mapping to use, we simply use the 
inverse of the isomorphism that took the empirical structure to the mathematical 







                                                 





2.4.3. Remarks Concerning the Inferential Account. 
 
I have shown how the mapping account may resist the criticisms levelled at it by 
Bueno and Colyvan. Moreover in many crucial areas there are in fact great 
similarities between the two accounts, for instance the three stages of the inferential 
account do not differ significantly from anything in the mapping account, which also 
involves the possibility of making some choices at the ‘immersion’ stage, concerning 
e.g. what mathematical structure to map into. Likewise the mapping account and 
inferential account both involve a derivation stage where mathematical 
consequences are derived, and a stage where these consequences are interpreted 
empirically using a mapping (in this case the inverse of an isomorphism). However I 
have argued that suitably developed the mapping account has several advantages 
that the inferential account lacks. These are that unlike the inferential account, the 
mapping account is not burdened by the need to provide complete information to 
solve every physical problem; it is very clear about what mapping is required from 
the mathematical back to the empirical; it avoids any commitment to dubious 
‘genuine’ platonistic explanations of empirical phenomena; and it does not provide 
an unnecessary account of idealisation. I submit that the version of the mapping 
account as developed in this thesis is an advance over Bueno and Colyvan’s 
inferential account. I hope that the treatment that the mapping account has received 
in this chapter has been sufficient to make the nature of that account, and its 
potential, clear. In the following chapter we turn to a discussion of putative genuine 







…even on the platonistic 
assumption there are 
numbers, no one thinks those 
numbers are causally 
relevant to the physical 
phenomena.  











In this chapter I am concerned with arguing against genuine platonistic 
explanations of physical, that is empirical, phenomena. This is essential to the 
mapping account as if such explanations were possible an account of 
applicability would need to explain how this could be the case, which the 
mapping account does not do, implying the mapping account would be either 
straightforwardly false or radically incomplete. Section 3.1. is the chapter 
introduction. Section 3.2 discusses the nature of explanation in general and 
causal explanation in particular. 3.3 and 3.4. are concerned with describing 
Baker’s cicada example of a genuine platonistic explanation of a physical 
phenomenon and examining arguments against it, formulating a nominalistic 
version of the explanation of the cicada example and showing therefore that 
platonistic mathematics is dispensable to Baker’s example. I conclude that 
Baker’s failure does not bode well for genuine platonistic explanations of 
physical phenomena, and that if there is no need for such explanations, the 






3.1.  Chapter Introduction 
 
Why does a thesis defending a mapping account of the applicability of mathematics 
to empirical phenomena require a digression into genuine platonistic explanations 
of such phenomena? The answer is simple: if there are genuine platonistic 
explanations of physical phenomena, the mapping account’s failure to address this, 
qua theory of the applicability of mathematics, would render it unacceptably 
incomplete or inadequate. It is not so much that the account would lack a detailed 
explanation of how the platonistic could explain the empirical, but rather that it 
would not address this issue at all. If there is no need for such explanations then this 
requirement is obviated, and an explanation of applicability can focus on the 
representational abilities of mathematics, as was undertaken in the previous 
chapter. Thus the aim of this chapter is to indicate what form a theory of 
applicability should, or need, not take, and to justify the conception of applicability 
as purely a matter of the representation of empirical phenomena.  
Aside from its implications for any theory of applicability, the discovery of a 
genuine platonistic explanation of a physical phenomenon would also be a holy grail 
for a platonistically inclined philosopher whose justifications for mathematical 
platonism centred around the indispensability argument (see chapter six). This 
discovery would be so important because it would imply that platonistic 
mathematics is not just psychologically indispensable, or practically indispensable, 
to explanations of physical phenomena, but rather that it is genuinely indispensable, 
and would therefore provide complete support to the second premise of the 
indispensability argument. The purpose of the discussion of platonistic explanation 
in this chapter is to assist in arguing against such genuine platonistic explanations of 




such an explanation in the literature, which concerns the prime lifecycles of 
periodical cicadas.31  
My response to Baker takes the form of several arguments, some 
appropriated from the literature, and one of my own. If these arguments are 
successful then neither platonistic objects nor platonistic concepts are part of the 
genuine explanation of why cicadas have prime lifecycles, and thus such concepts 
and objects must be dispensable to any genuine explanation of this phenomenon. As 
Baker’s is perhaps the best extant example of a putative genuine platonistic 
explanation, I conclude that the success of my argument against Baker shows that 
the burden of proof is on the proponent of genuine platonistic explanations to find 
an example of a platonistic explanation of a physical phenomenon to which the 
criticisms levelled at Baker do not apply. I suggest that this burden is too heavy for 
such a proponent to carry. Of course there are many good explanations of physical 
phenomena which do contain platonistic mathematics, indeed this is likely true of 
the majority of such explanations, and it may even be the case that human cognition 
is such that without platonistic mathematics we cannot even practice natural or 
social science, that such mathematics is indispensable to human scientists’ 
explanations even if it is not indispensable to all possible good explanations of the 
phenomenon in question. This however does not mean that platonistic mathematics 
should be considered part of the genuine explanation of a physical phenomenon, at 
least not if it can be shown that this mathematics is dispensable to a given 
explanation.   
 
 
3.2 Explanation and Genuine Platonistic Explanation 
 
An explanation E of a fact f0 is a statement describing a relation R of further facts 
f1…fn such that f0 obtains because Rf1…fn obtains. For example, suppose the fact we 
                                                 
31 Several examples have been given, but Baker’s focuses purely on number-theoretic rather than 
geometrical examples, and thus bypasses the accusation that geometry is an empirical science of 
space rather than a platonistic theory, and that therefore genuine explanations involving geometry 




want to explain, f0, is ‘precipitation takes place at a particular location x’. The 
explanation of this phenomenon appeals to a relation R between chemical facts (e.g. 
the condensation point of water), geological facts (e.g. the proximity of the location 
to mountains), and environmental facts (e.g. the temperature and humidity, and the 
presence of nearby water sources). Explanations are vital because without them we 
would not know, or at least believe we know, why or how things occur, just that 
they do. Explanation has not always been so highly desired in science – consider 
Newton’s injunction to ‘feign no hypotheses’ and merely describe phenomena. This 
was due to his belief that this method was more reliable for making accurate 
predictions than the messy, speculative, physics that had dominated natural 
philosophy almost exclusively prior to the era of Copernicus and Galileo.   
The subsequent development of robust scientific methods has ensured that 
explanation can be sought through the discovery of laws, or putative laws, that can 
be verified experimentally. It is possible to provide an explanation that seems to 
account for why f0 obtains but which does not do so in reality, in the sense that the 
putative facts f1…fn appealed to do not really bear a relation R to each other that 
actually accounts for f0. That is, the situation described by the explanation E does 
not comprise the actual relation of the ‘real’ facts of the situation, a failure which can 
be explained by the non-obtaining of (some of) the facts appealed to, or an 
inappropriate relation between the explanandum and the facts that are components 
of the explanans, or some combination of these. For instance, to return to the above 
example, I may try to explain precipitation through appeal to ‘facts’ about 
supernatural forces, but science tells us that this is not the genuine explanation of 
this phenomenon, not least because if we are disposed to believe in science we are 
likely to also be indisposed to accept the reality of empirically relevant supernatural 
facts. But the authority of science in such matters does not imply that scientific 
explanations are indubitable. Insofar as the majority of practising scientists are 
likely to be scientific realists they will be inclined to accept that any scientific 
explanation is in principle falsifiable and that one seemingly genuine explanation 
can be superseded by a superior explanation with a stronger claim to being genuine. 




being genuine (we might even say they become ever more genuine, if that is not 
misleading) whilst remaining asymptotic to ‘full genuineness’.   
 
3.2.1. Causal Explanations 
 
The main category of explanations of empirical phenomena that I accept are causal 
explanations, though we will see below that my conception of causal explanation is a 
fairly broad one, and does not just include the micro-causal explanations that are 
the business of physics. We have to be careful when discussing causal explanation 
precisely because there are a variety of sorts of causal explanation and if we ignore 
this and treat only those causal explanations involving just laws of physics 
(construed broadly enough to include chemical laws) our conception of causal 
explanation will be extremely impoverished. For instance, take an example of a fact 
that stands in need of explanation: birds fly. What is the explanation of this fact? One 
explanation will involve all sorts of facts about aerodynamics, gravity, bone density 
etc. This explanation of the fact that birds fly is an explanation of how any particular 
bird can fly, and will come out as a causal explanation on even a narrow conception 
of causal. But this is not the only explanation of the fact that birds fly. There will also 
be at least one other relevant sort of explanation, namely the explanation of why 
they can fly. Not why they can fly (that is just the ‘how’ question just considered 
above) but rather why it is they do fly rather than say, crawl.32 This too is an 
empirical question that stands in need of explanation, though clearly any 
explanation of this in terms of purely low-level physico-chemical facts is going to 
miss the point. Rather an evolutionary explanation must be provided.  
An evolutionary explanation of why birds do fly is (I shall assume – see 
footnote 33) no less a causal explanation than the lower-level explanation 
concerning a particular bird and the story of how and why it can fly. It is admittedly 
                                                 
32 A similar sentiment is expressed in Colyvan (2010) p.302, concerning Kirkwood gaps in the 
asteroid belt. We can give a causal explanation in terms of forces, particles and the history of any 
given asteroid that explains why it does not happen to occupy a Kirkwood gap, but we also want to 
say why no asteroid will occupy such a gap. I agree, but disagree with Colyvan that we have to use a 




not a microcausal explanation, as it rather involves such things as selection 
pressures, extended time periods and fitness, but this does not mean it is not causal. 
The evolutionary explanation above concerning why birds fly, that they evolved the 
capacity for flight since a rudimentary ability to take-off gave a survival advantage, 
which has been reinforced and developed through hundreds of thousands of 
generations of birds (where this rudimentary ability can itself be explained in terms 
of further evolutionary facts which it is not necessary to go into here 33) has, at the 
risk of hammering the point home too much, just as much claim to be an causal  
explanation of an empirical fact as the explanation in terms of bone-density etc, and 
will be correct if evolutionary theory is true. That is to say, it may have such a claim 
if evolutionary explanations do not involve essential reference to platonistic objects 
or concepts, pace Baker below who argues at least one evolutionary explanation 
does, in the periodical cicada case. Even if we are persuaded by Baker it does not 
follow that there are not any evolutionary explanations that are purely causal. All I 
wanted to do was to motivate the idea that the category of causal explanations is not 
exhausted by the category of microcausal explanations, and that evolutionary 
explanations are a species of causal explanation. This motivation was necessary to 
show that I am not simply objecting to Baker for the trivial reason that his proffered 
explanation is not a microcausal explanation, I am not just begging the question 
against him.  
So what is a genuine explanation? A ‘genuine’ explanation describes how or 
why things actually happen in reality. As the remarks in the previous paragraph 
have indicated we cannot know that an explanation is genuine, since it is always 
possible that we are wrong. Indeed there may be a variety of competing 
explanations which can appear to explain x. If the explanations are of different types 
                                                 
33
 But in case the reader is curious, these are the options given in a Biology article on the topic: “Two 
fundamentally different theories have been put forward to account for the origin of flight in birds. One 
theory postulates an early adaptation to arboreal habits followed by successive adaptations that increased 
leaping ability and range, and facilitated safe, controlled descent from elevated positions…The alternative 
theory visualizes a primitive, cursorial, bipedal ancestral stock followed by succeeding stages that 
incorporated adaptations that augmented bipedal running and leaping up from the ground”. (Ostrom, 1974, 





they may not be in competition, i.e. the low-level explanation of how birds fly and 
the evolutionary explanation of why they fly do not compete. Rather competition 
often occurs between theories of a particular type, i.e. two low-level explanations of 
a particular phenomenon and two evolutionary explanations. The issue is 
compounded by the existence of explanations with different levels of detail. An 
example of this is that gravity can be explained as ‘the force which attracts objects to 
each other in virtue of mass’ and also by General Relativity. Although we might like 
to say that both of these explanations are genuine, it is clear that the first 
explanation is also compatible with Newton’s law of universal gravitation, which is 
not compatible (except as a limit case in a particular form) with General Relativity. 
So the vaguer explanation can have both genuine and non-genuine instances, a 
situation which can only be avoided by an explanation being fully specific, though in 
practice this is unlikely to be possible, and we have to make do with the most 
genuine explanation of a phenomenon that we can obtain.  The question for this 
chapter is, does this explanation ever have to be a platonistic one? I argue that it 
does not.  
 
 
3.2.2. Platonistic Explanations of Platonistic Facts 
 
I have included this section solely for completeness. Whatever view one holds of 
platonistic explanations of platonistic facts need not bear on the view of platonistic 
explanations of non-platonistic facts. The reader who wants a more thorough 
discussion would be advised to engage with  some of the emerging literature on the 
topic. For instance, Marc Lange (2010) ‘What Are Mathematical Coincidences and 
Why Does it Matter?’, Mind, vol. 119, pp. 307-340, and Paolo Mancosu (2008) The 
Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, Oxford: OUP. In a platonistic explanation of a 
platonistic fact both explanandum and explanans would seem to have to be 
platonistic.34 Such explanations abound. One view is that a proof of a platonistic-
                                                 
34 Such a fact may be explained through a physical example, but it is clear that with such an example, 




mathematical theorem is an explanation of a platonistic-mathematical fact. For 
instance the explanation of there being no greatest prime number is may be thought 
to be explained by natural numbers being either prime or composite, together with 
there being no greatest natural number, and that the product of any collection of 
prime numbers plus unity is either a prime number or divisible by a prime number 
greater than any prime number which is a factor of the product. If these claims are 
correct then it follows there is no greatest prime number. If the reader is 
uncomfortable with the idea of a formal algebraic proof as an explanation there are 
more visual examples – for example, the triangular numbers. A triangular number is 
“the number of dots in an equilateral triangle evenly filled with dots…three dots can 
be arranged in a triangle; thus three is a triangular number. The nth triangular 
number is the number of dots in a triangle with n dots on a side”.35 How do we 




 is the number of dots that can be fitted 
into an equilateral triangle of dot-length n’?  
Well firstly, we bear in mind the expression for the area of a triangle, namely 
area = ½ × base × height. That is, it is the area of a rectangle with the base and 
height of the triangle, cut in half. Every rectangle can of course be cut in half to make 
two triangles, but only certain rectangles  will yield equilateral triangles of dots if 
cut in half, that is, if the area is divided by two. These are just those rectangles one of 
whose sides is one unit longer than the other side, that is, those whose area (in 




                                                                                                                                                 
may be essential in grasping some mathematical fact, but no particular diagram is essential, and the 
diagram itself is irrelevant to the genuine explanation of the fact’s obtaining. The mathematical fact 














, the number 
of dots in a rectangle of height n dots and length n+1 dots, cut in half. The triangular 
numbers are exhibited in the following dot pattern of triangles:  … Thus 
the fact that the expression above yields the triangular numbers is explained in 
terms of further facts about areas, triangles, rectangles, and equivalent formulations 
of expressions.  
Far more controversial is whether or not we can have genuine platonistic 
explanations, or partially platonistic explanations, of physical, that is, empirical, facts. 
Prima facie, it would seem we cannot. After all, as I said at the beginning of this 
chapter, if platonistic objects are causally inert, or do not exist, then how could they 
play a role in the genuine explanation of any physical phenomenon? For example, 
Hartry Field, the famous nominalist, says “…even on the platonistic assumption that 
there are numbers, no one thinks that those numbers are causally relevant to 
physical phenomena” (Field 1980 p.43). Even Baker, the philosopher advocating 
platonistic explanations of physical phenomena, does not think this: “[c]learly this 
[causal] account is incompatible with the existence of any genuinely mathematical 
explanations [of empirical phenomena], since mathematical objects if they exist are 
acausal” (Baker, 2005 p.234).  However the force of this objection depends on the 
claim that the platonistic explanation involved merely concerns platonistic objects. 
Baker and Colyvan are making a stronger and more insidious claim however, that 
platonistic concepts are doing the explaining. Presumably platonistic concepts also 
do not feature in causal explanations, and as such Baker and Colyvan allow that 
there can be genuine explanations of empirical phenomena that are not causal 
explanations. 36 Below we shall see Baker try to show that there is an evolutionary 
explanation of the lifecycle of the periodical cicada that contains platonistic 
mathematical concepts and which is therefore not a purely causal evolutionary 
explanation, although he thinks it is nevertheless an example of a genuine platonistic 
                                                 




explanation of an empirical phenomenon. This, if successful, would undermine the 
view that there are no genuine platonistic explanations of physical phenomena, and 
a fortiori the view that there are no genuine non-causal evolutionary explanations of 
physical phenomena. It would also bring the mapping account into question insofar 
as that account does not say anything about how platonistic concepts could explain 




3.3 A Candidate for a Genuine Platonistic Explanation? 
 
The piece of literature that has generated most of the recent discussion surrounding 
platonistic explanation is Alan Baker’s paper ‘Are There Genuine Mathematical 
Explanations of Physical Phenomena?’ (2005).37 Baker reinforces the need for such 
an example with a reflection on the state of the literature: “Colyvan has not come up 
with any unequivocal cases of mathematical explanation in science, and Melia has 
not given any non-question-begging grounds for thinking such explanations are 
impossible” (Baker 2005, p.229).38 The subject of the example is the seven species of 
the genus Magicicada of the cicada family of insects, which possess a lifecycle which 
is a prime number of years long, viz. 13 or 17 years. 39 Periodical cicadas live 
underground for most of their lives at a depth of at least 30cm, and attach 
themselves to tree roots, from which they feed. Every 13 or 17 years, depending on 
species, they emerge in synchrony in order to mate and lay eggs.40 The reason for 
this mass emergence is the biological phenomenon of ‘predator saturation’, whereby 
[cicada] “densities are so high that predators apparently eat their fill without 
                                                 
37
 When Baker says ‘mathematical’ in this paper, he usually means ‘platonistic’. This is evident as his 
motivation for furnishing the cicada example is to support the indispensability argument for platonism.  
38 This refers to Colyvan (2001), (2002), where some possible cases of genuine mathematical 
explanation are presented, and Melia (2000), (2002) where both the indispensability argument, and 
the possibility of genuine mathematical explanation, are criticised.  
39 Not three species as Baker erroneously mentions – rather three species have a 17-year cycle (and 
are often found in the southern states), and four species have a 13-year cycle (and are often found in 
the northern states). Since all periodical cicadas are of the genus Magicicada, we may use the terms 
‘Magicicada’ and ‘periodical cicada’ interchangeably. 




significantly reducing the population” (Cooley & Marshal 2000). The reason why 
this mass emergence is prime-periodic is, as Baker shows, usually explained in 
terms of both biological and platonistic-mathematical facts. 
 Baker identifies five features of Magicicada lifecycle that biologists wish to 
explain, the first four of which receive straightforward biological explanations. 
However, the fifth, that the lifecycles of the cicadas are prime, is allegedly not so 
amenable to purely biological explanation. There are, Baker says, two different 
explanations that biologists have advocated (Baker 2005 p.230-231). The first of 
these is that in an earlier period of their evolutionary history periodical cicadas 
evolved in response to being the prey of predators that unlike the cicada-eating 
creatures of contemporary America, were also periodical. These predators would 
likely have low-number periods due to the fact that they would need to feed 
reasonably regularly, even with a slow metabolism, for unlike the periodical cicadas 
they could not simply subsist from a subterranean tree root. Prime-numbered 
lifecycles, it is argued, helped cicadas to avoid emerging at the same time as the 
predators. The second explanation is that prime lifecycles enabled periodical cicadas 
to more successfully avoid mating with other cicada species with different periods in 
an era in which there were more periodical cicada species than just the prime-
numbered Magicicada. This meant that cicadas would avoid producing offspring 
with different lifecycle periods (a ‘hybrid’) whose divergent lifecycles would greatly 
reduce mating opportunities and increase predator exposure. I shall focus on the 
first of these in this section.  
 It is evident that if a cicada wished to minimise contact with periodical 
predators, the best way is to minimise the frequency of the intersection of their 
emergence with that of the predators, in mathematical terms, to possess a lifecycle 
which maximises the lowest common multiple (lcm) of the two periods. Baker 
explains that the “fundamental” concept in the platonistic-mathematical explanation 
of such a minimisation is not in fact the monadic property of primeness but rather 
the dyadic property of ‘coprimeness’. Two numbers are coprime iff their only 
common factor is ‘1’. A lemma of number theory is given that relates maximal lowest 





Lemma 1: the lcm of m and n is maximal iff m and n are coprime. 
 
Thus if a cicada’s lifecycle m and the predator’s lifecycle n are coprime then the 
frequency of intersection of cicada and predator lifecycles will be minimal. Baker 
then shows that we can get from the coprimeness of the cicada/predator lifecycles 
to the primeness of the cicada lifecycle with an additional lemma of number theory: 
 
Lemma 2: m is coprime with all n such that (n < 2m and n ≠ m) iff m is prime. 
 
That is, any number less than twice an arbitrary prime number that is not that 
prime number will be coprime with that prime number. So if a cicada has a prime 
lifecycle its lifecycle will be coprime with the lifecycle of the predator and that it will 
thus intersect minimally with the lifecycle of the predator.  
Baker gives the entire explanation as follows (p.233, my emphasis), with 
both platonistic and non-platonistic components, claiming that “the purely 
mathematical component (2) is both essential to the overall explanation and 
genuinely explanatory in its own right”:  
 
1. Having a lifecycle period which minimises intersection with other periods is 
evolutionarily advantageous. (Biological Law) 
 
2. Prime periods minimise intersection compared to non-prime periods. (Number-
Theoretic Theorem) 
 
1 and 2 imply 3: 
 
3. Thus organisms with periodical lifecycles are likely to evolve prime periodical 





4. Cicadas in ecosystem-type E are limited by biological constraints to periods 
ranging from 14-18 years (12-15 years). 3 and 4 imply: 
 
5. Cicadas in ecosystem type E are likely to evolve 17 (13) year periods.  
If primeness plays a genuine role in the explanation of the lifecycle then we can see 
why a philosopher might hold that we are committed to platonistic objects (prime 
numbers) and platonistic concepts (primeness as a property of numbers).  
Although coprimeness and not primeness is doing most of the explaining, the 
primeness is important because a prime number is automatically coprime with a 
wide range of other numbers. But although prime periods p minimise intersection 
because they are coprime to all numbers n < 2p that are not p, there are other non-
prime numbers m which also minimise intersection relative to certain n, that is, 
composite numbers which are coprime with some n, e.g. 4 is coprime with 21. As not 
only prime numbers are coprime, primeness of a lifecycle is not essential in order 
for the lifecycle to minimise intersection with predators and there are instances 
where a non-prime lifecycle can be more advantageous than a prime lifecycle. The 
vast majority of predators will be non-periodical, and so will have a lifecycle of up to 
and including one year. Thus every time a periodical cicada emerges it will find itself 
in the company of non-periodical predators. But since such predators equally affect 
all cicadas of whatever lifecycle, prime or not, we may cease to consider them here, 
and need only consider periodical predators. Let us assume, with Baker, that the 
ecological conditions restrict northern-state cicadas to a lifecycle within the 14-18 
year range. If the only periodical predators around have a three year lifecycle, then 
there is no reason for evolution to select a 17 year lifecycle over e.g. a 14 year 
lifecycle, as 14, as well as 17, is coprime with 3. Moreover, it is more evolutionarily 
advantageous for a cicada to have a lifecycle of 14 years, than 17 years, all predation 
being equal, since it will have more frequent opportunities to mate. Both will be 
vulnerable to non-periodical predators every time they emerge but in a given time-
frame of e.g. fifty years, the 14 year cicada with its shorter lifecycle will be able to 
mate more frequently than the 17 year cicada and thus adapt/evolve more quickly. 




4 years, a 15 year cicada lifecycle is as coprime with 2 and 4 as 17 is, and again 
offers a mating advantage. So prime lifecycles do not offer any advantage in these 
cases.  
 It would thus only make sense for a cicada to evolve to be prime-periodical if 
there were many different predators with many different lifecycle periods 
themselves. For if the predators are 1, 2, 3 and 4-year periodical then a prime 
number lifecycle will evolve since it will be coprime with every possible predator 
lifecycle – but this is just to say that in the case that there are periodical predators 
for all relevant possible lifecycles a periodical predator can occupy then the prime 
number lifecycle will evolve. And if the focus is shifted from predation to 
hybridisation, the point still stands: yes a cicada may mate with cicadas of other 
periods and produce hybrids, and being coprime with these other cicada lifecycles 
offers an advantage in avoiding them. But if these other cicadas do not have periods 
of every possible relevant type then there is no guarantee that being prime is an 
advantage to a cicada lifecycle, and as with the example above, could in fact impede 
mating, since there will be shorter periods that will likely result in mating 
opportunities as safe, hybridisation-wise, as the prime periods, but which offer 
more frequent opportunities for mating. If a rational cicada got to choose its 
lifecycle behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, ignorant of actual predation and mating 
conditions, it would be a safe bet to choose a prime lifecycle. But although evolution 
does not work like this, and in fact progresses due to actual, and not merely possible, 
conditions that affect natural selection, it is still the case that if there are many 
cicadas and predators with a broad range of periods prime lifecycles will be 
evolutionary advantageous, and given the undeniable fact that the magicicada has a 
prime lifecycle it seems that must be what has happened, if evolutionary theory is at 
all true. The question is, is the use of the platonistic (number-theoretic) concept of 
primeness, or the prime numbers, in this explanation, essential to it? Some 












3.4 Arguments Against the Cicada Example 
 
Helpfully for our purposes here, Baker, in a recent article (2009), categorises the 
various negative responses that have been made to his cicada example. I am going to 
focus on two of these that seem especially worth discussing: that the choices of 
mathematical objects and concepts in the explanation are arbitrary; and that the 
explanandum itself is not purely physical and thus begs the question against the 
impossibility of genuine platonistic explanations of physical phenomena. I argue 
that although these arguments are initially compelling, Baker’s responses to both of 
these criticisms are adequate. To these therefore I add an objection of my own, that 
we don’t need to appeal to primeness (or more importantly, coprimeness) as 
platonistic components in the genuine explanation of what is going on, since we can 
state primeness and coprimeness nominalistically. This shows that the role of the 
platonistic objects here need be nothing more than representational, a way to talk 
about empirical structures (of years for instance), but not essential, in principle, to 
explanations concerning them, and that platonistic concepts can be replaced with 
nominalistically acceptable concepts which can do the explaining just as well as the 




The concern with respect to arbitrariness is that if something is arbitrary to an 
explanation of x it is not necessary to explain x, and cannot thus be part of the 
genuine explanation of x. It seems therefore that a well-supported accusation of 
arbitrariness is a worry to the believer in genuine platonistic explanations of 
physical phenomena. There are three possible charges of arbitrariness that can be 




2009), though I am concerned with only two here – object-level arbitrariness and 
concept-level arbitrariness.  
Object-level arbitrariness is the claim that the specific platonistic (and indeed 
some of the physical) objects referred to in the explanation are arbitrary. For 
example instead of the 13 or 17 years that form prime periods, we could have 
discussed 676 or 884 months, neither of which is a prime number. Baker’s answer 
to this charge is that the years are physically significant in this example given that 
cicada lifecycles must be governed at least in part with respect to the seasons. There 
is perhaps more to say here, but Baker’s response is cogent, and so we can progress 
to more concerning criticisms.  
Concept-level arbitrariness means that the concepts involved in the 
explanation are arbitrary, e.g. the very notions of ‘prime’ and ‘coprime’. If there are 
explanations of the cicada example which have, as far as our current resources are 
concerned, an equal claim to be genuine and that do not invoke primeness, then 
primeness would seem to be arbitrary. This objection would seem to affect both 
platonistic and nominalistic statements of primeness But can we give a good 
explanation that does not involve primeness?. Juha Saatsi (2007) presents an idea 
for how we can avoid primeness, e.g. by utilising a more specific explanation, in the 
sense that what is important is that the periods are 13 and 17, not that the periods 
are prime. This would not of course demonstrate that prime numbers are arbitrary, 
but could demonstrate that the concept of primeness is arbitrary, at least to this 
explanation. How could we use 13 and 17 without explicitly using primeness? Saatsi 
suggests laying down sticks of 1 unit (and 2 units and 3 units…to e.g. 18 units) end 
to end and observing that concatenations of sticks of length 13 units or 17 units 
need to be longer than concatenations of sticks of up to 18 units in order to make 
concatenations of length equal to any other concatenations. This would convey that 
concatenations of 13 and 17 units are best for maximising the lowest common 
multiple, at least within a certain range, without explicitly invoking the concept of 
primeness. This objection is however vulnerable to the counter-objection that it 
may be incoherent to invoke prime numbers without invoking primeness itself, 




requested. Granting that Baker’s example way well be immune to charges of 
arbitrariness, both objectual and conceptual, let us progress to the second objection, 
that Baker’s example is question-begging.  
 
3.4.2 Begging the Question  
 
Sorin Bangu (2008) believes he can undermine Baker’s strategy by showing that 
what is being explained in the cicada example by appeal to number theory is an 
already partly platonistic phenomenon, and that the example therefore begs the 
question in favour of platonistic mathematics being a genuine part of the 
explanation. Specifically, the issue is that Baker’s explanandum is not purely 
physical because the explanandum in question is ‘periodic cicada lifecycles are 
prime’. Bangu contends that this explanandum clearly contains the platonistic 
concept of primeness, and that it is no surprise that the explanans of a platonistic-
mathematics-containing explanandum has to involve platonistic mathematical facts. 
As Bangu points out, if the explanandum did not contain any platonistic 
mathematics there may be little need for the explanans to contain any either, 
leading us to the conclusion that the explanandum begs the question against the 
impossibility of genuine platonistic explanations of physical phenomena if those 
phenomena are described platonistically, and if they are not described 
platonistically there would seem to be no need to bring platonistic mathematics into 
their explanations. If the cicada example does beg the question in favour of what it is 
trying to establish, then it can’t very well be accepted as showing that there are 
genuine platonistic explanations of empirical phenomena.  
 Baker agrees with Bangu that this argument has a certain plausibility. 
However, he does think that there is a way out. Baker’s counter-argument runs as 
follows (Baker 2009, pp.620-621). We begin with two pieces of data: (1) the length 
(in years) of cicada species A’s lifecycle is 13 and (2) the length (in years) of cicada 
species B’s lifecycle is 17. This, explains Baker, is nominalistically acceptable (i.e. 
does not involve any of the platonistic mathematics at issue) since 13 and 17 can be 




thing1, and another thing2...and another thing13 all with the property of being a year 
of a cicada’s lifecycle, none of these things are the same, and if anything else has the 
property in question then it is one of the aforementioned things’. The need to 
interpret 13 and 17 as names for abstract mathematical objects has thus been 
dispensed with, and at present no question has been begged. Now, Baker needs to 
show that moving from 13 and 17 to primeness does not beg any questions. One 
way of doing this would be to provide a logical definition of primeness just as he 
was able to provide logical definitions of the numbers, but Baker is sceptical of this. 
At least, he agrees that this cannot be done with first-order logic, and, I presume 
because of the possibility that second-order logic may be set-theory in disguise, 
does not consider second-order formulations of the concept.41 So he needs another 
argument to show that we can move from 13 and 17 to primeness without begging 
any questions.42  
Baker explicitly gives such an argument (ibid. p.621-622). I add the actual 
argument below each premise in brackets: 
 
(i) Biological data, D 
[species A has a lifecycle of 13 years] 
(ii) Tentative hypothesis H containing mathematical concepts 
[A has a prime lifecycle] 
(iii) Explanation E of H which is also an explanation E* of D 
[that periodical lifecycles are likely to be prime explains why A has a prime 
lifecycle – and why A has a 13 year lifecycle] 
(iv) E* is the best explanation of D 
                                                 
41
 Baker also neglects to consider any possible plural-logic formulations of primeness, based on work 
such as Boolos (1984) and Hossack (2000). In this thesis my approach is to follow Rizza (2011) and 
treat years as unit-intervals of some sort and then talk about primeness nominalistically in terms of 
congruence of segments partitioned into such intervals. The plural logic approach is very interesting 
but due to space restrictions here I will have to examine it in future work. 
42 It might be thought that Baker can rest content once a logical definition of 13 and 17 is provided, 
and ignore the concept of primeness altogether. Even if one were happy to proceed without such a 
definition (though as I said in connection with Saatsi’s objection, such an endeavour may not even be 
coherent) it is the properties of prime numbers in general and not just the properties of numbers 13 
and 17 that seems to explain the lifecycles of both the 13 and 17 year cicadas AND why cicadas would 
likely develop prime lifecycles. For the claim that  ‘periodical lifecycles are likely to be prime’ does 
have the form of an explanation of (1) and (2) and also enables us to make predictions about other 
periodical creatures, namely that they are, biological constraints permitting, likely to evolve prime 




[that periodical lifecycles are likely to be prime is the best explanation of why 
A has a 13 year lifecycle] 
(v) So we should believe E* and therefore, E. 
[so we should believe that periodical lifecycles are likely to be prime] 
(vi) But D and E together imply H 
[the fact that species A has a lifecycle of 13 years together with the principles 
that periodical lifecycles are likely to be prime imply A has a prime lifecycle] 
(vii) So we ought to believe H  
[so we ought to believe that A has a prime lifecycle] 
 
The question of course is, does this ingenious combination of inference to the best 
explanation and ‘bootstrapping’ meet Bangu’s clear and concise objection? Prima 
facie one may well think that it does not – hesitancy could lie in the fact that Baker 
recommends that “from a philosophical perspective therefore we do not at this 
stage endorse [(1*) A’s lifecycle is prime or (2*) B’s lifecycle is prime] for fear of 
begging the question” (ibid. p.621). Rather we ‘tentatively advance’ (1*) and (2*). 
And it might be thought that it is not apparent how tentatively advancing that 
something is prime is any more nominalistically acceptable than endorsing outright. 
After all, if I tentatively open an email, the important thing is that I opened it, not 
how, and so it may be felt that this strategy is little more than equivocation on 
Baker’s part, for the purpose of masking the inadequacies in the cicada account and 
justifying Baker’s intuitions. But to believe this is to approach the issue of ‘tentative 
advancing’ with a lack of subtlety – if one goes carefully, and charitably, through 
Baker’s new argument, without construing ‘tentative advancing’ as just an 
adverbially modified advancing, but rather as a sort of hypothetical advancing, it is 
clear that no question is in fact being begged here. So Bangu’s objection is met and 
Baker, for now, is safe.  
 
 
3.4.3 Dispensing with Platonistic Mathematics: An Objection to Baker  
 
I agree that Baker’s example is a good one, but I deny that the existence of genuine 
platonistic explanations of physical phenomena follows from it. This is because I 
think that the number-theoretic explanation of the cicada lifecycle can be 




theoretic (and therefore platonist, since numbers are abstract mathematical objects) 
claims from the explanation of the periodical cicada lifecycle would severely 
impoverish it, that we want to keep the explanation so we had jolly well better keep 
the platonistic part of it. But if it is possible to nominalise the explanation then we 
can avoid the poverty of either having to make do with only specific causal stories 
peculiar to particular cicadas, or accepting that platonistic mathematics plays a 
genuinely explanatory but non-causal role.  
My strategy will be to show that we can give non-platonistic definitions of 
those concepts that possessed such unifying power in Baker’s example, namely the 
concepts of primeness and coprimeness, and thus that the platonistic construal of 
these concepts is dispensable to the genuine explanation of the cicada lifecycle. If we 
can do so then the argument that there are genuine platonistic explanations of 
physical phenomena loses its force. Now, Baker explicitly says “…the number-
theoretic notion of primeness plays a key role, and—despite the relative simplicity 
of the mathematics involved—no easy nominalistic paraphrases are available” 
(Baker 2009 p.619). No easy paraphrases perhaps, but certainly not no paraphrases. 
Indeed we can give, as I will shortly show, a nominalistic paraphrase.  
The usual way of thinking about properties such as primeness is as a 
property of numbers. But we do not have to think like this. One alternative is a 
geometric interpretation: treat such properties as pertaining to intervals.43 For 
instance, in the cicada case, divisibility will be a relation between time-intervals. I 
propose to follow Davide Rizza’s approach in his paper ‘Magicicada, Mathematical 
Explanation and Mathematical Realism’ and nominalise the cicada example by using 
the geometric approach.  
The basic units in the cicada example are years. Sequences of years are time-
intervals, and these time-intervals themselves may be composed of smaller time-
                                                 
43
 If we dislike this because we consider that geometry is too platonistic, Rizza says we can think of 
the various properties involved as empirical, and talk about congruence and divisibility etcetera as 
empirical relations among attribute-intervals (Rizza 2011 p.107f). Indeed I think there must be such 
properties and relations, and I discuss this briefly below. However these properties and relations are 
precisely what we want to represent, to abstract from, in order to facilitate counting, measuring, and 
the description of attributes etc. As such a more general language is required, and this is what the 




intervals. For clarity I will refer to the larger intervals as sequences, and the 
individual year-long intervals as unit-intervals. Although natural numbers form an 
infinite ordinal sequence, properties such as primeness and operations such as 
multiplication do not depend on this infinity. For instance, 17 would be prime even 
if there were no numbers after 20 (in this case 40% of the numbers would be prime, 
so primeness would not be such a rare and interesting property!)  The upshot of this 
is that we can refer to the primality of some sequences with respect to unit-intervals 
even when all of the sequences involved are finite. These sequences can be 
represented by a line segment split into congruent unit-intervals which represent 
years. The unit-intervals must be congruent because years are all of the same 
duration. This gives: 
 
 
 “One may simply say that a sequence X of consecutive intervals ‘divides’ a sequence 
[of consecutive intervals] Y if successive congruent copies of X determine an interval 
congruent to Y” (Rizza 2011, p.106). Thus if X = ab and if Y = ag, then X will divide Y, 
since if we juxtapose X to copies of itself, we will get a sequence congruent to Y. 
‘Juxtaposition’ of a sequence with itself here refers to there being successive 
congruent copies of that sequence. So far so good, and we haven’t referred to any 
platonistic entities at all. What of the concepts of primeness and coprimeness? A 
sequence of unit-intervals X will be coprime with respect to another sequence of 
unit-intervals Y if the only sequence dividing them both is a sequence congruent to 
the unit-interval. Suppose X is ad and Y is ag (ag is a prime sequence). The only 
sequence that can be juxtaposed to copies of itself  in order to give both ad and ag is 
the sequence ab, which is congruent to the unit-interval. If a sequence X is prime it 
will be coprime with a very broad range of other sequences Y, namely all those 
sequences Y which are shorter than any sequence Z where Z is congruent to X 
juxtaposed to a copy of  X, and where Y is not identical to X. A sequence X will be 




prime when the only sequence that can divide X is the unit-interval and X. Thus 
nominalistic versions of primeness and coprimeness have been defined, and the 
need to give platonistic formulations of these concepts has been obviated. Since X 
being a prime sequence minimises the range of sequences which can divide both X 
and Y, the greatest common divisor of X and Y within the above mentioned range 
will be the unit-interval, so the range of possible divisors will be reduced to just that 
interval.  
Suppes (and Rizza) also show that we can prove the existence of a 
representation function from the empirical relational structure 〈A, ÷4〉, where A is a 
finite sequence of consecutive and congruent unit-intervals, to the numerical 
relational structure 〈N, >4〉. The empirical comparison relation is ab ÷4 cd, where ÷4 
is the quaternary relation ‘interval ab is longer than interval cd’. A structure 
containing this relation is known as a finite equal-interval difference structure. The 
numerical comparison relation >4 is the quaternary relation m - l < o – n. Rizza 
(2011, p.107) explains that the appropriate axioms for proving the required 
representation theorem are to be found in Suppes (1972) paper ‘Finite Equal-
Interval Measurement Structures’. This theorem (with the vocabulary altered to 
reflect that used in this thesis) is: 
 
“Let 〈A, ÷4〉 be a finite, equally-spaced difference structure. Then there exists a real-
valued function φ  on A such that for every a, b, c, d in A, ab  ÷4 cd iff φ(a) − φ(b) >4 
φ(c) − φ(d).” (Suppes 1972, p.50).  
 
Finite, equally-spaced difference structures (including the above sequence of years) 
are those which satisfy the following axioms: (1) ÷4  imposes a weak order; (2) if 
ab  ÷4 cd then ac  ÷4 bd; (3) if ab  ÷4 cd then dc  ÷4 ba; (4) If aJb and cJd  then ab ~ cd. 
Axiom 4 expresses the equal-spacing assumption, the congruence of the intervals, 
and its predicate J is defined as obtaining iff  a ÷ b and for all c in A, if a ÷ c then 
either b ~ c or b ÷ c. (Suppes 1972 p.50). If the reader is interested in the proof of 




We thus see that although numbers can be invoked to give a familiar way of 
treating the primeness and coprimeness of sequences of years, no numbers in fact 
have to be appealed to at all in order to keep the explanation. This means it is 
possible to express when the intersection of the lifecycles in years of those cicadas 
and predators will be minimised without using abstract mathematical objects, that 
we can talk about minimised periods of intersection without reference to the lowest 
common multiples or greatest common divisors of pairs of numbers. For if two 
sequences of years are coprime, the intersection of predators and cicadas 
possessing those sequences as lifecycles will be minimised, since by definition the 
year-long unit-interval is the smallest unit of time in the sequences. Platonistic 
mathematics may be a useful way of talking about empirical attributes, and this 
usefulness extends to the making of very particular descriptions and predictions, 
but it is a tool only, and there is no reason, despite Baker’s attempt, to think it a 
feature of any genuine explanations of physical phenomena, least of all the lifecycles 
of the periodical cicada. For  the dispensability of the platonistic explanation shows 
that it is not a genuine explanation, regardless of what our attitude towards of 
platonistic explanation is.  
Now this may be though superficially similar to Saatsi’s attempt exposited 
above (as mentioned in Baker 2009) to show that the references to prime numbers 
in the cicada example are not essential, by instead talking about sticks laid end to 
end, and seeing that what is important is that they are 13 and 17 units long, not that 
they are prime. But this is not so. Firstly I agree that the primeness is an essential 
part of the explanation, but I deny that we have to think about this platonistically, or 
draw any inferences about the existence of abstract mathematical objects from it. 
Secondly, the geometric approach outlined above can easily be adapted to a variety 
of situations, and thus has a generalness that Saatsi’s example lacks. Numbers may 
be a good way to talk about common structural properties that different systems 
possess, but they are by no means the only way to do so: the geometric approach 
utilised above also enables us to speak generally about structural properties of 
systems of objects by talking about properties of sequences of intervals. It may be 




numbers they do appear to have an abstract character, especially insofar as it does 
not seem to be the properties of any particular sequence that is doing the explaining. 
Moreover there may be different sequences doing the explaining in different cases, 
whereby we have properties of lots of different sequences explaining diverse 
situations, and have gained concreteness at the price of the unity, the unity that the 
number-theoretic approach provides in explanations of different explananda. One 
possible response to this is to talk about resemblances between these different 
sequences, along the lines of one standard nominalist response to the metaphysical 
realist about universals and types. Unfortunately I do not have space to pursue this 
further here, but it is certainly an avenue for future research.  
One quick point. It may be objected that I earlier endorsed only causal 
explanations, and that was reason I wanted to do away with platonistic explanations 
of empirical phenomena. So it may be asked exactly what trading the platonistic 
evolutionary explanation for the nominalistic one has gained me. After all, it is not as 
if I am suggesting that the geometric representation of the year-intervals has a 
causal power the platonistic definition lacks. Whether platonistic or nominalistic it 
seems primeness and coprimeness are still doing the explaining. My response to this 
is to take Rizza up on his suggestion that we treat the property of primeness and 
relations of divisibility, coprimeness etc as primitive empirical properties and 
relations. Thus we can see primeness as a genuine property of time-sequences, and 
coprimeness as a genuine relation between them. The reason the cicadas survive is 
because of these empirical relations between their life cycles, relations whose 
properties are best understood by ascending to  a greater level of abstraction. The 
unit-intervals of these empirical sequences are what are represented by the 
platonistic objects, and the properties and relations of these sequences are what are 
represented by the platonistic concepts of primeness and co-primeness (mutatis 
mutandis in the geometric approach by the nominalistic versions of these objects 
and concepts, viz. intervals and interval properties). The beauty of the nominalistic 
approach is that it offers a way of representing empirical structures that does not 
use platonistic objects, and is thus available to the philosopher who wishes to 




A similar view to my representational conception of applied mathematics 
(though not directly concerning the cicada example, which came later) is endorsed 
by Joseph Melia in his paper ‘Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument’ 
(2000).  Melia argues that abstract mathematical objects are not explanatory in their 
own right, but merely index elements of the empirical situation which themselves do 
the explanatory work, e.g. the fact a is 7/11 metres from b merely indexes a certain 
distance relation, namely that a and b are the distance apart that they are. That is to 
say, Melia is claiming in effect that the platonistic mathematics here is purely 
representational. I give the quote in full. It concerns a mathematical theory T2: 
 
The fact that T2 is capable of generating infinitely many distance predicates using 
only a few primitives does not entail that the distance relations expressed by these 
predicates are themselves not primitive, irreducible, relations. Indeed, in this 
particular case, although T2 expresses the fact that a is 7/11 metres from b by using a 
three place predicate relating a and b to the number 7/11, nobody thinks that this fact 
holds in virtue of some three-place relation connecting a b and the number 7/11. 
Rather the numbers are used merely to index different distance relations, each real 
number corresponding to a different distance. (Melia 2000, p.473).  
 
This reference to indices is a clear gesture at a mapping account of applicability, 
where to say that numbers index distances is to say that they measure distances, 
that a number represents a distance. Baker concedes that “even if [Melia – and a 
fortiori myself] were to concede [that primeness is ineliminable from the cicada 
example], Melia could still maintain that the [platonistic] mathematics is not 
genuinely explanatory in its own right but rather is a non-explanatory component of 
a larger explanation” (Baker 2009, p.622). And this is exactly what I have said above, 
and in chapter two – we may indispensably need some sort of mathematical 
structures and concepts (platonistic or nominalistic) for measuring empirical 
phenomena and for both arriving at and stating scientific theories, but the mapping 
account holds that the use of mathematics here is purely representational, that it is, 
as Baker puts it, a non-explanatory component of a larger, empirical, theory. 
 I have argued above that there are no such things as genuinely platonistic 
explanations of empirical phenomena, for in no way is the platonistic mathematics 




attributed. We saw that the most notable case of a philosopher trying to locate an 
uncontroversial example of such an explanation (drawn from biology not physics) 
has been Baker’s cicada example. I then evaluated these arguments, conceding to 
Baker that none of them seemed entirely convincing, before presenting my own 
argument against him, along the lines that we can give a nominalistic version of the 
objects and concepts involved in terms of sequences of time-intervals and their 
properties and relations. Since these are available there is no reason to think 
platonistic mathematics a genuine part of the explanation. It may be objected that 
this does not show the dispensability of platonistic explanations of empirical 
phenomena, only dispensability in this single case.44 But I believe that enough has 
been said to make cast significant doubt on the possibility of finding other necessary 
examples of such explanations. Until (per impossible) such an explanation is found I 
will persist in my claim that there are no such explanations, and that any account of 
the applicability of mathematics must focus on the representational aspects of 
mathematics only.45 At the very least both parties to the debate must agree with 
Colyvan that “[t]he debate over platonism and nominalism would be genuinely 
advanced by a better understanding of explanation – especially those explanations 
that have mathematics playing the leading role” (Colyvan 2010, p.304). The next 
chapter, chapter four, will examine in detail how it is possible to give nominalistic 
versions of more complicated platonistic-mathematics-containing empirical 
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 Recall that Baker does mention other cases, e.g. Colyvan’s example of antipodal points, but he expresses 
reservations about its explanatoriness (Baker 2005 p.226-7). As regards Colyvan’s examples of the bending 
of light and  Minkowsi space-time, Baker is concerned that geometrical explanations may not be viewed as 
platonistic – they could be viewed as based on facts about physical space. To he clearly takes his cicada 
example to be the only case given his paper that he feels unequivocally supports his argument.  
45
 It has been pointed out to me that Lyon and Colyvan (2008) claim such an example with the explanatory 
power of phase spaces in the explanation of galactic stability. They argue that phase-space theories cannot 
be nominalised, and that even if they can much explanatory power is lost in the nominalisation. They say 
“…as Malament points out, it seems highly unlikely that Field can provide a nominalist account for the 
structure of phase spaces. Or at least nothing in Field’s treatment of space-time indicates how phase spaces 
would be nominalised” (p.240). This is certainly a claim I would need to address in future work, but I 
would observe here that Lyon and Colyvan have not shown for certain such a nominalisation is impossible, 
and the fact a nominalisation does not follow easily from Field’s treatment of space time is to a degree 
irrelevant here, as I have not claimed Field’s approach is the only viable strategy towards nominalisation. 
Clearly further work needs to be done in order to buttress the notion that mathematics has only a 




theories, further undermining the view that platonistic mathematics is essential to 






Future discussions of this 
area must take up where 
Field leaves off. 









The purposes of this chapter are twofold. Firstly a positive proposal is given for 
showing how it is that we can state scientific theories in such a way that 
platonistic mathematics does not appear as part of those theories. This is 
essential, since although the previous chapter argued that there are no genuine 
platonistic explanations of empirical phenomena, it showed positively how we 
could dispense with mathematics in a only a fairly simple case. Secondly, this 
chapter shows in detail how we need only assume that the applicability of 
mathematics consists in the ability of mathematics to represent physical 
phenomena in a certain way, by giving an account of a scientific theory 
(Newtonian gravitational theory) in which the mathematics involved is purely 
extrinsic to, that is, has only a representational role in, the theory. This is 
achieved by showing that there is a nominalistic, intrinsic version of the 
aforementioned theory, which is equivalent to the platonistic version, as there 
is an isomorphism between the nominalistic and platonistic structures involved. 
These two aims are realised chiefly through an engagement with and exposition 
of Hartry Field’s monograph, Science Without Numbers. In the final section I 






4.1. Chapter Introduction  
 
The question of whether or not platonistic mathematics is indispensable to science 
is central to contemporary philosophy of mathematics because so many discussions 
about the plausibility of platonism have directly concerned the issue of 
indispensability. As I have said before, this thesis is primarily concerned with the 
applicability of mathematics rather than the plausibility of platonism per se, 
although I do address the platonism/nominalism debate in chapter six, and said a 
little at the end of the previous chapter. The focus of the that chapter was  not on 
indispensability as an argument for platonism but rather with genuinely platonistic 
explanations of empirical phenomena, the main argument concerning which was 
given by Baker, and the purpose of my response was to justify the representational 
character of applied mathematics. Thus any strike against platonism vis a vis the 
undermining of Baker’s attempt to salvage the indispensability argument has been 
entirely accidental. At this stage I am agnostic about platonism, though opposed to it 
having an indispensable role in explanations of empirical phenomena.  
I have argued against Baker that his evolutionary example was not a genuine 
platonistic explanation of an empirical phenomenon because the platonistic 
mathematics was dispensable to it. I did this by showing that the platonistic 
mathematics used in Baker’s example could be formulated in a nominalistically 
acceptable way. In this chapter I shall utilise Field’s account of how to nominalise 
physical laws to demonstrate in detail how platonistic mathematics can be 
dispensed with in physical as well as biological explanations – specifically I look at 
Newtonian gravitational theory. Baker could grant dispensability in this case, 
holding that the platonistic mathematics in Newtonian gravitational theory does not 
have the sort of explanatory role he claimed for platonistic mathematics in his 
evolutionary example, but rather a descriptive role that can be dispensed with. Not 
all philosophers who think that platonistic mathematics is essential to scientific 
explanations would agree with this descriptive-role attribution however, since 




quantification over an array of abstract mathematical objects. Such philosophers 
would include those confirmational holists who are sceptical of the Fieldian 
programme are and fans of the indispensability argument.   
If it can be shown that platonistic mathematics is dispensable in both some 
evolutionary and some classical mechanical cases, and if there is no good reason not 
to think the success of these examples can be reproduced, then this bodes well for 
the prospect of showing that such mathematics is inessential to scientific theories in 
general. Since the evolutionary example was defused, so to speak, in the last chapter, 
I shall address the classical mechanical case in this chapter, as well as taking a look 
at the possible extension of the methods used in the classical mechanical case to 
Quantum Mechanics, which has been advocated by Mark Balaguer. I go into 
significant detail in both these cases to make it clear what is being accomplished and 
how these programmes actually work. The purposes of this enterprise is to see in 
much greater detail, and for an actual physical theory, how it is that platonistic 
mathematics is dispensable, and that the role of such mathematics here is a purely 
representational one, explicable, as I argued in chapter two, in terms of mappings 




4.2. Field’s Nominalisation of Newtonian Gravitational 
Theory 
 
In 1980 Hartry Field published a monograph containing a nominalist philosophy of 
mathematics, Science Without Numbers. Although Field intended his book to 
establish the plausibility of nominalism, it contains much material relevant to the 
philosopher who is agnostic about platonism but who is investigating the 
applicability of mathematics, and it was one of the first detailed philosophical 
treatments of applicability. Field regarded the indispensability argument as the best 





…there is one and only one serious argument for the existence of [abstract] 
mathematical entities and this is the Quinean argument that we need to postulate such 
entities in order to carry out ordinary inferences about the physical world and in order 
to do science.   (Field 1980 p.5)  
 
The truth or otherwise of the substantive claim in this quotation – that the Quinean 
indispensability argument is the only serious argument for platonism – is not 
relevant to the considerations in this chapter, although I discuss this argument 
briefly in chapter six. We need only recognise that it was the indispensability 
argument which provoked Field to seek to demonstrate that platonistic 
mathematics, though very useful for scientists, is not in fact indispensable to science. 
Whilst Field has attempted to show that this mathematics is (in principle) 
dispensable to science, he acknowledges that for scientists to directly adopt the 
nominalistic way of doing science without platonistic mathematics would be very 
difficult indeed, and Field admitted that he does “not of course claim that 
nominalistic concepts are anywhere near as convenient to work [with] in solving 
problems or performing computations: for these purposes the usual numerical [i.e. 
platonistic] apparatus is a practical necessity” (Field 1980 p.91). I shall now turn to 
the details of how Field’s programme actually works.   
 
 
4.2.1 The Background to the Fieldian Programme  
 
Although Field believes that platonistic statements are not literally true and that 
abstract mathematical objects and structures are useful fictions he does not have to 
reject or denounce the practice of platonistic mathematics along with all its utility, 
since he establishes the conservativeness of platonistic mathematics over 
nominalist science, thereby licensing the purely instrumental use of platonistic 
mathematics by the nominalistically inclined scientist without the possibility of any 
nominalist consequences that were not already implicit in the nominalist premises. I 
shall not present the details of conservativeness in this chapter, since (a) it is largely 




addressed in detail in chapter six, where I am more directly concerned with the 
existence of abstract mathematical objects and the plausibility of Field’s programme 
as a sui generis nominalist programme rather than just as a means to produce non-
platonistic versions of scientific theories.   
Field explains that one benefit of a non-platonistic formulation is that “it 
would be illuminating if we could…[have] an explanation that did not invoke 
functions to extrinsic…entities” (Field 1980 p.43). Such an explanation would not 
make references to either arbitrary coordinate systems, or to arbitrary units for 
scalar attributes such as temperature and mass, or indeed to any abstract 
mathematical objects at all. Chapter two of this thesis explained how it is that 
mathematics can be applied, given its representational role, and made it clear why 
mathematics is applied, namely it makes things a great deal simpler. Below we see 
in detail how it is that platonistic mathematics makes things a great deal simpler in a 
particular case, namely Newtonian gravitational theory. What we see however is 
that just because one theory makes another one easier to state does not mean that it 
is essential to that other theory. It may have been unintentional, but Field, in the 
course of trying to nominalise science, actually shines much light on this very topic 
and indeed the mapping account itself, by showing in several instances how it is that 
platonistic mathematics can usefully represent empirical phenomena and assist in 
the development and statement of empirical theories despite being extrinsic to the 
subject matter of those very theories.  
 
 
4.2.2. Nominalising Newtonian Space-Time and Magnitudes of Scalar 
Attributes.  
 
Before showing how science can be nominalised, Field establishes some results 
concerning the conservativeness of platonistic mathematics over nominalist 
theories, that platonistic mathematics is not essential to the derivation of the 
nominalist consequences of a nominalist theory. At any rate he establishes that if it 




will be a conservative extension of that theory. It is not until the nominalisation of 
Newtonian gravitational theory is complete that conservativeness becomes not just 
hypothetical, but a reality. For to show not just that conservativeness is a possibility 
in the case of scientific theories but that there is some such (nominalised) scientific 
theory such that platonistic mathematics is a conservative extension of it, such a 
theory has to be constructed. Because, as I stated above, the fact of conservativeness 
itself is not directly relevant to the specifics of how to produce a nominalised 
version of a scientific theory I omit discussion of it here but will take it up again in 
chapter six.  
The nominalisation of Newtonian gravitational theory proceeds through the 
proof of representation theorems concerning isomorphisms between platonistic 
relational structures (in many instances the reals with addition and a comparison 
relation) and empirical relational structures (in this instance space-time points and 
various scalar attributes, with concatenation and a comparison relation). Using 
nominalistic predicates built out of primitive relations such as spatio-temporal 
betweeness, which are represented by platonistic predicates such as ‘x is greater 
than y but less than z’, Field arrives at nominalist definitions of various platonistic 
concepts. These platonistic definitions hold if, and only if, the nominalistic 
definitions do, a fact demonstrated by the existence of isomorphisms between the 
platonistic and empirical structures. Eventually enough concepts are defined that it 
is possible to give a nominalist statement of Newton’s gravitational laws. This 
section (4.2.2) will consider the proof of the necessary representation theorems, the 
next section (4.2.3) will consider the nominalist definitions of the various concepts 
that are essential for stating Newtonian gravitational theory nominalistically.  
In order to nominalise Newtonian space-time, Field uses the resources of 
measurement theory, normally construed as a branch of platonistic mathematics. It 
might be objected that Field has no place using such mathematics to establish his 
programme. Field’s response is that this is not an issue – he is showing the platonist, 
in platonist terms, why platonistic mathematics is dispensable to science, and is not 
“trying to…provide a positive argument for nominalism but to undercut the only 




indispensability argument is fine as far as my account of applicability in this thesis is 
concerned, since I could perfectly well be a platonist about mathematics and a 
nominalist about science, so long as the use of platonist mathematics in science was 
not the source of my belief in platonism. If this caveat is satisfied, I could help myself 
to platonistic mathematics for any legitimate purpose, including showing that 
platonistic mathematics is not essential for nominalistic science. For if a person 
believes in platonistic mathematics it does not follow that he believes in genuine 
platonistic explanations of physical phenomena, for instance. As an aside it may be 
wondered how the nominalist can account for the applicability of mathematics, a 
phenomenon undeniable whatever our views on what mathematics is and what it is 
about. The nominalist will thus need to provide an account of applicability, a fact 
underscored by Field himself who states that the problem of applicability is “the 
really fundamental one” (Field 1980, p.vii). It is clear that if there is a way of 
nominalising the mapping account, and thus measurement theory, in a non-circular 
manner then the nominalists can, in the manner of Sir Francis Drake, have the 
luxury of being able to explain applicability and defeat [some of] the platonists too. 
But that’s enough about metaphysics for now – I shall return to issues of platonism 
and nominalism in a later chapter.  
Let us now recall some of the content of chapter two. Measurement theory 
explains exactly how it is that a mathematical structure can represent an empirical 
structure, justifying our ascent to the mathematical level, our performance of 
operations on the mathematical structure, and our subsequent descent to the level 








Remember, a central part of measurement theory consists in the proof of 
representation and uniqueness theorems for the measurement of magnitudes of 
empirical attributes that are ordered in a certain way. Representation theorems 
establish a homomorphism φ between an ordered empirical relational structure and 
a (frequently) numerical relational structure such that for any two objects a and b of 
the domain of the empirical structure and an empirical comparison relation 
÷ concerning a given empirical attribute, a ÷ b iff φ(a) > φ(b), which means that the 
numerical structure can then be used to measure the magnitude of that attribute of a 
and b which is being considered. If the empirical domain were rods, the attribute 
length, and the numerical domain the real numbers, then the relevant 
representation theorem would show a homomorphism between lengths of the rods 
and the real numbers.46 Further conditions introduce an operation of concatenation, 
                                                 
46 It was shown in chapter two that it makes sense in fact to view the empirical domain as a set of 




Predictions etc.  
Ascent to the Mathematical 
(measurement of magnitudes 
empirical attributes etc) 
Descent to the Empirical 
(result of operation given an 
empirical interpretation) 
Operations Performed 
(numbers representing empirical magnitudes plugged 
into mathematically stated laws) 
Non-Mathematical  Derivation of the Results 




show that concatenation is additive, and ensure that the measurement is sensitive to 
the units involved.  
 Representation theorems thus prove that one collection of entities can 
represent another collection if the stipulated conditions are met. One of these 
collections will be the platonistic objects that are the real numbers in very many 
cases, ranging from the extensive measurement of lengths to some of the laws of 
classical mechanics. The other collection will consists of empirical objects and one, 
or some, of their attributes. In the case of Newtonian space-time Field envisages the 
empirical objects in question as ‘space-time points and regions of them’, an ontology 
motivated by Field’s substantivalist view of physical space. The debate over whether 
such entities are or aren’t nominalistically acceptable is relevant here, since if such 
space-time points and regions are not so acceptable then they cannot very well be 
used in a version of our scientific theories that does not quantify over abstract 
objects. However Field claims that “according to such theories [that take the notion 
of a field seriously] space-time points are causal agents in the same sense that 
physical objects are” (Field 1980 p.114, note 23). I direct the reader to Field’s 1984 
paper ‘Can we Dispense with Space-Time?’ for a persuasive account of the matter, 
and must now let it rest. 
Having granted space-time points as empirical objects, how are the 
appropriate representation theorems proved, and what do they say? The first 
representation and uniqueness theorems that need to be proved are those 
concerning the representation of spatio-temporal distance (where distance is a 
distinctly platonistic notion since it is given in numerical terms) by betweeness 
relations, and relations constructed out of betweeness relations, on space-time 
points.47 The proofs are not given due to lack of space, but any reader familiar with 
Krantz et al (1971) will see that these theorems are uncontroversial enough.  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
isomorphism between real numbers and the empirical structure, since not every possible magnitude 
of e.g. length, for instance, will be instantiated. 
47 The material in the box is distilled from chapter six of Field (1980), and much of it is quoted 
verbatim. 





The Representation and Uniqueness Theorems for Newtonian Space-Time 
 
(RST) – The empirical relational structure 〈Ν, Simul, Bet, S-Cong〉  satisfies the Szczerba-
Tarski axioms if and only if there is an isomorphism φ from N to R4 such that  
 
(a) ∀x,y [x Simul y ↔  φ4(x) = φ4(y)]  
(b) ∀x,y,z [y Bet xz ↔  dφ (x,y) + dφ (y,z) = dφ (x,z)]  
(c) ∀x,y,z,w [xy S-Cong zw ↔  ((φ4(x) = φ4(y)) & (φ4(z) = φ4(w)) & (dφ (x,y) =             
dφ (z,w))] 
 
Where dφ (x,y) is defined as: 










φi(x) is the ith component of the quadruple φ4(x), where each i corresponds to a 
dimension of space-time. Each ith difference is squared to ensure there are only positive 
differences – the square-rooting of the whole sequence is for the purposes of undoing the 
effects of the squaring once the positive distance has been obtained. 
 
N is the collection of space-time points, Simul is a (binary) simultaneity relation on 
space-time points, ‘x is simultaneous with y’. Bet is a (trinary) betweeness relation on 
space-time points, ‘y is between x and z’. S-Cong is (quaternary) spatial congruence 
relation on space-time points, x and y are congruent to z and w. 
 
 
 (UST) - given any model of the axiom system and any two functions φ and φ' whose 
domain is the domain of the model: if φ meets the conditions of the representation 
theorem (i.e. of (RST)), then φ' meets those conditions iff it has the form (T o φ); where T 
is a generalized Galilean transformation of R3, i.e. a transformation that can be obtained 
by some combination of shift of origin, reflection, rotation of axes, and multiplication of 
all coordinates by a positive constant (and where ‘o’ indicates functional composition). 
 
According to the representation theorem RST therefore, anything we could say about 
space-time using numerical distances and platonistic distance functions, we can say 
without using any such distance functions, and a fortiori, any numbers, at all. 
Moreover, the above-mentioned Szczerba and Tarski (1964) helpfully provide a set 
of geometrical axioms for affine geometry (a type of geometry that subsumes under 
its umbrella the geometry of Newtonian space) which use only the betweeness 
relation, and are therefore nominalistically acceptable alternatives to axioms that 




adequacy of these axioms, Szczerba and Tarski assure us that “…we easily obtain an 
adequate axiomatization by proceeding exactly as in the metric case…In this way we 
arrive, e.g., at the following axioms system…” (Szczerba and Tarski 1964, p.168). 48 




The Szczerba-Tarski Axioms 
 
Note: unless otherwise specified all variables are implicitly universally bound. 
 
A1.  Identity Axiom:  yBxx ⊃ x = y 
  
A2.  Transitivity Axiom:  (yBxz & zByu & y ≠ z) ⊃ yBxu 
 
A3.  Connectivity Axiom: (yBxz & yBxu & x ≠ y) ⊃ (zByu ∨ uByz) 
 
A4.  Extension Axiom:  (∃x)[yBxz & (x ≠ y)] 
 
A5.  Pasch’s Axiom:  (∃v)[(tBxu & uByz) ⊃ (vBxy & tBzv)] 
 
A6.  Desargue’s Axiom: 
 
xBtx' & yBty' & zBtz' & yBxu & y'Bx'u' & zBxv & z'Bx'v & zByw & z'By'w & ~(xBty) 
& ~(yBxt) & ~(tByx) & ~(yBtz) &  ~(zByt) & ~(tBzy) & ~(zBtx) & ~(xBzt) & ~(tBxz) 
&  ((x ≠ x') ⊃ vBuw) 
 
A7.  Lower Dimension Axiom:  (∃x)(∃y)(∃z) [~(yBxz) & ~(zByx) & ~(xBzy)] 
 
A8.  Upper Dimension Axiom: 
 
(∃u) [{uByz & [uBxt ∨ tBxu ∨ xBtu]} ∨ {uBxy & [uBzt ∨ zBtu]} ∨ 
{uBxz & [uByt ∨ yBtu]}] 
 
A9. Elementary Continuity Axiom Schema 
(v)(w){(∃z)[(φ & ψ)  ⊃ xBzy] ⊃ (∃u)[(φ & ψ)  ⊃ uBxy]} where φ stands for any 
formula in which the variables x, v, w …, but neither y nor z nor u may occur free and 
similarly for ψ , with x and y interchanged.  
 
 
                                                 
48 Note that I have rendered the axioms somewhat differently to Szczerba and Tarski to keep them in 




E.  Euclid’s Axiom 
(∃v,w) [{uBxt & uByz & (x ≠ u)} ⊃ {yBxv & zBxw & tBvw}] 
 
Since the Szczerba-Tarski axioms describe the geometry of Newtonian space-time, 
and because points in Newtonian space-time satisfy these axioms in the same way 
that quadruples of real numbers satisfy the numerical version of these axioms, we 
can conclude that Newtonian space-time can be represented nominalistically.  
Much remains to be done however in order to nominalise the entirety of 
Newtonian gravitational theory. For instance a nominalistic treatment of scalar 
quantities is needed, since Newtonian gravitational theory talks not only about 
distance relations between Newtonian space-time points, but also about 
comparisons between magnitudes of scalar attributes that regions of such space-
time points have, specifically the mass at a region, or the gravitational potential at a 
region. The earlier representation theorem RST has taken care of distance, but has 
omitted any mention of scalar attributes. Each scalar attribute needs its own 
representation theorem stating that the magnitudes of the attribute and some 
empirical comparison relation on these magnitudes maps on to the real numbers 
with the greater-than relation. Fortunately the form of the theorem is the same in 
the case of each scalar attribute, and so a theorem-template can be used, where the 
required attribute can just be inserted where needed. The representation (ψ) and 
uniqueness theorems for mass are (Field 1980 pp.56-57, mutatis mutandis): 
 
The Representation and Uniqueness Theorems for Scalar Quantities 
 
(RMass) –  The empirical relational structure 〈Ν, Scal-Bet, Scal-Cong〉 satisfies the 
axioms describing the scalar attribute in question (perhaps the axioms of extensive 
measurement considered earlier in chapter two) if and only if there is a homomorphism  
ψ from N to a connected subset of R such that 
 
(a) ∀x,y,z [y Scal-BetA xz ↔ either ψ(x) ≤ ψ(y) ≤ ψ(z) or ψ(z) ≤ ψ(y) ≤ ψ(x)] 








Thus, anything we can say about magnitude of a scalar attribute using numbers, we 
can say using space-time points and regions, and empirical relations on them. It may 
be thought that there is no homomorphism here, because betweeness and 
congruence do not map onto the ‘greater or equal to’ relation. However ‘having the 
same or greater mass’, ÷ , does map onto the ‘greater or equal to’ relation, and 
betweeness and congruence are constructed out of these in a way that preserves the 
mapping. So we would expect that since a ÷ b iff ψ(a) > ψ(b), a is between b and c iff 
b ÷ a and a ÷ c, or c ÷ a and a ÷ b if, that is if, ψ(b) > ψ(a) and ψ(a) > ψ(c) or ψ(c) > 
ψ(a) and ψ(a)  > ψ(b), and the same for congruence. And these are exactly the 
definitions Field gave above, so the mapping holds. 
 
 
4.2.3. Nominalising the Gravitational Theory and its Constituent Concepts 
 
To give a thorough account of Field’s nominalisation of Newtonian gravitational 
theory would be an extremely large undertaking that would take us far afield from 
the explanation of applicability with which this thesis is primarily concerned, and 
would moreover likely require such vast quotations from Field’s work that its 
originality would be highly diluted. This is because pages 61-91 of Science without 
Numbers consist primarily of sketches of, and dense attempts at producing, 
nominalist definitions of platonist concepts that appear in our physical theories, 
definitions which for obvious reasons it is not easy to reproduce in ones’ own words. 
I nevertheless do want to discuss Field’s nominalisation, and present some of the 
nominalistic definitions he gives of some platonistic concepts. After this has been 
done I shall summarise what Field has achieved, and look at how it is related to the 
mapping account.   
(UMass) - Given any model of the axiom system and any two functions ψ and ψ' whose 
domain is the domain of the model: if ψ meets the conditions of RMass then ψ' meets 
these conditions iff it has the form (T o ψ). Where Mass-Less is not used as a 
primitive, T is a linear transformation of the reals (a function of the form ax + b). If 
Mass-Less is used as a primitive, T is a positive linear transformation (a linear 




We saw above that the platonistic description of Newtonian space-time and 
numerical magnitudes of arbitrary scalar attributes of points and regions in that 
space-time can be replaced by talk of nominalistically acceptable structures. What 
we need next is a nominalisation of the laws concerning these attributes, since it is 
the business of physical science to state physical laws. Field notes: “…physical laws 
governing a scalar [attribute] like temperature or gravitational potential are often 
expressed as laws about a scalar function T, mapping quadruples of real numbers 
into real numbers” (Field 1980 p.59), in other words, mapping spatio-temporal 
coordinates into platonistic values of measurement. Since φ takes points of space-
time to quadruples of reals, and ψ  takes points of space-time to reals, the 
composition of φ and ψ, namely (ψ o φ-1), will take quadruples of reals to reals. (ψ o φ-1) 
is thus T, the subject matter of the platonistically-stated physical laws which we wish to 
nominalise.  
With this in mind, we stipulate that there is a joint axiom system (JAS) of the 
Szczerba-Tarski axioms and the empirical axioms governing the attribute in 
question such that if the empirical structure satisfies the JAS then there will exist 
representation functions ψ and φ. In a simple case the axioms governing the scalar 
attribute will be minimally the axioms for extensive measurement, but Field 
considers a more complex case where they are the axioms for gravitational potential 
and mass-density – in which case there will be T1 = (ψ o φ-1) and T2 = (ρ o φ-1) 
containing the scalar representation functions, ψ and ρ, and the gravitational law 
will describe the relation of T1 and T2. The JAS will of course involve the various 
primitive predicates (spatio-temporal and scalar) which have been defined for the 
set N of space-time points. Once the JAS is established and the representation 
theorems are proven then we know that we can dispense with the platonistic 
structure in favour of the empirical structure, since we can talk about space-time 
points, and their relations, rather than real numbers and relations of numbers.  
The question is, in all cases will we be able to do this? Field suggests that we 
can by actually doing it in the case of Newtonian gravitational theory. So far all that 




themselves. We have not yet shown how to nominalise the statement of the 
relations of these attributes to each other, that is, how to nominalise scientific laws. 
Representing space-time and scalar attributes was a fairly simple task, but to 
explain their relations, that is, to state the natural laws, requires quite a lot more 
apparatus, and as we saw at the end of chapter two the exact nature of this 
relationship is frequently quite complicated, though it will be attempted shortly in 
the case of gravitational theory. Usually in science, especially physics, a key part of 
the apparatus for expressing laws involves differential equations. Is Field able to 
nominalise differential equations as easily as he nominalised the numerical 
representation of Newtonian space-time, and scalar magnitudes? It might be 
thought that the real numbers can easily be nominalised so long as there is some 
sort of physical continuum to represent them, but that differential calculus is a very 
different matter. The reason for this view is that it is not necessarily clear what 
nominalistically acceptable relations of space-time points and their attributes would 
correspond to the platonistic relation described by the calculus. I shall try to show in 
what follows that this is a mistaken view, though a good deal of this will be a sketch. 
We need to establish that some nominalist version of a law is equivalent to the 
platonist statement, that N iff P. One question is: does the nominalist structure need 
predicates besides those that can be constructed out of empirical comparison 
relations on space-time points and their attributes in order to get the job done? 
Field argues that, at least in the case of Newtonian gravitational theory, it does not.  
There are a lot of nominalistic versions of platonist concepts to be 
constructed, and as I said above, I cannot realistically give them all here. Field 
attempts nominalist definitions, or at least sketches of such definitions, for all of the 
following platonistic concepts: continuity; products and ratios (signed and 
unsigned); derivatives (first- and higher-order); Laplaceans; Poisson’s Equation; 
inner products; gradients; differentiation of vector fields; and a Law of Motion. 
Before I progress any further, note that Field is not nominalising Newton’s work as 
it appears in his Principia Mathematica, but rather a more modern formulation of his 





By the Newtonian theory of gravitation I mean the theory of motion for an arbitrary 
particle, assuming that the only forces acting on the particle are gravitational forces. 
Given the space-time framework, which I have already shown how to handle 
nominalistically, the Newtonian theory of gravitation can be stated in two laws: a 
field equation governing a certain scalar field (the gravitational potential) and an 
equation of motion. The field equation is Poisson’s equation [and the equation of 
motion is Newton’s]. (Field 1980 p.78) 
 
Thus, to nominalise Newtonian gravitational theory it suffices to nominalise 
Poisson’s equation and the relevant law of motion. We know that if the platonist 
structure (numbers, platonistic operations and relations) is sufficient for expressing 
the two laws then the nominalist structure (space time points and empirical 
predicates, operations and relations) will likewise be sufficient, so long as there is 
an isomorphism between the two structures. What Field needs to show is that there 
is such an isomorphism. He has already shown there is an isomorphism between 
some less complex platonist and nominalist structures, and now he has to show that 
this isomorphism obtains between the structures we are interested in, as concerns 
the Newtonian gravitational theory.  
 
Poisson’s Equation. This equation is a partial differential equation that is a field 
equation, meaning that it describes how a fundamental force (in this case, gravity) 
interacts with matter. A field is a physical property associated with each point in 
space-time. Poisson’s equation in its general form is ∆φ = f, or specifically for gravity,  
∆φ = 4piGρ. The left hand side is the Laplace operator (which Field discusses, ibid 
p.76.) operating on a function representing gravitational potential at a point in a 
space. The right hand side of the equation is  product of number 4, pi, the universal 
gravitational constant (i.e. three constants) and the mass-density of the point. Thus 
“at any point the Laplacean of the gravitational potential is proportional to the 
mass-density at that point…” (Field 1980 p.78). Field points out that we can restate 
Poisson’s equation thus, where x and y are points, and rho is the symbol for mass-
density. (I have stated this in logical notation for clarity):  
 





This formula then is what Field needs to nominalise. It is evidently not 
nominalistically acceptable as it stands, because the Laplaceans and mass-densities 
are given numerically. To facilitate showing that this is equivalent to some 
nominalistic definition this we need to break the formula down into its constituent 
conjuncts: (Field pp. 79-80) 
 
(a) at any point the Laplacean of the gravitational potential is zero iff the mass-density of 
that point is zero 
 
(b) at any two points at which the mass density is not zero, the ratio of the Laplaceans of 
the gravitational potential is equal to the ratio of the mass-densities. 
  
We can then reconstruct (a) and (b) using the nominalistic versions of platonist 
concepts that Field has defined earlier in his monograph, e.g. the nominalist 
definition of ratio. Mass-density is slightly more complicated than attributes such as 
mass or length, as it is a derived and not a fundamental attribute, but that does not 
affect the substance of the argument. As Field himself notes, we can talk about 
comparisons of ratios of mass-density differences with ratios of gravitational 
potential differences in a manner similar to his earlier nominalistic treatment of 
ratios of other quantities. We shall see an example of some of these concepts after a 
brief look at the second half of the gravitational theory, the law of motion.  
 
The Law of Motion. As will be familiar to anyone with even the slightest knowledge 
of physics, there are various statements of the law of the motion of an arbitrary 
particle. The statement Field selects involves the notion of a tangent to a trajectory 
of such a point-particle (or trajectory-like region of space-time).  “A tangent to a 
trajectory T at point z is a straight line S through z such that the directional 
derivative of the spatial separation between T and S with respect to any vector 
exists and is zero at T. The tangent to T is unique if it exists…” (Field 1980 p.89), and 
a trajectory is differentiable at z if it has a tangent at z and this tangent is not purely 
spatial. The preliminary part of the law of motion consists in the claim that ‘the 
trajectory of any point particle is both trajectory-like and differentiable’. I shall 





The main part of the law of motion requires that we compare the accelerations of 
points on the same or different trajectories with the gradients of the gravitational 
potential at those points. Let T and T' be any trajectories and let z and z' be any 
points on them. Let S and S' be the tangents to T and T' at z and z' respectively and 
let y and y' be points on S and S' such that zy

 and z y′ ′

 are temporally congruent 
and have the same temporal orientation. The law of motion is then simply that there 
is a positive real number k such that:  
 
(1) the second directional derivative of the spatial separation of S from T at z with 
respect to zy

 taken twice is k times the gradient of the gravitational potential at z 
(2) the second directional derivative of the spatial separation of S' from T' at z' with 
respect to z y′ ′

 taken twice is k times the gradient of the gravitational potential at z'.  
 
Since Field has defined nominalist versions of the concepts, such as derivative, used 
in this statement of the law of motion, it is, as with Poisson’s equation, a relatively 
simple matter to produce a nominalist statement of this law. The interest here is not 
so much that the law can be nominalised, but rather with the ingenuity that Field 
uses to nominalise the component concepts in the law. I briefly want to outline three 
of these concepts, Field’s treatment of continuity; ratio and product; and his 
treatment of derivative or rate-of-change. As we shall see, and as with the 
nominalisation of Newtonian space-time above, Field uses ever more complex 
predicates built out of relations on space-time points and scalar attributes, and 
combinations of them, to define nominalist versions of the various concepts 
required.  
 
Continuity [of a scalar attribute with respect to a region of space-time]. Given that 
the scalar attribute is represented by scalar function T, this continuity can be 
expressed platonistically by saying that T is a continuous function. But how do we 
say this nominalistically? Field’s answer is to introduce the notion of ‘basicness’ of 
space-time regions. Space-time region R is spatio-temporally basic when R contains 
only those points z that are strictly spatio-temporally between x and y. Space-time 
region R is scalar-basic when R contains only those points z such that the magnitude 
of z with respect to a given scalar attribute is strictly between the magnitudes of x 




both the platonistic and nominalistic content of a region of space-time points being 
continuous with respect to some scalar attribute: 
 
(a) for all space-time points x, for any scalar-basic region containing x there is a 
spatio-temporally basic sub-region containing x iff T is continuous at φ(x)’.  
 
The left hand side of this biconditional (which Field refers to as the claim ‘CONT’) is 
purely nominalistic since it uses only the betweeness relation, logical vocabulary, 
and predicates built up logically from space-time points, their empirical attributes, 
and the betweeness relation.   
 
Ratios. In many cases we will want to say that one interval, or product of intervals is 
less, or more, than another interval or product. In other words, we will want to talk 
about the ratio of the relevant intervals. In a very simple case we will just want to 
say one spatio-temporal interval is less than another, which can obviously be stated 
nominalistically in terms of betweeness and congruence, since if one interval is less 
than another the intervals will not be congruent. But in the majority of cases we 
actually want to talk about the relative magnitudes of scalar attributes that the 
points in the intervals in question possess. Now suppose we want to say that the 
product of one spatio-temporal interval x1 x2 with a scalar interval y1 y2 is less than 
the product of the spatio-temporal interval u1 u2 with a scalar interval v1 v2. We 
would, says Field, need to prove the following biconditional, where ST-SCAL is a 
nominalistic predicate that does the job (we will see below how that predicate is 
defined):   
 
(b) |x1 x2 y1 y2| <ST-SCAL  |u1 u2 v1 v2| iff  





where dφ is the platonistic spatio-temporal distance function 
4 2
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( ( ) ( ( ))i ii x xφ φ= −∑ , and φi(x) is the ith component of the quadruple φ(x). I shall 
state this biconditional in English as well, to aid comprehension:  
 
(b*) The product of one spatio-temporal interval x1 x2 with a scalar interval y1 y2 is 
nominalistically-speaking less than the product of the spatio-temporal interval 
u1 u2 with a scalar interval v1 v2 if and only if the product of (the magnitude of 
the difference of the real numbers measuring the scalar magnitude across y1 y2) 
with  the distance of the first spatio-temporal interval is less than the product of 
(the magnitude of the difference of the real numbers measuring the scalar 
magnitude across v1 v2) with the distance of the second spatio-temporal interval.  
 
Whether or not this biconditional is acceptable depends on the nominalist predicate 
in question – if the predicate does the job it should, then the biconditional is fine, if 
not, then it isn’t. Currently ST-SCAL is just a placeholder for a definition not yet 
given. How is the predicate defined? Field gives the nominalist definition of the 
octadic ST-SCAL predicate, with temperature as the scalar attribute in question, as:  
 
u1 ≠ u2 and v1 MScal  v2 and if x1 ≠ x2 and y1 MScal y2 then ∃RST∃RTemp[RST is a spatio-
temporally equally spaced region and RTemp is a temperaturely equally spaced region; x1 
and x2 are in RST and y1 and y2 are in RTemp; there are a, b in RST such that u1 and u2 are 
spatio-temporally between a and b, and there are c, d in RTemp such that v1 and v2 
temperaturely between c and d; there are just as many points of RST that are spatio-
temporally between x1 and x2 as there are points of RTemp that are temperaturely between 
v1 and v2, and there are fewer points of RTemp that are temperaturely between y1 and y2 
than there are points of RST that are spatio-temporally between u1 and u2. (Ibid. p.66) 
 
Clearly, this uses yet more predicates, some which have not been defined, namely 
being ‘spatio-temporally equally spaced’ and ‘scalarly equally spaced’. The above 
definition is very complex, but it should be clear to the reader that equal spacing will 
probably be definable using the more primitive notion of congruence outlined in 
section 4.2.2, and utilised in the nominalistic definition of primeness in the previous 
chapter. And indeed this is broadly correct – equal-spacedness is defined as a sort of 





‘spatio-temporally equally spaced 
region’ 
‘scalarly equally spaced region’ 
is a region R all of whose points lie on a 
single line such that for every point x of R 
which lies strictly spatio-temporally 
between two points of R, there are points y 
and z of R such that (a) exactly one point x 
of R is strictly spatio-temporally between y 
and z and (b) xy P-cong xz. [P-Congruence is 
congruence along parallel lines]. (Ibid. p.65) 
is a region R such that for every point x of 
R which lies strictly scalarly between two 
points of R, there are points y and z of R 
such that (a) exactly one point x of R is 
strictly scalarly between y and z and (b) xy 
Scal-cong xz. (Ibid. p.66) 
 
 
These two predicates also involve further predicates such as parallel congruence 
and scalar congruence, but these do not present any further conceptual difficulties 
and so there is no need to define them here. Additionally the cardinality relations  in 
the definition of ST-SCAL, ‘just as many’ and ‘fewer than’, present no problems, since 
they can be given nominalistically acceptable definitions in terms of betweeness and 
congruence, or if we prefer, purely logically. So the ratios in question can be given a 
nominalistically acceptable definition.  
 
 
Derivatives. We have seen, and perhaps been surprised by, the way in which some 
platonistic concepts such as ratio can be given a nominalistic definition. But the 
reader may feel that differentiation is in a category of its own. How can derivatives 
be defined nominalistically, specifically the partial derivatives that are so ubiquitous 
in the law-like statements of modern physics? This must be possible however, since 
derivatives are rates of change, and there is no reason to think rate-of-change is not 
plausibly an empirical concept. Field’s solution is to look for comparisons of 
directional derivatives with scalar intervals rather than to say outright that such and 
such a partial derivative has such and such a value. I shall give the biconditional 





(c) D(x,a1,a2,b1,b2) iff the directional derivative of T (= ψ o φ-1) with respect to the 
vector φ(a2) - φ(a1) exists at φ(x) and has a value there equal to ψ(b2) - ψ(b1). 
 
As with ST-SCAL above, the predicate D(x,a1,a2 b1, b2) clearly needs to be defined if 
this biconditional is to be satisfactory. The directional derivative of T with respect to 
the vector φ(a2) - φ(a1) exists at φ(x) and has a value there equal to ψ(b2) - ψ(b1) iff and 
only if D(x,a1,a2 b1, b2) obtains. The somewhat long-winded definition of D(x,a1,a2 b1, 
b2) is: 
 
(b1 ≈Scal b2 &  ∃b{∃c∃d (b [strictly] SCAL-BET cd) & (a1 = a2 ⊃ b ≈Scal b) &                     
[a1 ≠ a2 ⊃ (∀c∀d (if b [strictly] SCAL-BET cd ⊃ ∃y∃z yz PAR a1a2  &                              
x [strictly] ST-BET yz & ∀t (t ≠ x & t [strictly] ST-BET yz ⊃                                   
(a1a2xt) E-BETST,SCAL (xtbc)(xtbd)))]}) ∨ (b1 MScal b2 &  ∃a3∃b3[a3 ST-BET a1a2 & a1a3     
P-CONG a3a2 & b1b3 SCAL-CONG b3b2 & {∃c∃d (b2 [strictly] SCAL-BET cd) &          
(a1 = a2 ⊃ b1 ≈Scal b3) & [a1 ≠ a2 ⊃ (∀c∀d (if b3 [strictly] SCAL-BET cd ⊃ ∃y∃z               
yz PAR a1a2  & x [strictly] ST-BET yz & ∀t (t ≠ x & t [strictly] ST-BET yz ⊃            
(a1a2xt) E-BETST,SCAL (xtb1c)(xtb1d)))]}]) (Field 1980 pp.70-72 – I have altered Field’s 
style and inserted all the formulae Field only names for clarity and completeness).  
 
It is evident that the terminology here is all nominalistically acceptable since it only 
contains space-time points, empirical attributes, logical vocabulary, and predicates 
ultimately built out of empirical comparison relations. For the second (or higher) 
derivative “we merely need to express the result of taking a first derivative, by 
means of betweeness and congruence predicates, and apply the whole process again” 
(Field 1980 p.74).  
The rest of Field’s construction proceeds similarly – Laplaceans are defined 
in terms of derivatives, and Poisson’s equation in terms of Laplaceans. Likewise, the 
nominalist definitions of ratio and vector enable nominalist concepts of inner 
products, gradients and vectors, and eventually, the law of motion. I hope sections 
4.2.2 – 4.2.3 have been sufficient to make it plausible that Field’s programme 
achieves nominalistic success, at least with respect to Newtonian gravitational 
theory. I now want to discuss the issue of whether, the nominalistic acceptableness 
of Field’s programme notwithstanding, it offers a genuine explanation of the motion 




4.2.4. Field’s Nominalism and the Mapping Account 
 
Before I discuss how Field’s version of Newtonian gravitational theory relates to the 
mapping account outlined in chapter two, I think it will be useful to summarise 
Field’s treatment of Newtonian gravitational theory. Indeed Field himself gives a 
good summary at the end of chapter eight of Science Without Numbers, which will 
assist me. Firstly nominalistic axioms for Newtonian space-time (box 2 above, the 
modified Szczerba-Tarski axioms) were given, whilst those for gravitational 
potential and mass-density were fairly clear given the treatment of extensive 
attributes in chapter two of this thesis. These axioms together formed a nominalistic 
Joint Axiom System, or JAS, which was satisfied by the domain of points in 
Newtonian space-time. The satisfaction of the JAS by the empirical domain implied 
the existence of several representation functions (boxes 1 and 3 above) stating that 
there is an isomorphism φ from space-time points to quadruples of real numbers, 
representing points in Newtonian space-time, and two homomorphisms ψ and ρ 
from space-time points to R, which represented the magnitudes of the scalar 
attributes of gravitational potential and mass-density respectively of the points and 
regions. It was seen that the composition T of these representation functions took 
the quadruples of real numbers representing the points to the appropriate real 
numbers representing the magnitudes of the attributes in question, and that 
although physical laws normally concerned T, it was possible to dispense with T and 
talk about space-time points, their attributes, and relations on them instead, thereby 
avoiding any talk about real numbers.    
Further concepts (namely Poisson’s equation and the law of motion) were 
constructed from space-time points and regions and empirical comparison 
operations on them. No predicates were used which were not constructed out of 
clearly-defined nominalistically acceptable primitives, and no magnitudes of any 
empirical attributes were invoked which we were not sure could be, on the basis of 
our earlier discussion of representation theorems, represented by the reals. Thus 




structures, it was possible to state the laws governing the relations of the attributes 
of gravitational potential and mass-density, nominalistically.  
 Let us agree for argument’s sake that this programme works. One concern is 
that the platonistic, i.e. classical, formulation of the theory is the explanatory one, 
and that all Field has done is to provide nominalistic surrogates for platonistic 
concepts, surrogates which are formally equivalent but in fact not really explanatory. 
However this is a foolish objection and that even if it is in practice impossible to do 
science the Fieldian way, this in no way reflects badly on the nominalist. The 
nominalistic formulation is no less explanatory than the platonistic one insofar as it 
manages to pick out the requisite empirical objects, properties and  relations, and 
indeed has the advantage that it does not need to quantify over abstract objects and 
relations to do so. However a final quote from Field is appropriate here:  
 
I do not of course claim that the nominalist concepts are anywhere near as convenient 
to work in solving problems or performing computations: for these purposes, the usual 
numerical apparatus is a practical necessity. But it is a necessity that the nominalist 
has no need to forgo: he can treat the apparatus in the way suggested earlier in the 
book, i.e. as a useful instrument for making deductions from the nominalistic system 
that is ultimately of interest; an instrument which yields no conclusions not obtainable 
without it, but which yields them more easily (Field 1980 p.91). 
 
Of course, the question of what is the best nominalistic formulation of Newtonian 
gravitational theory is an open one: there may be a version other than Field’s which 
is perhaps simpler or has greater unificatory power or some such. It is nevertheless 
evident that any nominalistic theory will have to account for spatio-temporal 
continuity, ratios between magnitudes of empirical attributes, and the rate of 
change of one property with respect to another. These are not inherently platonistic 
concepts, but rather part of the furniture of the universe: platonistic mathematics 
merely provides a very useful and intuitive way of talking about them.   
 I can now finally turn to one of the key questions raised at the beginning of 
this section, namely the relation between Field’s nominalisation of Newtonian 
gravitational theory and the mapping account. Recall that the mapping account says 
that mathematics can be usefully applied because mathematical structures 




mathematical structures and arrive at an empirically relevant answer that could 
nevertheless (in principle) have been obtained without the help of the mathematics. 
It is plainly the case that Field’s nominalisation is a perfect example of this. If I want 
to solve a problem in classical mechanics about the effect of gravitational forces on a 
point-particle, it is a very simple matter to obtain some numerical values for the 
variables in the relevant equations, plug them in, and get an (empirically correct i.e. 
empirically verified) answer.  
But as Field shows, it is also possible to get that result without using any 
platonistic mathematics whatsoever, by using the (more complicated) nominalistic 
version of the theory as given above. So this is a perfect example of the mapping 
account at work, since it shows in detail both the nominalistic and the platonistic 
routes to the empirical answer (e.g. the left and right-hand components respectively 
of the biconditionals in Field’s theory). Thus Field’s theory comes across as an 
instance of the mapping account I outlined in chapter two, although if the nominalist 
wishes to make the theory totally nominalistic, e.g. to remove references to abstract 
mathematical objects from even the proofs of the representation theorems, he will 
of course have some extra work to do. This is the focus of part of chapter six. 
However before progressing onto chapters five and six, I want to take a look at one 
other attempt to nominalise a scientific theory, namely Mark Balaguer’s sketch of a 




4.3. Balaguer’s Nominalisation of Quantum Mechanics. 
  
The purpose of this section is really just to reinforce that that the dispensability of 
platonistic mathematics to science isn’t just a fluke that applies only to Newtonian 
gravitational, and similar, theories – that the role of platonistic mathematics in 
science is a purely representational one across the board. The question that will be 
on the lips of philosophers will surely be ‘can the Fieldian approach be extended to 
other physical theories?’. Field holds that “…it would be routine to extend the 




format, e.g. special relativistic electromagnetic theory” (Field 1980 p.42). But what 
about theories that do not have a similar format, such as General Relativity (GR) and 
Quantum Mechanics (QM)? Some philosophers, such as David Malament (in his 
1982 review of Science without Numbers) are sceptical about how far Field’s 
programme can be extended.  
One worry is that although Field manages to nominalise many parts of 
platonistic mathematics, including the differential calculus, more sophisticated 
areas of that mathematics may resist nominalisation. Field himself was reasonably 
optimistic about the prospect of extending his programme to cover General 
Relativity:  
 
…I believe that without too much trouble all the mathematical developments [that we 
have just considered] could be generalised to a space-time with a more general sort of 
affine structure than that considered here…such as the space-time of general relativity” 
(Field 1980, p.64).  
 
Can the same be said of Quantum Mechanics? Malament’s objection concerns the 
possibly abstract status of even the non-mathematical objects found in Quantum 
Mechanics – for if we construe QM as a theory which determines a set of Hilbert 
spaces, as is common, we would need to prove that subspaces of some Hilbert 
spaces merely represent purely empirical objects and their relations, and can be 
dispensed with in favour of these. An obvious candidate for the subject matter 
which the Hilbert spaces represent would be propositions or eventualities. The 
problem here is that propositions and eventualities may be at least as 
nominalistically unacceptable as Hilbert spaces are. Mark Balaguer believes he can 
provide a nominalistic reconstruction of QM that meets Malament’s objection, 
utilising propensities.  
 It is important to note that unlike Field, Balaguer does not provide a 
nominalistic reconstruction of the laws of Quantum Mechanics, e.g. the Schrödinger 
equation, but he believes that this can be done in the same manner that Field 
nominalises the laws of Newtonian gravitational theory. He does however try to 




what Field did with space-time points and Newtonian gravitational theory. The 
foundation of Balaguer’s approach is that “quantum probability statements are 
about physically real propensities of quantum systems” (Balaguer 1996 p.217, my 
emphasis). Balaguer does make a small effort to defend propensities as physically 
real, attempting to refute what he takes to be the main form of Malament’s worry, 
that “propensities are properties, and properties are abstract objects” (ibid. p.224). 
Balaguer’s response is that we can deal with propensities the same way we deal 
with empirical attributes like length, namely by introducing a comparison relation 
like ‘longer-than’, in this case some sort of x has-a-greater-propensity-than y 
relation. Balaguer is correct that we are able to speak of empirical attributes in such 
a way that they don’t refer to any sort of abstract objects, but as yet he has not 
shown that propensities are among such empirical attributes. If they are in fact 
abstract then evidently nothing nominalistic has been achieved. Balaguer’s response 
is that propensities are causally efficacious, which rules out their being platonistic, 
abstract, objects. The problem still remains that propensities can only be causally 
efficacious if they actually exist in the relevant sense, and Balaguer has not, in his 
brief treatment, really and unambiguously shown us what a propensity is, that it is 
an empirical thing, which would be required in a fully worked out Balaguer-style 
nominalisation of Quantum Mechanics. However for the sake of the example I am 
content to grant Balaguer the empirical reality of propensities – what is more 
interesting is his actual strategy for how the nominalisation should take place. 
The primary platonistic claim is that quantum states are functions from 
quantum events to probabilities, where a quantum event (A,∆) is a measurement of 
an observable A that yields a result in some Borel set ∆ of real numbers. 49 (I shall 
quote liberally from Balaguer 1996 for the next few hundred words, so for ease of 
presentation please assume that the technical material is from that source unless 
otherwise indicated). This quantum event will then determine a propensity 
property r of a quantum system to yield a value in ∆ for a measurement of A (Ibid. 
                                                 
49 Borel sets are used because they are required in certain parts of the theory of probability and 
measurement theory that I do not need to go into here. Suffice to say that roughly speaking “Borel 
sets are the sets that can be constructed from open or closed sets by repeatedly taking countable 




p.218).  Each quantum state q is then associated with a set S(P) of such 
propensities.50 The central claim made by Balaguer here is that from the set S(P) a 
nominalistic orthomodular lattice L(P) can be constructed which is homomorphic to 
the orthomodular lattice L(H), constructed from the set S(H) of closed subspaces of 
a Hilbert space H in which the given observables are represented (ibid p.218). If this 
homomorphism obtains then L(P) can represent L(H). The justification of this claim 
is a transitive one: L(P) is homomorphic to L(E), the lattice built out of the set of 
quantum events associated with given observables, and L(E) is homomorphic to 
L(H), ergo, L(P) is homomorphic to L(H). This depends on three claims, namely (a) 
that L(P) is homomorphic to L(E), (b) that L(E) is homomorphic to L(H), and (c) that 
homomorphism is preserved under transitivity, since if one structure can map 
another, and that one can map a third, the first can map the third, as they will all 
have the relevant structural features in common. What about the former two claims 
(a) and (b)? Earlier in his paper Balaguer defends the claim that L(E) is 
homomorphic to L(H):  
 
we can define lattice-theoretic predicates on S(H) and S(E) and thereby construct 
(non-distributive) orthomodular lattices out of these two sets which are isomorphic 
to each other. We can call these orthomodular lattices L(H) and L(P) respectively. 
(Balaguer 1996 p.216).         
 
He does not provide the construction explicitly, but for the purposes of the 
exposition I will assume that this claim is an accurate one and that (b) is 
unproblematic, since the reason that Hilbert spaces are used at all is for their 
representative capabilities, and platonistic mathematics is a rich source of such 
structures.  
What of (a)? Once again, Balaguer does not formally prove a homomorphism 
between L(P) and L(E), but he does give an informal two-part argument for the 
truth of his claim. The first part is to show a homomorphism exists between the 
domains of L(P) and L(E) for any L(P)-L(E) pair. The second part involves 
demonstrating the existence of nominalistic versions of the lattice-theoretic 
                                                 
50 Balaguer uses ψ to denote quantum states, but I am keen to avoid confusion with the 




predicates and operators. The first part proceeds by showing a homomorphism 
obtains between the domains of S(P) and S(E), since if their domains are 
homomorphic then so are the domains of L(P) and L(E). We have already said that 
S(E) is a set of quantum events. Each quantum state q determines a probability 
function pq from quantum events in S(E) to real numbers (probabilities). Balaguer’s 
suggestion here is that if we fix the quantum state of the system to a particular state, 
then each quantum event will be associated with a propensity, and that it is very 
easy to see how each propensity can be associated with a quantum event. That is, 
each member of S(E) will be associated with a member of S(P). The second part is a 
little more complex.  
Just as Field needed to construct nominalistic predicates, so too must 
Balaguer. At this stage Balaguer needs fewer predicates than Field, because he has 
not gone into the details of nominalising those parts of platonistic mathematics and 
science beyond those which Field has already nominalised, and because he does not 
explicitly state the laws of Quantum Mechanics. However Balaguer must define 
platonistic predicates of inclusion and orthocomplement for both S(H) and S(E) – 
thus we have ‘x is subspace-included in y’ (x ≤H y), ‘the subspace-orthocomplement 
of x’ for S(H), ‘x is event-included in y’ (x ≤E y) and ‘the event-orthocomplement of x’ 
for S(E). Balaguer’s method then is to construct nominalistic versions of the 
inclusion and orthocomplement predicates for S(P), although he only gives the 
procedure for constructing propensity-inclusion in any detail. We can represent 
propensity-inclusion as (x ≤P y). Balaguer’s suggestion is to “lift the definition of ≤P 
directly off the definition of ≤E” (Balaguer 1996 p.220). Since (A,∆) ≤E (A',∆') iff for 
every quantum state q associated with the given L(E), pq(A,∆) ≤ pq(A',∆'), then  
 
(A,∆,r) ≤P (A',∆',r') iff it is a law of nature that every quantum system has a propensity to 
have a value in ∆ for a measurement of the observable A which is weaker than, or equal 
in strength with, its propensity to have a value in ∆' for a measurement of the observable 
A'. (Balaguer 1996 p.220) 
 
Thus Balaguer feels that he has shown that L(P) and L(E) are homomorphic – 




considerable part of QM can be nominalised. It is clear that if propensities are 
acceptable nominalistic entities then Balaguer has shown how part of Quantum 
Mechanics can be represented nominalistically. Just as the bulk of Field’s work 
concerned the nominalisation of the laws of Newtonian gravitational theory, so 
Balaguer’s work stands in need of expansion, as he has said, to cover the laws of 
Quantum Mechanics. This would be a very large and complex undertaking indeed, 
and there is no space here to consider how this might be done. We must rest content 
with the belief that it is possible, and certainly there is no prima facie reason why it 
should not be so.  
I conclude this chapter then with the claim that we have seen how it is that 
we might possess scientific theories which do not use any platonistic mathematics 
at all, reinforcing the view that the function of this mathematics is a purely extrinsic, 
representational, one which facilitates the deriving of empirical consequences and 
predictions from empirical premises whilst remaining contingent to those 
derivations. In essence the discussion of the motivation for, and content of, the 
mapping account has been completed in chapters two to four, and the view that the 
role of mathematics is only a representational one has been sufficiently argued for. 
In chapter six, as I have said, I will discuss some of the metaphysical issues that I 
have glossed over in both this chapter and the previous one. But before turning to 
such metaphysical issues I want to consider some objections to the mapping account 
that have been raised by Mark Steiner, along that lines that it cannot effectively 
account for what he calls the descriptive applicability of mathematics. I trust that my 
development of that mapping account and that fact that the role of platonistic 
mathematics in science need only be a representational one has been persuasive 








My claim is that an 
anthropocentric policy was a 
necessary factor…in discovering 
today’s fundamental physics.          









This chapter confronts a philosophical problem of applicability which, it is 
claimed, goes beyond a representational role for applied mathematics and poses 
a problem for the mapping account. The problem in question is referred to by 
Mark Steiner as the ‘descriptive problem of applicability’, and is introduced in 
section 5.2. Subsection 5.2.1 covers the sort of reasoning that is central to the 
descriptive problem, namely Pythagorean reasoning, and discusses the most 
notable examples of it, viz. Pythagorean analogies and Pythagorean faith. 
Subsection 5.2.2 gives three examples of  Pythagorean reasoning that might be 
thought to yield descriptive problems of applicability. 5.2.3 is a taxonomy of the 
species of descriptive problem, under three categories. After the problem is 
outlined, discussion and suggestion of solutions take place in section 5.3. 
Subsection 5.3.1. rejects the possibility of anthropocentrism as a solution to the 
descriptive problem. In subsections 5.3.2, 5.3.3. and 5.3.4 possible solutions to 
the descriptive problems – of the first, second, and third category respectively – 
are discussed. I conclude that since each of these problems is successfully met 




5.1. Chapter Introduction 
 
The descriptive problem is a putative philosophical problem of applicability which 
Mark Steiner, most recently in his monograph The Applicability of Mathematics as a 
Philosophical Problem,  has drawn attention to. This problem, Steiner argues, arises 
principally from a type of reasoning in science which he calls ‘Pythagorean 
reasoning’. In this chapter I aim to clarify Steiner’s account of this reasoning, and 
present it in the most reasonable and charitable way possible. I do agree with 
Steiner that there is such a thing as Pythagorean reasoning, though disagree with 
him about the degree to which one aspect of this reasoning, Pythagorean analogy, 
does not depend on empirical similarities. As such I present a more cogent account 
of Pythagorean analogy, and I classify the descriptive problem of applicability into 
three sub-categories, comprising respectively Pythagorean analogy, Pythagorean 
faith, and the category of ‘off the shelf’ applications, namely the pre-existence in 
mathematics of many of the mathematical theories that are required for the 
development of science, especially theoretical physics. 
I argue ultimately that each of these problems can be met without invoking 
any connections between mathematics and reality that go beyond either the 
mapping account of applicability or the well-trained physical intuitions of scientists. 
This is in opposition to the anthropocentric response to the descriptive problem 
that I argue that Steiner is committed to. The purpose of this chapter is to show that 
the philosophical problems of applicability do not outrun the mapping account, that 
it is possible to undermine a view that would pose a problem for the adequacy of 
that account.  Before this chapter commences, I just have one terminological 
observation to make, namely that the philosophical problems discussed in this 
chapter arise more with surprising discoveries and novel predictions than with 
description, but since ‘descriptive problem’ and not ‘discoverability problem’ or 
‘prediction problem’ has entered the literature now, I feel obliged to make use of 





5.2. The Descriptive Problem of Applicability 
 
 
The descriptive problem of applicability concerns the fact that mathematics, a 
subject many branches of which have no obvious connection with empirical 
phenomena, plays a major role in the description and discovery of seemingly true 
empirical theories, and the prediction of novel empirical phenomena.51 Specifically 
the problem is that our mathematical knowledge, knowledge utterly unlike our 
natural-scientific knowledge, enables us to gain natural-scientific knowledge in a 
way which appears to go beyond any explanation of applicability as a matter of just 
the utilisation of the representational capacities of mathematical theories in order to 
greatly simplify the description of empirical attributes their magnitudes and 
relations, and the making of physical predictions. I argued in chapter two that the 
role of mathematics in the making of predictions, deriving of laws, etc, is a purely 
representational one, with which Steiner would seem to agree for the most part, 
though not in all cases. Thus the descriptive problem does not concern the 
possibility of using mathematics in making predictions per se, but only in certain 
novel or surprising special cases in which it might appear that the role of the 
mathematics is more than representational.  
  I have already argued against the idea that platonistic mathematics can 
genuinely explain empirical phenomena, but the descriptive problem left unsolved 
would leave open the possibility that mathematics, whether construed 
platonistically or otherwise, has some connection with the physical world that 
entails that there is more to applicability than the mapping account would have us 
believe. Before I say more about this problem, I want to point out that it is not a 
single problem. Rather ‘descriptive problem’ is an umbrella term for a variety of 
issues, including the making of fruitful mathematical analogies between equations 
describing empirical phenomena; the fact that the equations in empirical theories 
can have solutions that we would not expect to find in nature but that we look for 
                                                 
51 This caveat covers such branches as geometry, which originated in a concern to describe the 




anyway; and the seeming convenience that mathematics is so useful in describing 
the world and making predictions in certain cases, and is moreover often found 
‘ready to use’ by physicists and other scientists.  Before I go into the details of each 
of these categories, I want to say a little about the sort of reasoning that generates 
the descriptive problem of applicability.  
 
 
5.2.1 Pythagorean Reasoning as a Source of the Descriptive Problem: 
Pythagorean Analogy and Pythagorean Faith 
 
Steiner makes the case that Pythagorean reasoning gives rise to two forms of the 
descriptive problem, concerning (Pythagorean) analogy and (Pythagorean) faith. He 
argues that Pythagorean reasoning does not merely consist in reasoning from the 
empirical to the empirical via the mathematical for the purposes of simplifying 
theories, making many predictions etc – this sort of reasoning is used in all 
applications of mathematics, and is, as the explanation of the mapping account of 
applicability in chapter two made clear, and as I mentioned in 5.2, relatively 
straightforward – but rather feels that there are other examples that are not 
amenable to such a mapping-account based treatment. The most prevalent type of 
Pythagorean reasoning is, Steiner tells us, Pythagorean analogy. This is the sort of 
reasoning that involves moving from one equation describing one phenomenon to 
another equation describing another phenomenon, based only on mathematical 
similarity, or analogy, between the equations. One account of Pythagorean 
reasoning Steiner provides in his book involves two functions linked only by 
differentiation, although he does not give any examples of this.52  
                                                 
52 Steiner explains one way that a physically real equation E may be derived, but it does not seem to 
me that in actual fact any of the examples that Steiner gives involve this analogy-via-differentiation, 
and it is not at all clear that it has ever been used: “a standard way to “derive” a differential equation 
is to begin with a function f , already known to be “physically real”; and then, by differentiating f, find 
an equation for which f is a solution. The assumption that another solution, g, of the equation, is also 
“physically real” is…an analogy between f and g, mediated by the equation. The analogy becomes 
Pythagorean if f and g are physically disanalogous, so that only the equation links them.” (Steiner 
1998 p.76, emphasis in original). The problem with this is that since the equations describe physical 




I do however think that there is a serious problem here. This is the idea that 
scientists make analogies where the physical phenomena are completely physically 
disanalogous. For this is simply absurd, and the examples of Pythagorean reasoning 
which Steiner gives do not support it. We will see some of these in more detail 
below, but let us jump ahead briefly to the Schrödinger case, Schrödinger made an 
analogy from a monochromatic light-wave equation to obtain another equation, the 
Schrödinger wave-equation for the electron. But he did not make an analogy 
between two phenomena which were linked only by the equation, they were linked 
by empirical similarities, i.e. both were wave phenomena. And moreover, does it 
even make sense to say of any two phenomena that they are linked only by an 
analogy between the equations describing them? If an analogy is possible between 
the equations this must be, at least in part, because the phenomena are similar in 
some respect.53 A fruitful analogy suggests a similarity. If the phenomena weren’t 
similar there would be no reason to think it would be possible to make an analogy in 
the first place. I am not the only person to take issue with this. Michael Liston echoes 
my view somewhat in his extended critical study of Steiner’s book, where he states 
“I believe there are reasons to be cautious about [Steiner’s] interpretation of the 
evidence” (Liston 2000, p.200-201). For instance, regarding the scientists whose 
breakthroughs Steiner attributes to Pythagorean reasoning in the no-physical-basis 
sense, Liston has much to say: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
respects, and so the phenomena will not, in fact, be physically disanalogous. Hence my alternative 
presentation of Pythagorean analogy.   
  
53
 It has been pointed out to me although in the natural sciences an analogy may be grounded in empirical 
similarity, this may not be the case in other disciplines, such as economics, where the similarities between 
phenomena may be only manifested in structural similarities between the abstract structures that are the 
subject matter of the theories of these phenomena. One response to this could be to widen our notion of 
‘empirical similarity’ to include such structural similarities, that is, to accept Steiner’s characterisation of 
Pythagorean reasoning, contra what I have argued above…If we baulk at this we will be committed to 
finding a concrete basis for the similarity in each alleged case. If, as seems likely, part of the problem is 
that the empirical situation is extremely idealised, so that the abstract structure involved is the structure 
used by the theory of the idealisation (since there may be no adequate direct theory of the empirical 
phenomenon itself for whatever reason) then this similarity may be explicable in terms of whatever 
empirical considerations it is that justify using the idealisation to represent the empirical situation in the 




In his groundbreaking quantization papers, Schrödinger reasoned by exploiting the 
ideas of de Broglie that he traced back to Hamilton and Klein. There is a physical 
basis in wave optics (pointed out by Klein) for Hamilton’s analytical 
generalisations of ray optics (Liston 2000, p.201) 
 
[Schrödinger’s] reasoning was guided by the optical-mechanical analogy, an 
analogy based on [Pythagorean] considerations believed by him to be grounded in 
physical considerations (Liston 2000, p.202). 
 
Heisenberg, who of all these theorists was probably the most open to innovation, to 
exploring different paths, and to breaking with classical ideas, was initially guided 
by classical physical models (Liston 2000, p.202) 
 
Liston says more, but I think that is enough to motivate a reformulation of 
Pythagorean analogy. Although Steiner’s characterisation of such analogy is either 
incoherent or irrelevant, Pythagorean analogy is still a useful concept. For 
‘Pythagorean’ can serve to pick out a subset of applications of mathematics that 
contain some novel or surprising elements, or perhaps the transformation of one 
equation into another.  As such, I am going to suggest that we ignore Steiner’s clause 
that for an analogy to be Pythagorean the phenomena described must be 
disanalogous, and give the following definition, even if Steiner would not accept it: 
 
(PA) An analogy is Pythagorean iff the scientist begins with one equation 
which describes a physical phenomenon (to a greater or lesser extent) and 
operates on this equation to produce another equation similar to the first in 
some relevant respects, for the purpose of describing a phenomenon that is 
similar in relevant respects to the phenomenon described by the first 
equation.  
 
The analogy made is that they both describe physical phenomena that are similar in 
some sense, and so their equations should be similar in some sense. Moreover if we 




similarity between them should not be surprising. It is clear that both the Maxwell 
and Schrödinger examples considered below are cases of this sort. Maxwell began 
with Ampere’s and Gauss’s equations for electricity and magnetism and modified 
them to get one unified equation to describe electromagnetism. Schrödinger began 
with an equation for monochromatic light waves and modified that equation to get a 
wave equation for the electron. In both cases the similarity with the equations that 
were the starting points is obvious, as is the similarity between the phenomena 
being described. I shall argue below that this similarity implies that there is nothing 
perplexing going on here and indeed is what makes the analogy possible, and that in 
large part the reason that there is nothing mysterious is because of the work done 
by the mapping account of applicability, which together with the plausible 
proposition that ‘similar empirical situations should be described similarly’, leaves 
nothing to be explained.  
There do however appear to be degrees of Pythagorean analogy, though I 
submit that these degrees do not denote any difference in kind. Steiner argues that a 
more extreme example of Pythagorean analogy is formalist analogy, a method used 
in quantum mechanics and not to be confused with anything in the eponymous 
branch of the foundations of mathematics. The focus of formalist analogy is the 
formalisms of mathematics and physics themselves. When making formalist 
analogies, physicists take previous formalisms and extend them, subject to certain 
formal restrictions, hoping that the formal restrictions will cash out physically and 
that the extension of a previously successful formalism will yield an equally 
successful formalism in a new case. Steiner asserts that “perhaps the most blatant 
use of formalist reasoning in physics was the successful attempt by physicists to 
‘guess’ the laws of quantum systems using a strategy known as quantization” 
(Steiner 1998 p.136). Quantization is the attempt to deduce quantum mechanical 
laws from classical laws, and has provided the basis for much work in quantum 
mechanics. It works by treating quantum systems classically, and converting the 
classical description of the system into a quantum description, essentially ‘wave-
ising’ the classical particle models. This is done by replacing certain variables in the 




What is interesting (and formalist) about this is that the quantized equation 
has the same form as the classical equation. This quantum-mechanically-motivated 
conversion of a classical equation into a quantum mechanical equation is been 
enormously successful in quantum mechanics, and incredibly useful in physics, 
despite the fact that it may be thought that there was prima facie no reason to 
suspect that the classical equation had a direct quantum mechanical counterpart 
with a very similar form, especially given the false initial assumption that the 
quantum system obeyed classical laws. However, I do not agree with this prima facie 
reasoning, since there is large degree of similarity in many respects between 
classical and quantum systems, and thus we would expect a certain degree of 
similarity between their equations. This is not just a bold assertion made by an 
inexperienced philosopher, it is in fact an accepted physical principle, the 
correspondence principle, which was vigorously advocated by Niels Bohr: “when 
considering phenomena in the regime of classical physics, the results of quantum 
mechanics must give rise to the appropriate classical physics results”.54 In other 
words if, say, General Relativity says a result should be x, then quantum mechanics 
should say this too: the quantum equations should correctly describe classical 
phenomena in classical (e.g. macroscopic) situations. It should occasion no surprise 
that this is in fact the case when the quantum equations are obtained from the 
classical equations through substitution of some variables for others. There is no 
deep mystery here despite Steiner’s protestations otherwise (ibid. p.97-98).   
Another sort of Pythagorean reasoning, and perhaps the most interesting, 
concerns those instances where the mathematics tells us something we did not 
expect, or even feel should not be possible, given what our other theories tell us – in 
other words the ‘spooky’ cases (cf. Weinberg 1986). This sort of Pythagorean 
reasoning I shall call ‘Pythagorean faith’. Steiner gives a good characterisation of 
Pythagorean faith, though he does not distinguish it as such and it is lumped 
together with his discussion of Pythagorean reasoning:  
 





(PF) A belief is an example of Pythagorean faith iff an “…equation E has been 
derived under assumptions A [and] the equation [E] has solutions for which 
A [is] no longer valid; but just because they are solutions of E, one looks for 
them in nature”. (Steiner 1998 p.76).  
 
The degree of faith involved depends on the extent to which the solutions 
contravene the background assumptions, and how strong these background 
assumptions are. Pythagorean faith played a role in, inter alia, the Maxwell example 
considered below. There the background assumptions A in that example are that (1) 
it should be possible to make the known laws of electricity and magnetism 
consistent with the law of charge conservation, and (2) that a magnetic field should 
only arise when there is an actual ‘real’  current flowing. Maxwell’s equation implied 
that there could be a magnetic field even in the absence of an actual flowing current, 
which contravened (2), an assumption under which the equation itself had been 
derived. Nevertheless despite this some scientists did successfully look for examples 
of a magnetic field in the absence of a real current, and this was due in large part to 
the unifying power of the equation and the scientists’ seeming faith in the equation 
despite their previous training. 
Steiner states that a key element in Pythagorean reasoning is “looking for 
solutions [to equations] in nature even where there is reason to doubt their very 
possibility.” (Steiner 1998, p.82). In fact this applies only to some cases, although 
certainly they are interesting. But for the most part the scientist performs a 
Pythagorean analogy, that is, modifies one equation or set of equations to explain a 
physical phenomenon similar in some way to that described by the original 
equation(s), and is not looking for any radically new predictions. If in fact many 
theoretical physicists did spend lots of time looking for surprising solutions to their 
equations this would possibly disrupt the progress of normal science. There may 
seem to be a connection between Pythagorean faith and scientific revolution since 
many of the cases that Steiner cites as examples of Pythagorean reasoning qua 
Pythagorean faith, including those following after a Pythagorean analogy, are in fact 




electromagnetic radiation. This is not the case for all examples of Pythagorean faith 
however, as sometimes an unlikely solution is sought in order to reinforce normal 
science, when a theory has been accepted as part of normal science but is still used 
instrumentally to a degree. Clearly it is desirable to minimise instrumentalism if 
scientists don’t just want to ‘save the appearances’ but to genuinely explain 
phenomena. One way to reduce the instrumentalism of an equation for instance is to 
find that all of the solutions to that equation can obtain in nature. One such example 
is the Schwarzschild solution, which is useful to scientists because it enables both 
Newton’s laws and deviations from them to be obtained from the Einstein Field 
Equations. Unfortunately the Schwarzschild solution implies the possibility of the 
existence of an entity of infinite density. Specifically, if fully physically interpreted, 
the solution states that when a body shrinks to less than its ‘Schwarzschild radius’ 
(a magnitude dependent on its mass) it will collapse into a space-time singularity. 
Such singularities are clearly extremely exotic objects, but despite their perverse 
character the faith of scientists in the otherwise usefulness of the solution 
encouraged them to attempt to discover such singularities. It is theorised that 
singularities lie at the centre of black holes and several candidates black holes have 
been isolated, including one such hole at the centre of our own galaxy. Although the 
motivation to locate such a solution may have been pragmatic, faith must have 
played some role or else the entire endeavour could have been written off as 
hopeless – though I by no means believe this faith is in any way mysterious. I shall 
now discuss three concrete examples of Pythagorean analogy and Pythagorean faith, 
subsequently proceeding to a taxonomy of the descriptive problem of applicability.  
 
 
5.2.2. Three Examples of Pythagorean Reasoning 
 
Maxwell’s Equations and Electromagnetism. This example shows both a 
Pythagorean analogy resulting in a new equation, and the result of a Pythagorean-
like faith in the equation that yielded an example of a new sort of physical 




was motivated by the observation that the classical laws of electricity and 
magnetism contravened the law of the conservation of electric charge.55 In order to 
arrive at the more satisfactory situation whereby electricity, magnetism and electric 
charge conservation could all be accounted for under the same laws, Maxwell made 
a Pythagorean analogy. He took Ampere’s law, and added a purely formal element, 
the ‘displacement current’, which at the time was not known to have any physical 
correlate, but rather stood for the rate of change of an electric field. Maxwell thereby 
arrived a new law 
4 1B = J + E
c c t
pi ∂
∂∇ × , where B = the magnetic field vector, 
J = the current density, E = the electric field vector, and c = the speed of light in a 
vacuum. Essentially, this law says “the curl of a magnetic field is proportional  to the 
sum of the conduction current and the displacement current” (Colyvan, 2001a 
p.268). ‘Curl’ is a form of differentiation through vector fields. The second term in 
the sum is the displacement current – this is the purely formal part of the theory, or 
at least the part of the theory for which there was no physical evidence at the time. 
The symbols representing the displacement current were a purely platonistic device, 
despite that device’s physical-sounding name, and even allowed for the presence of 
a displacement current in situations of zero real current (i.e. in the absence of the 
conduction current), something that the science of the time did not accommodate. 
The unifying power of the law was such that physicists did attempt to find a physical 
correlate to displacement current. This was discovered subsequently by Hertz, 
being namely electromagnetic radiation, which was described perfectly by 
Maxwell’s new law. This new law made it possible to talk about electromagnetism, 
rather than electricity and magnetism separately, and also resolved the whole issue 
of the consistency of charge conservation with the other laws.  
It might well be asked, as a side issue, how this discovery was different from 
say, the discovery of Neptune. I think the distinction is clear – in the case of Neptune, 
observations of irregularities in Uranus’ orbit together with the Newtonian 
gravitational theory implied that there had to be a large body affecting the orbit of 
Uranus. Plugging values into equations already known to be physically real, the 
                                                 




applicability of which the mapping account can explain (cf. the speculative 
discussion of Newton’s law in chapter two) yielded a precise prediction for where 
Neptune would be. But in the case of electromagnetic radiation, the phenomenon 
was not expected to be physically real. Rather the equation’s commitment to the 
possibility of displacement current without real current was tolerated as an artefact 
of the equation because of its ability to unify electricity and magnetism. The upshot 
is that in the prediction of electromagnetic radiation some Pythagorean faith was 
required to even search for a physical solution to the equation, whereas in the 
Neptune case no faith was required, beyond the faith in the pre-existing scientific 
theories and methods of the time, and in fact in that case it would have been much 
more surprising if Neptune wasn’t there. I shall have more to say on the matter of 
Pythagorean faith below, where I explain how it can be explained in a way perfectly 
consistent with the mapping account of applicability. 
 
Schrödinger’s Equation and Wave Mechanics. Schrödinger’s success in wave 
mechanics provides another, more recent, example of a Pythagorean analogy. Some 
years before Schrödinger’s work, the wave-particle duality of the photon had been 
discovered, as exhibited in the now famous two-slit experiment. The physicist De 
Broglie conjectured that this wave-particle duality is a property of all particles, not 
just light particles. If true, this would mean all particles could be described as waves, 
which prompted Schrödinger to attempt to discover the wave equation for the 
electron. As a starting point, Schrödinger took a quantum-mechanical wave equation 
describing the behaviour of monochromatic light waves (waves which are all of the 
same frequency), and specified a similar equation with the same form describing a 
wave of frequency E which corresponds to a particle of energy E. This was the base 
for the Pythagorean analogy. Once the analogy was started Schrödinger continued to 
refine the equation at each step, to obtain a satisfactory equation.  
  The initial wave equation formulated by Schrödinger, based on  the equation 
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This is an equation for a sine wave of a frequency fixed by E. But unfortunately this 
equation was too simple – Schrödinger had to account for the majority of cases 
where radiation affects the energy level of a given electron and so the energy level is 
not fixed, where, to speak very loosely, the electron-wave is not monochromatic. To 
remedy this Schrödinger decided to modify the equation still further and remove 
energy completely from its left hand side, by substituting for it another expression 
already known to be equivalent to that left hand side but not containing any energy 
terms. This worked as follows: Schrödinger took the classical equation for the 






potential energy V, and then he differentiated and quantised this classical equation 
in order to obtain , that is, Ei ih E
t h t
∂Ψ ∂Ψ
= − Ψ = Ψ
∂ ∂
. Substitution of the left hand 
side of this equation for E into the initial equation immediately yielded the (time-
dependent) Schrödinger equation, 
2
2 ( , , )
2
hih V x y z
t m
 ∂Ψ
= − ∇ + Ψ ∂  
, with no energy 
terms on the left hand side.  
The Pythagorean analogy is thus complete, and as far we can see, this 
proceeded as expected and no surprises were encountered. Indeed we would not 
expect any, given that I maintain that Pythagorean analogy is straightforward and 
well understood scientific method that is completely compatible with the mapping 
account of applicability. That the platonistic mathematics is not doing any more than 
representational work here is apparent once we abstract away from the 
complicated physical details of the situation and look at what has actually happened: 
an equation describing one sort of wave was modified so that it described another 
sort of wave, by making substitutions in the original equation. Yes the phenomena 
are different, since electrons and photons are different, and so yes the equations 




but it is plain that despite this the analogy works just fine since the phenomena in 
question are relevantly similar, and does not at any stage impugn the fact that in 
both cases all the platonistic mathematics is doing is representing magnitudes of 
empirical attributes and their relations.  
 
 
Dirac and the Positron. Dirac’s discovery of the positron is the most well known 
example of formalist reasoning, and was very much inspired by the Schrödinger 
example just given. Schrödinger made substitutions in the Einstein mass-energy 
equation to obtain the Klein-Gordon Equation (KGE),    
2 2 22 2
x y zE p p p m− − − = , in an 
attempt to derive a relativistic version of his famous equation for the electron. 
Unfortunately the KGE can only describe spinless particles such as pions, which 
seems to rule it out as being an equation for the electron since electrons have spin. 
Dirac’s intuition nevertheless told him that this equation was basically what he 
needed, and that he should adjust it to meet his needs.56 One of Dirac’s adjustments  
was to ‘factor’ the KGE. The result of this factoring was the Dirac equation: 
 
       
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However Dirac had a problem, because in order for the KGE to be factorisable the 
coefficients would have to anti-commute and their square would have to be one. 
Only 1 or -1 satisfy the property of squaring to 1. But these numbers cannot be anti-
commutative, since this would have the consequence that -1 = 1 which is false. Since 
no other two different numbers have a square of 1 no number can be a coefficient of 
the factored KGE and so KGE cannot be factorised. Or so it would seem.  
Dirac’s brilliant idea was not to use numbers as coefficients, but rather 
another sort of abstract mathematical object, matrices, the multiplication of which is 
not necessarily commutative. Because in matrix multiplication only certain matrices 
can be multiplied (viz. where the number of columns of the first matrix has to equal 
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the number of rows of the second) and because the matrices were 4x4, the solutions 
they were the coefficients of would have to be at least 4x1 matrices, that is really 
four solutions. This solution-matrix is known as a ‘spinor’. Two of the solutions were 
known to yield the probability of the spin of the electron. But the remaining 
solutions were a mystery, especially since they were negative-energy solutions, and 
would seem to correspond to some sort of anti-electron, the positron, which had 
never been observed. Dirac nevertheless did believe positrons existed, and they 
were discovered in 1932 by physicist Carl Anderson. Why is this such a good 
example of formalist reasoning? Because Dirac took an equation known to be 
physically real for pions, converted it through factorisation into an equation which 
when equal to zero gave the correct predictions for the electron, and moreover 
predicted the existence of a totally new type of particle through interpreting some 
seemingly surplus elements of the solutions to the equation which were only 
required in order to accommodate the coefficients which were necessary to get the 
equation off the ground in the first place. I maintain however that the idea that these 
physicists are just manipulating equations using purely platonistic techniques with 
little in the way of physical analogue, which Steiner plainly seems to believe, is just 
wrong, as it ignores the fact that their physical knowledge and intuition is a vital 
factor in guiding physicists to workable solutions and constructing the equations in 
the first place, a view I shall substantiate below.  
 
 
5.2.3 The Taxonomy of the Descriptive Problem 
 
We have seen above that it may be thought that the various degrees of Pythagorean 
analogy, and the success of Pythagorean faith, give rise to descriptive problems of 
applicability, that is, problems where it seems platonistic mathematics is delivering 
more than it should be able to if it really is just a formal system that we use to 
represent the empirical world and simplify our inferences concerning it. As I have 
made abundantly clear, I do not think that this mathematics is delivering more than 




as I hope the tone of my remarks has indicated, this is not because platonistic 
mathematics is warranted to make gratuitous claims about physical ontology, but 
because the role of applied mathematics is in fact fully explained by the mapping 
account of applicability together with scientists’ empirical intuition, which is 
explored in more detail below. I have been promising throughout this chapter to 
provide a solution to the descriptive problem and I shall imminently.  
Before I do so though I want to replace the rambling taxonomy of descriptive 
problems  discussed above with a clearer classification, putting the various forms of 
the descriptive problem already mentioned, as well as another form of the problem I 
will shortly introduce, into clearly demarcated categories. A descriptive problem of 
the first category is a putative philosophical problem arising from Pythagorean 
analogies of varying degree. Thus we would say that any successful Pythagorean 
analogy generates a descriptive problem of the first category. Descriptive problems 
of the second category are generated by vindicated acts of Pythagorean faith, where 
a scientist finds a solution to his equation that normal science rules is unlikely.   
The descriptive problems of the third category are generated by a 
phenomenon that has not yet been explicitly discussed in this thesis, although there 
was an earlier example of a third category problem, namely Dirac’s appropriation of 
matrix theory for his factorisation of the Klein-Gordon equation. This third category 
concerns the pre-existence of the platonistic mathematical theories which are vital 
to the statement of a given physical theory, or to the prediction of a given empirical 
phenomenon, but which are taken ‘off the shelf’ as it were, in that they were not 
created by the scientist for the purposes of science, but rather by the pure 
mathematician for the purposes of mathematics.  This is an interesting phenomenon, 
because it can seem so unlikely.  
Once we understand that we can usefully apply mathematics to the world, we 
can begin to construct platonistic scientific theories to efficiently describe and help 
to explain empirical phenomena. But what frequently happens is either that the 
physicist develops a mathematical theory and then finds out that the same theory 
has been previously developed by a mathematician perhaps hundreds of years 




chance to develop it himself, assuming he has the ability, he finds it ready and 
waiting for him. The reason this seems so peculiar is that we are not just talking 
about simple and intuitively applicable theories, that could have occurred to anyone, 
such as the use of numbers for counting physical objects, but rather highly 
developed and complex pieces of abstract reasoning whose development 
independently of the physical problems that give rise to them could appear to some 
minds to be something of a miracle.  
As well as Dirac’s use of matrices, the imaginary numbers also furnish an 
example of a third category problem. Orlando Merino has provided a helpful account 
of the history of the development of these numbers: an account of them was 
published by Gerolamo Cardano in 1545 in his Ars Magna, after knowledge of the 
imaginary numbers was imparted to Cardano by the mathematician Tartaglia. 
Tartaglia had developed them (as components of complex numbers) in order to win 
a mathematical contest which involved solving certain cubic equations.57 Thus a 
concept introduced to enable a man to win a contest, to solve cubic equations, found 
an essential use in modern science. It took over two hundred years after their 
introduction before imaginary numbers were accepted as legitimate mathematical 
objects by the majority of mathematicians. And here is the Wignerian ‘miracle’: a 
concept introduced for pure convenience has found a not just widespread, but an 
essential and ineliminable use in physics, with phenomena corresponding to 
imaginary-component-containing solutions of equations (though not, of course, 
corresponding directly to the imaginary components).58 Thus in this case as well I 
shall try to show that there is no genuine miracle at work here. I can therefore now 
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5.3   Solutions to the Descriptive Problem 
 
Up till now I have contented myself with giving a fair account of the descriptive 
problem as it appears in the literature. Therefore it is now time to discuss how the 
problem can be solved, and I argue that this is easily done once the various 
categories of the problem are understood and Steiner’s credulous rhetoric of 
‘miracles’, ‘wonders’ and ‘mysteries’ is done away with. I argue that each category 
can be explained satisfactorily and in a wholly non-mysterious fashion 
commensurate with mapping account of applicability. But before I give my solutions 
I want to discuss Steiner’s response to the problem.  
 
 
5.3.1 Anthropocentrism as the Solution to the Descriptive Problem 
 
One interesting question concerns the implications of the descriptive problem for 
philosophy in general. This question is ‘does the descriptive problem imply that the 
universe is anthropocentric?’. In other words, does the success of Pythagorean 
reasoning imply that mankind occupies a privileged space in the scheme of things? It 
will clarify matters to say a few words about the nature and history of 
anthropocentrism itself. Anthropocentrism was a common belief in the era before 
Galileo and Copernicus, an era dominated by Aristotelian physics and Ptolemaic 
astronomy, when it was widely believed that the earth was the centre of the 
universe and indeed that it was part of the earth’s purpose to be so. As is so well 
known that it scarcely needs repeating, in the post-Galilean era, the sciences were 
characterised by the opposite trend, by a significant move away from the 
anthropocentrism of Aristotle and Ptolemy.   
Thus anthropocentrism is by no means an unfamiliar concept, and indeed 
Steiner argues that in the last one hundred or so years science has once again 
become anthropocentric, though this anthropocentrism may be subtle. He identifies 
several forms of anthropocentrism, explicit and implicit, covert and overt. The 




Pythagorean reasoning by contrast is claimed by Steiner to be an example of covert 
anthropocentrism since the success of Pythagorean reasoning could suggest a 
privileged position for human mathematics and its applications, even though few 
physicists would explicitly claim such a position, even to themselves. Indeed, self-
consciously working in the Galilean tradition, it is likely that the majority of 
physicists would vehemently deny any anthropocentrism. Steiner’s goal is to 
question whether they can consistently do so – if they cannot it could be possible to 
use some naturalistic argument to establish anthropocentrism. Although Steiner 
does not make this argument, it would proceed from actual Pythagorean scientific 
practice to the acceptance of anthropocentrism, and could be motivated if the 
descriptive problem cannot be straightforwardly solved and if extreme examples of 
Pythagorean reasoning are as widespread as Steiner maintains. For if we accept that 
the universe is anthropocentric then the ability of human mathematics to mesh with 
facts about the universe becomes less enigmatic. 
It is important to be clear about the issue of aesthetic considerations in 
mathematics, as it is quite central here, for Steiner is at root arguing, or wanting to 
argue, from aesthetic considerations to anthropocentrism. Aesthetic considerations 
are relevant to which mathematical theorems are proved, and how mathematical 
theories, including physical theories with a large mathematical component, are 
stated, and there is no a priori reason to hold that aesthetic considerations that are 
persuasive to humans would be persuasive to non-humans.59 It is plausible that no 
theorem proved by the alien will follow if it does not also follow for the human, at 
least so long as the human and alien are using the same logic.60 Certainly, unless 
there is some error lurking within our mathematics itself, or within the alien 
mathematics, the human and alien will never prove inconsistent theorems so long as 
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they do not make mistakes. Rather, the problem is how the human and alien practice 
mathematics.  
The methods of human mathematics are guided by considerations of both 
aesthetics and convenience. But what is beautiful or convenient to a human may not 
be so to an alien. Human mathematical methods are restricted by what human 
mathematicians can comprehend, and many calculation systems arise out of human 
factors, the fact we have ten fingers on our hands giving rise to our base-10 
notational system, for example. Aliens may well have very different systems, and 
their (for the sake of argument) superior intellect may see convenience and 
aesthetic value where human mathematicians witness only chaos. Therefore aliens 
might have not only made huge advances in areas we have only dreamt of, or cannot 
even dream of, but might have focused on entirely different areas, possibly to their 
detriment and possibly to ours.  
Here we have a potential dilemma that arises from the descriptive problem: 
either anthropocentrism is false and the fact our aesthetic impulses are partially 
responsible for the platonistic mathematics that has contributed so much to 
physical discovery does not suggest a privileged place in the universe, but is rather a 
coincidence, or it does suggest this and anthropocentrism is true. I do not believe we 
can afford to impale ourselves on the second horn without getting embroiled in 
discussions concerning pre-established harmony. Indeed aversion to such a view 
has been ubiquitous among responses to Steiner’s work, where reviewers have 
raised important questions. For instance, even Mark Colyvan, the reviewer most 
enthusiastically sympathetic to Steiner’s work, writes:  
 
…if Steiner is right and the universe is user-friendly (that is, human consciousness 
holds a privileged place in the universe), what are the consequences of this? 
Although Steiner falls short of drawing any theistic conclusions, such conclusions 
are beckoning! (Indeed his thesis appears to be closely related to design arguments). 
(Colyvan 2000 p.394) 
 





[Steiner’s argument] is prey to a variant of Hume’s objection to the argument from 
design, which is that we cannot infer from a single case, the universe we actually 
inhabit, that it is unexpectedly “user friendly…” (Simons 2001, p.184) 
 
I cannot see how Steiner might hope to get away from the anthropocentrism he 
discusses: “[f]or what seem to be anthropocentric methods of discovering laws are 
so entrenched and widespread and so spectacularly successful that they cannot 
simply be dismissed” (Steiner 1998 p.73), and indeed he concludes “[t]he world, in 
other words, looks ‘user friendly’...” (ibid.p.176), which I read, not uncharitably, as 
an endorsement of anthropocentrism. If he does not endorse it he certainly makes 
no attempt at all to explain why this ‘seeming’ user-friendliness, this 
anthropocentrism, is not in fact genuine. But as I have said, I have no wish to go 
down the anthropocentric road. This leaves the first horn of the dilemma: it is a 
coincidence that our aesthetic impulses have in some cases led to mathematics that 
has a played vital role in various empirical descriptions and predictions, though not 
a coincidence that they have had an impact on our development of mathematics. But 
this coincidence is not inexplicable, which is reassuring as philosophers are 
notoriously intolerant of unexplained coincidences.  
The bulk of this chapter focuses on showing how the mapping account can 
solve, or at least be consistent with the solutions of, the various forms of the 
descriptive problem, and so the role of aesthetic impulses is largely neglected. It 
would be a mistake however to say nothing more about the matter, since it  
provides some motivation for the descriptive problem in the first place. The answer 
is simple however: symmetry. Human aesthetic impulses tend towards the 
symmetrical and much symmetry has been discovered in nature, and provides a clue 
to the form of natural laws.61 Beyond this our aesthetic impulses have little role to 
play in the development of mathematics, though they do have an influence of the 
specific proofs of particular theorems, where beautiful proofs, ‘proofs from the 
book’, to use Erdos’ phrase, are preferred to ‘ugly’ ones. Some branches of 
mathematics such as group theory are very concerned with symmetry, and with 
which transformations will preserve various symmetries, and group theory 
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especially finds a great deal of use in theoretical physics. But for the most part the 
role of aesthetics here has been exaggerated – the discovery of such things as the 
integers, the reals, and the complex plane, all of which have a vital role in applied 
mathematics, owe little to aesthetic considerations.  
I have two further points to make. Firstly, it is perfectly possible that in the 
scheme of things our aesthetic impulses are not particularly useful in motivating the 
mathematics that is conducive to science, and that aliens who have different 
aesthetic impulses have obtained a more advanced and more complete physics. No a 
priori considerations can rule this out. Secondly, I have said the main aesthetic 
impulse here is the drive to symmetry and symmetry is also found to be 
fundamental in the way the universe is structured. But to jump from this to 
anthropocentrism is about as valid as jumping from the fact we have evolved senses 
that can interpret the world to anthropocentrism, i.e. not at all (the ‘intelligent 
design’ posse notwithstanding). Therefore, I believe, we should be content to grant 
that aesthetic considerations aren’t especially problematic, and do not support 
anthropocentrism.  
Moreover it is not evident that aesthetic impulses are the only, or main, drive 
in the development of mathematics: in a recent paper Sorin Bangu (2006) has 
argued that in many cases our mathematical impulses are quite explicitly anti-
anthropocentric. Bangu’s argument is these anti-anthropocentric drives are clear in 
two very important mathematical developments, the rejection of definabilism and 
the acceptance of the axiom of choice. The rejection of definabilism, led by Euler, 
was the rejection of the idea that all functions must be definable in an explicit and 
uniform way. This entailed that a great many more functions could be admitted as 
part of the subject matter of mathematics, and lead eventually to the notion of a 
function as an arbitrary correspondence. The acceptance of the axiom of choice 
meant that mathematicians accepted the existence of a set with an element from 
every set in a range of sets (a ‘choice’ set), even in cases where the choice set was 
not explicitly defined. This axiom has been vital in the proofs of many important 
mathematical theorems such as the Banach-Tarski Theorem and the Baire category 




deal of mathematics, mathematics which is no less likely a priori to find empirical 
application than that mathematics based on aesthetic impulses, even temporarily 
allowing that  such impulses are anthropocentric. However it is now time to get on 




5.3.2 Solving Descriptive Problems of the First Category.  
 
Recall that a descriptive problem of the first category is a putative philosophical 
problem generated by a successful Pythagorean analogy. The reason such an 
analogy appears to generate a descriptive problem is that we take one equation 
describing one phenomenon, manipulate it mathematically, and obtain another 
equation describing another phenomenon. Thus it looks as though mathematics has 
some power to give us knowledge of the world by non-trivially transforming our 
existing descriptions of the world into other descriptions of different parts of the 
world. Moreover, thinks the believer in descriptive problems of the first category, 
this power cannot be explained in terms of the representational capacities of 
mathematics because the mathematical manipulations we perform may lack an 
empirical correlate, which is to say they do not correspond to any empirical 
connection between the equations, and so nothing is being represented. Besides 
being extremely questionable given how it was seen in the previous chapter that 
many abstract mathematical operations do represent empirical relations, I submit 
that this view of the descriptive problem is completely false. The descriptive 
problems of the first category can only be motivated by a loaded statement, which 
may be persuasive to the unwary but which is certainly not accurate.  
See how the problem disappears when what is going on is understood 
differently, and all the facts are accounted for: we take an equation describing one 
phenomenon. We manipulate it mathematically and obtain another equation for 
another phenomenon. But the phenomena in question are related. So we would 




equation can be transformed into another equation through a certain degree of 
manipulation. Take the Schrödinger example: monochromatic light is a wave. If 
wave-particle duality obtains, the monochromatic light also exists as photons of a 
fixed energy level. The conjecture is that wave-particle duality obtains for all 
quantum particles. So we would expect particles such as electrons to exhibit it, and 
thus be describable using a wave equation. Thus we would not be surprised if there 
was a high degree of similarity between an equation describing one wave and 
another equation describing another wave. And we would also not be surprised if 
those equations could be transformed into each other, since the equation describes 
the wave and so substituting different variables etc in the equation for others keeps 
the structure of the equation, whilst enabling it to describe different, though similar, 
waves.  
Moreover, as we already have a background of equivalent definitions of 
empirical attributes in terms of other, perhaps more fundamental, attributes, it is 
evident that expressions can be substituted for other extensionally equivalent 
expressions salva veritate, which may, even to a high degree, appear to change the 
form of the equation somewhat, but which has in not actually altered its form at all, 
just how it is displayed. For example, to obtain his equation Schrödinger substituted 
a quantum mechanical version of the equation for the energy of a particle for the 
classical version of the equation, but the form of the equation remained the same, 
for it was still the energy of a particle that was being defined by the right hand side 
of the equation, though this energy was now understood in quantum mechanical, 
and not classical, terms.  
There is no more mystery here than if I give a description of rugby and then 
supply a description of American football by altering my description of rugby. Both 
rugby and American football are similar to quite a high degree so we would expect 
their descriptions to be quite similar and for it to be possible to transform one 
description into another. The mathematical manipulation here is by no means an 
indication of a special power of mathematics that is to be explained by appeal to 
some sort of anthropocentrism: the physicist starts with one description of a 




he wants to describe is. So with enough physical intuition and formal skill, the 
cultivation of which is, after all, the point of his extensive research training, the 
physicist can obtain a description of the second phenomenon from the description 
of the first. Of course he may also be able to invent a description of the second 
phenomenon from scratch, but this would be a lot of extra work when he already 
has access to a description of a similar phenomenon. For that is how much science in 
its ‘normal’ phase proceeds – by piecemeal expansion and development of concepts 
and descriptions that are accurate within certain limits and which can therefore be 
constructively built upon. The intuition appealed to here may seem a little 
mysterious, especially given views such as Einstein’s that  
 
the supreme task of the physicist is the discovery of the most general 
elementary laws from which the world-picture can be deduced logically. But 
there is no logical way to the discovery of these elemental laws. There is only 
the way of intuition… (Einstein, in the foreword to Planck, 1981).  
 
However Einstein continues “[intuition] is helped by a feeling for the order lying 
behind the appearance, and this Einfühlung [literally, empathy or 'feeling one's way 
in'] is developed by experience.” (ibid). Developing a full account of this experience 
would no doubt be a complex and challenging task, but it seems clear that the 
experience, the ground of the intuition, is not in principle mysterious even if it is 
difficult to fully explain at present. We will see that this intuition plays a role in 
second category problems as well.  
So to conclude, descriptive problems of the first category present no issues 
for the mapping account of applicability, together with an appreciation of scientific 
intuition. If we avoid misleading statements of the way Pythagorean analogy works, 
then the use of the mathematics in the Pythagorean analogy does not go beyond the 
representational role which the mapping account allows it. The extent of this role is 
evident from the discussion in chapter two of this thesis, where it was shown how 
mathematical structures can represent relations of attributes of empirical entities. 




and enables him to abstract from phenomena, to appreciate structural similarities 
between phenomena, and describe phenomena accurately. But it is simply not true, 
as I showed in the last two chapters, that one’s account of the physical world need 
make any appeal to platonistic facts. For knowing that both photons and electrons 
have wave-like properties is empirical and not mathematical knowledge, and, at the 
risk of labouring the point, we would expect the equations describing those 
phenomena to be similar to the degree that the phenomena are similar.   
 
 
5.3.3 Solving Descriptive Problems of the Second Category.  
 
Descriptive problems of the second category, you will remember, are generated by 
vindicated acts of Pythagorean faith, ‘where a scientist looks for, and finds, a 
solution to his equation which normal science ruled was unlikely’. Can descriptive 
problems of the second category be solved in the same way as descriptive problems 
of the first? Evidently the answer to this question is in the negative, since the faith of 
scientists in their equations is a subjective matter to which the mapping account 
does not contribute, and regarding which Pythagorean analogy does not really play  
a role. The aim of this section is therefore to explain, or at least to give the outline of 
an explanation, of how it is that scientists’ faith in their equations results in their 
successful conjecturing of solutions to these equations that represent totally new 
sorts of empirical phenomena. It is easy to why, at first glance, it might seem that 
this is a problem a good answer to which can be found if we believe in the 
anthropocentrism of the universe – that there is some deep connection between our 
platonistic mathematics and physical reality such that the mathematical form of the 
equation has empirical implications. But, I submit, this is surely to jump the gun. 
Equations describe the behaviour of phenomena that scientists are familiar with, 
and to be acceptable the equation must successfully describe all known instances of 
the phenomenon. It must also describe unobserved instances of the phenomenon if 
the scientist is to do more than ‘save the appearances’. The extent to which this is 




the problem of induction is not our problem – although it may seem superficially 
similar insofar as both the second category descriptive problems and the problem of 
induction go beyond what is observed.  
To return to the issue at hand, the equation might be satisfied by certain 
solutions that seem to be physically unlikely in the sense that these solutions satisfy 
the formal constraints of the equation but have properties that if physically 
instantiated would put them at odds with the views of the scientific community. So 
why should these solutions be expected to obtain, when all they have in common 
with the physically observed solutions to the equation is that they are also solutions 
of the equation? The answer has to be that there is no indubitable reason to expect 
this unless the scientist has some sort of non-observational knowledge independent 
of what has been currently observed. The anthropocentric answer to this problem 
suggests that there is, or at least could be, such knowledge, but this is precisely what 
I deny. In order to motivate this denial it is essential to see why acts of Pythagorean 
faith might exist at all, as well as why many of them might actually obtain. 
The answer is found in the minds of the scientists themselves, but it does not 
concern a mysterious connection: a scientist who has worked for a long time on a 
certain equation that proves successful in describing a known phenomenon  is likely 
to be encouraged by this, perhaps to the extent of asserting that it is actually 
satisfied by physically unlikely solutions. Anyone that has worked hard on a 
successful theory is familiar with the feeling of exultation and the thought ‘brilliant, I 
bet this works for more things’. Indeed it is by no means the case that this applies 
exclusively to the scientist who develops the equation – another scientist, 
familiarising himself with said equation, may be sufficiently impressed to 
hypothesise that all solutions to the equation obtain, perhaps because the equation 
solves a problem the second scientist is working on, unifies a certain amount of 
theory, or so on. We likewise cannot dismiss the relevance of other human emotions 
to acts of Pythagorean faith, such as arrogance or overconfidence in his or her 
abilities or intuitions.  
This brings us back to the subject of physical or empirical intuition, which, 




for acts of Pythagorean faith by scientists. Scientists, theoretical physicists especially, 
spend a large fraction of their time thinking about, and reflecting on, the structure of 
the empirical world in formal and abstract terms. It is therefore to be expected that 
their physical intuition is honed, that they are familiar with patterns they observe in 
nature, that they appreciate when their equations describe phenomena in ways 
consistent with these patterns, and that they eventually develop a ‘gut’ feeling that 
the solutions to these equations obtain, even the unlikely solutions.62 There need be 
no more to it than that.  
For example, Dirac felt that if there were solutions corresponding to every 
component of the 4x1 matrix (called a ‘spinor’) that was the solution to his equation 
possessing 4x4 matrix coefficients, then this would exemplify a certain amount of 
symmetry that physicists commonly observe in the universe, and that therefore 
such solutions should be possible.63 But he could not have known that this would 
occur because the positron had not yet been observed. And this is precisely where 
Pythagorean faith entered the picture: the symmetry of the theory may have 
required the existence of physical correlates to all the components of the matrix, but 
as the history of science shows us beyond doubt, scientific theories are often 
imperfect or incomplete, and just because the existence of a certain phenomena 
would make them more symmetrical or ‘round them out’ this does not entail that 
they exist, it took an act of faith to conjecture this.  
That it takes a certain faith in the equation to conjecture such solutions does 
not imply that successful acts of Pythagorean faith are statistically insignificant, 
indeed it is likely that they are statistically significant, especially compared to, say, a 
computer program that produced an output of random scientific theories. But this 
success can unproblematically be attributed to scientists’ physical intuition, and 
scientists are after all not producing random theories. I don’t invoke this intuition as 
a mysterious faculty, it is simply the product of years of scientific research training, 
                                                 
62 In fact, the mapping account outlined in chapter two explains precisely why it is that thinking 
about mathematical patterns helps physical intuitions, namely that mathematical structures 
represent physical structures such that thinking about mathematical structures in certain patterns 
leads naturally to thinking about empirical structures exhibiting these patterns. 




and is the point, we might say, of such research training, and grounded, as Einstein 
pointed out above, in extensive experience. Therefore, a descriptive problem of the 
second category can be explained in terms of physical intuition without appeal to 
either anthropocentrism or indeed any other enigmatic connection between 
mathematics and reality.  
 
 
5.3.4 Solving Descriptive Problems of the Third Category.  
 
Descriptive problems of the third category are those involving the knowledge of the 
requisite platonistic mathematical structures independently of their application to 
empirical phenomena. It seems clear that these problems cannot be solved by the 
above methods, but then I submit that it is equally unclear that there is really a ‘case 
to answer’ here.  Before we move on to how to dispense with third category 
problems, I want to give two examples.   
 
Matrix Mechanics. Matrix mechanics was a forerunner to the wave mechanics 
developed by Schrödinger, and indeed the term ‘Quantum Mechanics’ derives from 
the formal equivalence of wave and matrix mechanics. It is an instance of a third 
category problem because of the surprising application of matrices to quantum 
phenomena. Matrix mechanics was developed by Born, Jordan and Heisenberg in 
response to the famous problem of the missing spectral lines of hydrogen, although 
Heisenberg was the principal architect, after he had a famous revelation: ‘It was 
about three o' clock at night when the final result of the calculation lay before me. At 
first I was deeply shaken. I was so excited that I could not think of sleep. So I left the 
house and awaited the sunrise on the top of a rock’. The core of Heisenberg’s 
revelation was to focus on observable properties of atoms, and realise that these 
observables might have non-commutative properties. Given that non-commutative 
properties are nicely modelled by matrices, the introduction of matrices makes a lot 
of sense – interestingly matrices had very little application in physics hitherto. The 




Heisenberg was concerned was the ‘Hermitian’ or ‘self-adjoint’ matrix, “…a square 
matrix with complex entries which is equal to its own conjugate transpose, that is, 
the element in the ith row and jth column is equal to the complex conjugate of the 
element in the jth row and ith column, for all indices i and j”.64 An example of a 
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The first diagonal always consists of real numbers. Call the Hermitian matrix ‘A’. A 
nonzero vector B is an eigenvector iff there is some number λ such that AB = λB. λ is 
an eigenvalue of A, and a scalar which the vector is multiplied by. B is the 
eigenvector associated with λ. For the matrices with which Heisenberg is concerned, 
the eigenvalues are all real numbers. The power of matrix mechanics was such that 
it was the first remotely complete and accurate description of quantum phenomena, 
but not only did the matrix formulation of Quantum Mechanics agree with the 
known quantum data, it also provided many interesting results. For example, the 
uncertainty principle follows under a suitable interpretation from the non-
commutativity of the matrices, and matrix mechanics permits the derivation of 
physical results concerning the spectra of atoms which are more complex than the 
simple hydrogen case, e.g. the case where just a single electron ‘orbits’ the nucleus. 
What is so remarkable is that all this detailed mathematical matrix apparatus for 
describing these empirical phenomena already existed independently of the 




Eigenvalues of Hermitian Matrices and the Riemann Zeta Function. This is 
another example of mathematics having ‘been there before’, coincidentally also 
involving physical interpretations of matrices. In this example the existence of the 
mathematics was discovered by a physicist by accident, and as far as I know has had 
                                                 




no direct role in any scientific advances, but it is no less remarkable for all that. The 
mathematician Riemann was concerned with the distribution of the prime numbers 
and in the course of his work discovered a function, the zeta function, which bore a 
close relationship to the  prime numbers when the function returned a value of zero. 
Here is the function: 
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The discovery that this equation describes an empirical phenomenon was the result 
of informal discussion between mathematician Hugh Montgomery and physicist 
Freeman Dyson. When Montgomery was explaining his problem to Dyson, and 
showed him the distribution of the gaps between the zeroes of the zeta function, 
Dyson observed “that the gaps between pairs of eigenvalues of random Hermitian 
matrices are likewise distributed. Such eigenvalues have been studied at length in 
connection with energy levels in the nucleus of a heavy atom under bombardment 
by low-energy neutrons”.65 So a piece of totally pure mathematics, designed without 
anything empirical in mind at all turns out to describe perfectly the energy levels of 
certain atoms. The mathematics and physics is extremely complex, such that we 
should certainly not have looked for, or anticipated, such a correspondence.  
 
Solving the Problem. So how can third category problems be ‘solved’? Take the 
first example, matrix mechanics. Mathematicians study a whole range of different 
objects and structures. Around two hundred and fifty thousand new theorems are 
proved each year, and many new and exotic mathematical objects and structures are 
discovered or constructed. Heisenberg primarily needed mathematical objects that 
had non-commutative properties in order to describe certain physical properties he 
was concerned with. Had, counterfactually, matrix theory not been invented, but 
instead xyz-theory dealing with non-commutative xyz’s been invented instead, it 
                                                 






seems likely Heisenberg would have helped himself to this mathematics, or perhaps 
have invented matrices himself. (Of course neither of these situations may have 
obtained and the progress of Quantum Mechanics would doubtless have been 
severely set back). This could seem more problematic in the Dirac case above, which 
is really an example of a first, second, and third category problem because not only 
were matrices required for the description of phenomena, but it was the vector 
coefficient of the matrix (itself a matrix) which was instrumental in the discovery of 
the positron. However, it seems to me that this was accounted for quite well insofar 
as the solutions to problems of the first and second categories are concerned, and 
we ought not to be surprised that the matrix theory in question existed 
independently of Dirac.  
After all, as we have said, there are rather a lot of platonistic objects, and 
matrices do not even make it into the ranks of the exotic or bizarre. Pedestrian and 
ubiquitous as they are, it is not a surprise that they were discovered long before 
their applicability to empirical phenomena became apparent. This same answer 
cannot be given in the Riemann case, because in this instance we are dealing with a 
very abstruse entity, viz. the zeta function. This case is a much stronger instance of a 
third category problem, but recondite though it is, it does still seem solvable. There 
are a large amount of enormously complex structures in the physical world, and one 
would expect a physicist to be especially sensitive to those of them they are familiar 
with. Each empirical structure does of course have a platonistic analogue, since 
platonistic mathematics is about all self-consistent abstract structures. A physicist 
or mathematician, when presented with two structures which he has knowledge of, 
can say whether or not they are the same. And this is what happened in the Dyson 
case: Dyson knew the structure of the eigenvalues in question, and when presented 
with the eigenvalues qua values of the zeta function he was able to see the 
structures were the same, that the values of the function and the eigenvalues he was 
already familiar with were the same. There is nothing in the least bit surprising 
about this, although it is a coincidence – if Montgomery has been talking to an 
astrophysicist the similarity would probably have gone unnoticed. It must be the 




not been described by mathematicians (or physicists), the knowledge of which 
would be very useful for physics. Likewise, no doubt there are many already 
discovered mathematical structures that would be useful to physicists if they knew 
of them. Either way, I cannot agree that there is any philosophical problem arising 
out of this, and I hope the analysis of these examples has convinced the reader of the 
same. Certainly we would wish to know the extent to which this happens, but it is 
certainly frequent enough for physicist Steve Weinberg to write “it is positively 
spooky how the physicist finds out that the mathematician has been there before 
him of her” (quoted in Steiner 1998, p.13). However something being spooky stops 
very short of it being a miracle which can justify anthropocentrism, especially as I 
have offered an explanation in terms of thousands of mathematicians proving 
theorems about a diverse range of abstract mathematical structures.   
There is also another perspective concerning the surprise we might feel that 
abstract mathematical structures fit the empirical world, namely that abstract 
mathematical structures and theorems about them have empirical interpretations 
precisely because a great many of them were constructed for exactly that purpose, 
and it is not always just a happy accident arising from the plenitude of abstract 
structures being studied. In very simple cases this is obvious, no one is amazed that 
geometry is applicable because we all know geometry was originally developed for 
the purposes of ‘earth measuring’, hence its name. But it is important to remember 
that this holds true in many non-geometrical cases as well. Newton and Leibniz’ 
development of the differential calculus for the purposes of describing changes of 
forces with respect to each other is a non-trivial example here. (Of course in this 
instance it would be less likely that there would be a third category descriptive 
problem, as we would be less inclined to regard mathematical structures 
constructed for empirical purposes as being ‘off the shelf’. But either way, it seems 
clear that descriptive problems of the third category are nothing to worry about.)  
I submit then that all three categories of the descriptive problem of 
applicability have been solved, and that a fortiori the descriptive problem of 




which I have endorsed in this thesis. I turn now, in chapter six, to ontological and 





 Chapter 6 
 
 
In short … a reasonable 
interpretation of the 
application of mathematics 
to the physical world 
requires a realistic 
interpretation of 
mathematics. 




Implications for Philosophy of Mathematics: 




In this chapter I explore some of the implications of the mapping account 
developed in the preceding chapters for wider issues in the philosophy of 
mathematics including whether the mapping account is committed to abstract 
mathematical objects; the bearing of the account on the indispensability 
argument; whether the account can be nominalised; and if idealisations pose 
any problems for the mapping account. I argue that the account is prima facie 
committed to abstract mathematical objects, and examine the relation of this 
fact to the indispensability argument for mathematical platonism. However I 
maintain that there are construals of the mapping account which are both 
acceptable to and useful for a nominalist. I look at both fictionalism and 
nominalist views that try to provide surrogates for the mathematical objects 
that our scientific theories quantify over. Turning then to the issue of 





6.1. Chapter Introduction 
 
In chapters two to four the mapping account of applicability has been developed, the 
dispensability of genuine platonistic explanations of physical phenomena has been 
argued for, and the details of how nominalistically acceptable explanations of 
physical phenomena might be possible have been expanded on. In the previous 
chapter, five, I made the case that there is nothing mysterious about the applicability 
of mathematics to the physical world. Thus the preceding chapters amount to an 
argument for a representational conception of applied mathematics in general and 
for the mapping account of applicability specifically. I believe the treatment has 
been sufficiently thorough, although this is not to say that there are no philosophical 
loose ends to tie up. For instance, if a working account of applicability is as 
important to the philosophy of mathematics as I have suggested throughout this 
thesis, then we might expect it to have some implications for such traditional 
concerns in the philosophy of mathematics as the platonism/nominalism debate. I 
have not much hitherto addressed the ontological issues to a great degree because 
of a desire to remained neutral with respect to ontology as far as possible when 
developing the account, in order that the explanatory power of the account would 
not rest on any particular assumptions about the nature of mathematical objects.  
In this chapter I consider whether or not the mapping account is committed 
to platonism, and examine the relation of the indispensability argument, the most 
compelling argument for platonism, to that account (section 6.2). I then discuss 
some nominalist responses to the account in section 6.3. In 6.3.2 I consider the 
status of the mapping account as an explanation of applicability if one believes that 
mathematical objects are fictional. In section 6.3.3 I present an alternative 
nominalist philosophy that allows the mapping account to stand more or less as it 
was presented in chapter two, but which provides nominalistically acceptable 
surrogates for the platonistic objects that are referred to by it. Section 6.3.4 
discusses the modal structuralist approach to the issue of nominalistically 




issues are by no means the only questions raised by the mapping account – further 
questions arise from considerations about idealisations and are addressed in 
section 6.4. For example, are there non-physical idealisations in physical 
explanations, and if so what problems do they or would they cause for the mapping 
account? Can or even should the mapping account handle the physical idealisations 
that appear so ubiquitous in science? Section 6.5 forms the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
 
6.2. Platonist Ontology and Indispensability  
 
Over the last five chapters we have seen the mapping account developed and 
defended. But so far I have abstained, as I have frequently indicated, and the reader 
has doubtless noted, from drawing many ontological inferences from or about the 
mapping account. I can put this off no longer: does the mapping account commit us 
to abstract mathematical objects? That is, is it committed to a traditional platonist 
view of mathematics? The most natural reading of the mapping account is a 
platonist reading because the mappings it uses are mappings from empirical 
structures to what are usually taken to be abstract mathematical structures 
(frequently the real number structure) which provide the values of measurement of 
empirical magnitudes.  
This attitude of many mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics has 
contributed to the acceptance of the platonistic view as the standard view of 
mathematical structures, and thus the platonistic reading of the account is the prima 
facie reading. There is more evidence to support this: representation theorems are 
heavily involved in the mapping account insofar as they show how mappings are 
possible. These representation (and uniqueness) theorems are part of measurement 
theory, a branch of classical mathematics, and involve references to all sorts of sets, 
functions and numbers which are standardly treated as platonistic objects. Such 
references are also found in some of the axioms of the various axiom systems that 




particular empirical attribute that we want to measure or describe mathematically, 
such as the Archimedean axiom. I explained in chapter two that the mapping 
account holds that mathematics can be applied in virtue of mappings from empirical 
structures to mathematical structures, mappings that we know obtain between 
empirical structures satisfying suitable axioms and mathematical structures because 
of certain representation theorems. This suggests very strongly that the mapping 
account of applicability is in fact committed to some form of platonism, though it 
does not preclude there being a nominalist version of the account. If there is such a 
nominalistic interpretation of the mapping account it follows that applicability may 
be explainable in terms of something other than mappings into abstract 
mathematical structures. Before getting into nominalistic issues, I want to consider 
the degree to which a platonist could use the mapping account as an argument for 
mathematical platonism by arguing for platonism from the putative indispensability 
of mathematics for the mapping account.  
Indispensability to our best scientific theories is a powerful reason to believe 
in the existence of something. This view has received a great deal of attention at the 
hands of platonists who argue that references to abstract mathematical objects are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories and that we should therefore believe in 
the existence of what they seem to refer to. One common formulation of the 
argument is as follows, due to Quine (Colyvan 2001, p.11): 
 
1. We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities 
indispensable to our best scientific theories 
2. Platonistic entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories 
Therefore 
3. We ought to have ontological commitment to platonistic entities.  
 
The biconditional in the first premise may be weakened to a conditional if we think 
there may be other reasons for ontological commitment. The use of the ‘ought’ here 
is misleading, it suggests that we should, but don’t have to, be so ontologically 




cannot consistently accept the scientific theories and not accept the platonistic 
entities indispensable to such theories. Insofar as Field has managed to at least 
indicate how platonistic mathematics may be eliminated from the statement of 
(some of) our best scientific theories, examples of which I discussed in chapter four, 
I take it that premise two has been seriously challenged and that the 
indispensability argument has lost much of its force. But two issues remain. Firstly 
many platonists remain unconvinced by Field’s arguments undermining the second 
premise, and for these philosophers considerations about the first premise of the 
argument are likely to be more effective in bringing the argument into disrepute. 
However I am more concerned with a second issue – namely the ontological 
implications of the mapping account itself. To defuse these ontological implications, 
I argue in 6.3 that nominalistic versions of the mapping account are possible.  
Before looking at this topic, I would like to address the first issue: should we 
believe the first premise of the indispensability argument? That is, should we 
believe in all and only those objects reference to which is indispensable to our best 
current scientific theories? If we believe that science does tell us with at least 
approximate accuracy what physical entities there are, then we are going to be 
inclined to believe in the existence of these physical objects. And if we are 
physicalists who believe that all objects and forces are physical objects and forces 
then this view will have a certain persuasiveness. This much is uncontroversial, or 
at least if it is controversial, the burden of proof is on the opponent of science qua 
guide to ontology to tell us why. What is more questionable, though, is whether we 
should believe in the existence of the platonistic objects that our scientific theories, 
stated in their usual form, quantify over. If such objects are genuinely indispensable 
then there is relatively little room for manoeuvre here by the nominalist who is at 
all persuaded by naturalistic arguments. But there are different degrees of 
naturalism. In its strongest form (e.g. that of Maddy 1997) the role of philosophy in 
science and mathematics is reduced to little more than a sociology of science 
mathematics, where we accept what scientists seem to be saying. For instance 
Maddy says “[i]f and when the naturalistic philosopher does turn to metaphysical 




enquiries” (p.233) which “takes the actual methods of natural science as its own” 
(p.183). This version of naturalism takes platonistic commitments are more or less 
face value. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the sort of view anti-naturalistic 
Field sometimes seems to be espousing, when he says things like  
 
I believe that synthetic approaches to physical theory are advantageous, not 
merely because they are nominalistic but because they are in some ways  
more illuminating that metric approaches; they explain what is going on 
without appeal to extraneous, causally irrelevant entities”. (Field 1980, p.43) 
 
This is anti-naturalistic because metric approaches that involve causally irrelevant 
entities are precisely approaches contemporary scientists adopt. But there are 
moderate views between these two extremes that are not anti-naturalistic. For 
instance, we may also accept, as I do, that scientists do not necessarily think about 
the metaphysical commitments of their theories and that philosophers are aware of 
things that scientists are not, such as that if a term appears to refer to an abstract 
object it does follow that an abstract object is what is refers to. This suggests that 
what appears to be indispensible may not, on further reflection, be so. Such 
reflection would not be the business of science, which is not to say that science is 
not philosophically relevant, or that philosophical views cannot arise out of 
scientific views. 
In keeping with my more moderate view the earlier chapters of this thesis 
have challenged the idea that references to platonistic objects are genuinely 
indispensable to our physical theories. What has not yet been addressed though, 
and what I want to examine now, is whether references to such objects are 
indispensable to our best theory of applicability, the mapping account. For if they 
are so indispensable there is nothing to prevent a platonist from constructing an 
indispensability argument for platonism based on the appearance of such references 
in the mapping account. I believe such an attempt would be quite misguided 
however, and lack any force, since part of the support for indispensability 
arguments is that the practices they are built upon are extremely central to our 




way of gaining knowledge of the world. No one can claim such status for the theory 
of applicability, however desirable it might be to explain the application of 




6.3  Can we Nominalise the Mapping Account? 
  
I have just argued that the mapping account, at least on its prima facie interpretation, 
is committed to the existence of abstract mathematical objects. However I am 
sceptical about the existence of such objects. There are of course the usual worries 
about how we can have knowledge of such objects, since if they exist they are non-
spatial, non-temporal and acausal. Although some progress has been made towards 
solving some of the epistemological problems associated with abstract objects, as 
manifested in different research programmes, this does not dispel all the issues 
associated with such objects. For instance, Stewart Shapiro in his Philosophy of 
Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (1997) argues that the three methods of 
simple abstraction, linguistic abstraction and implicit definition are sufficient to give 
us knowledge of platonistic structures, but this relies on a certain amount of 
ideology, such as the principle of coherence, to guarantee the existence of the 
structures that are so defined (Ibid. p. 95). Moreover crucial issues of the identity 
conditions for structures remain unsolved.66  
Another influential research programme is Neo-Fregeanism, as manifested in 
the collection The Reason’s Proper Study.67 Neo-Fregeanism tries to analyse our 
knowledge of natural numbers in terms of principles such as Hume’s principle: two 
concepts have the same number if and only if the objects falling under those 
concepts and be put into one to one correspondence. However a large issue for Neo-
Fregeanism is explaining the epistemological status of such principles (ibid pp.11-
12, 307-332). A related issue, the Caesar problem, also arises, whereby Hume’s 
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principle cannot say of any object whether it is a number  or not. (Ibid. p.14-16, 335-
396). So despite recent work, serious problems with the possibility of our 
knowledge of abstract objects abound, and motivate the desire for an account of 
applicability that does not depend on such objects. For although the nature of the 
subject matter of mathematics is disputed, the brute fact of the applicability of 
mathematics to the empirical world is not, even though there is disagreement on 
how to explain this applicability.  
If platonistic objects do not exist then the mapping account cannot, as it 
stands, explain how it is that platonistic mathematics facilitates the description and 
prediction of empirical phenomena. It would explain the applicability of abstract 
mathematical structures if abstract mathematical structures existed, but if they 
don’t, it doesn’t. So what now? There are two possible, but incompatible, nominalist 
responses. Firstly we could be fictionalists, declare that that abstract mathematical 
structures and abstract mathematical objects are only fictions, and then try to find 
some role for the mapping account as a theory about platonistic fictions. The use of 
these fictions to derive nominalistic results is legitimate (in the sense they cannot 
lead us astray) because (I will argue) the theories of these fictions are conservative 
over nominalist theories, and useful because of our ability (says Field) to construct 
abstract counterparts of nominalistic statements. It might be then wondered where 
this leaves the mapping account, but I do not want to go into detail here – the 
reader’s curiosity will be satisfied shortly in 6.3.2, although the outcome is not a 
positive one 68 
There is a second nominalistic response to the extant platonistic 
commitments of the mapping account, which I alluded to above: we may try to 
                                                 
68 It may be thought for some reason that the extensive role the discussion of Field played earlier in 
chapter four of this thesis commits me to the fictionalist argument. But this is not so, for there Field’s 
ideas were merely used for providing intrinsic descriptions for the purpose of undermining belief in 
genuine platonistic explanations of empirical phenomena in order to add weight to the idea that 
mathematics is relevant to empirical phenomena only in a representational capacity. I intended no 
nominalist moral to be drawn from this exercise, and I only wanted to explore what the scope of the 
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reinterpret mathematics as being about something other than abstract objects.69 If 
successful we still retain a mapping account but it is an account of the applicability 
of some nominalistically acceptable entities to empirical phenomena in terms of 
mappings from empirical structures to the nominalistically acceptable entity-
structures rather than to abstract mathematical structures. If mathematics does not 
have to be about abstract objects then we may regard our nominalistic version of 
mathematics as mathematics in a serious sense, as nominalistic mathematics rather 
than platonistic mathematics. To motivate such a nominalist argument we would 
need to find surrogates for the natural and real number structures, sets and 
functions and the like, surrogates which are not abstract in the way that platonistic 
entities are and which are therefore nominalistically acceptable. The nominalistic 
structures would have to possess the same structural properties as the platonistic 
structures, but if the nominalistic structures are suitably rich that need not be a 
problem. Several versions of this second response are available and I describe two 
such versions here. One of these is developed by Davide Rizza (2010) – based on the 
results of Reinhard Niederee (1992). The second is the modal-structuralist strategy 
of Geoffrey Hellman (1989).  
 
 
6.3.1 A Scholarly Point about Rizza and Field.  
 
Before I begin presenting the arguments outlined above, there is one point that I 
wish to take up. This is that although Rizza’s attempted nominalisation is a clear 
example of surrogate nominalism since, as we shall see, he provides a 
nominalistically acceptable surrogate for real numbers qua c-types, he seems to take 
himself to be extending Field’s programme. In fact he says as much:  
 
[my] objective is to show that mathematical nominalism can be motivated as a 
methodological approach capable of providing valuable insight into the applicability of 
mathematics: the idea is to use mathematical nominalism as a basic theoretical outlook 
to investigate applicability and then to show that, from this starting point, a satisfactory 
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account of applicability can be developed. Such an objective is, to the best of my 
knowledge, not explicitly pursued by any recent work on nominalism in mathematics, 
although it is implicitly present in [Field, 1980]. (Rizza 2010 pp.56-57) 
 
and even more explicitly:  
 
What I want to show is that Field’s explanation can be further refined and this can be 
done precisely by showing that it is unsatisfactory from the point of view of a 
mathematical nominalist. A deeper nominalization of Field’s explanation produces a 
better account of applicability. (p.60) 
 
It is true that Rizza’s idea to use nominalism as a basic starting point to investigate 
applicability has not been explicitly pursued previously and that something like this 
is implicitly present in Field. What is not implicitly present in Field however, and in 
fact represents a departure from the Fieldian programme itself, is the idea that we 
need to nominalise measurement theory further than we have already done so, and 
by means of surrogates. If there were any dispute about this point, Field himself 
makes it very clear: 
 
I do not propose to reinterpret any part of classical mathematics, instead I propose to 
show that the mathematics needed for application to the physical world does not include 
anything which even prima facie contains references to…abstract entities like numbers, 
function, or sets (Field1980 pp. i-ii) 
 
For if we already believe that platonistic objects are useful fictions the invocation of 
which is conservative over nominalist science, and that the mapping account is not 
literally true, then why even bother to provide nominalistically acceptable 
surrogates for natural and real numbers, functions, and the like? Providing 
nominalistically acceptable surrogates for platonistic objects may appear to be a 
refinement or deeper nominalisation of Field insofar as reference to fictional 
abstract mathematical objects is avoided, but, from the Fieldian perspective, it is 
completely redundant and in conflict with Field’s stated views. However this 
confusion is a purely scholarly issue, and since nothing about the validity of Rizza’s 
claim to have nominalised much measurement theory is affected by it, I shall leave 
the discussion of it here, and turn to the first of the options for a non-platonistic 




6.3.2  The Fictionalist Approach to the Mapping Account 
 
Before I can develop a fictionalist response to the mapping account it is essential to 
be clear regarding what fictionalism, specifically mathematical fictionalism, actually 
is. I said a little bit about fictionalism in chapter four, but I was primarily concerned 
with the part of Field’s programme that focused on the possibility of producing 
nominalistic descriptions of platonistic-mathematics-containing empirical theories 
rather than with the part concerning fictionalism per se. Mathematical fictionalists 
believe that theories about platonistic objects are not literally true, but that 
nevertheless their use in inferring nominalistic consequences from nominalistic 
premises is both legitimate and useful, perhaps to the extent of being practically 
indispensible to such an enterprise. The reasons that fictionalists are nominalists is 
because they do not believe that abstract objects have any substantive existence, 
from which it follows that no statement about an abstract mathematical object can 
be literally true, though it can be ‘true in the story of platonistic mathematics’ – just 
as it is not literally true that ‘Venus was the mother of Aeneas’, since there is no such 
person as Venus and probably no Aeneas either, but this statement is true ‘in the 
story of the Aenead’. So far so good, but several questions immediately suggest 
themselves: (1) isn’t there a risk that using platonistic mathematics will allow us to 
infer all kinds of consequences from nominalistic premises that would not follow 
from the premises alone? (2) can we actually give nominalistic versions of the 
premises of scientific theories that capture the empirical content of what the 
scientist is trying to express? and (3) if it is false, why should platonistic 
mathematics be useful at all?  
 
Question 1: Accounting for the Legitimate Use of Platonistic Mathematics. The 
key concept in establishing that the fictionalist’s use of platonistic mathematics is 
legitimate is conservativeness. One theory A is a conservative extension of theory B 
iff no consequences of a certain type follow from the conjunction of A and B that do 
not follow from B alone. Nothing said so far rules out that A and B might contradict 




all consequences whatsoever will follow from the conjunction. But if the language of 
one of the theories is restricted so that the contradiction cannot arise, then 
conservativeness can be preserved. As Field explains, we might think nominalistic 
and platonistic theories will be inconsistent, since platonist theories talk about 
objects that nominalistic theories explicitly repudiate, but this can be avoided by 
relativising all the quantifiers of each nominalistically-statable assertion in the 
nominalistic theory to quantify over only non-abstract entities, yielding a new 
theory which will lack the resources to express the proposition that abstract objects 
do not exist. This is done by introducing a predicate Mx (x is a mathematical object) 
and only permitting quantification over those objects x such that ~Mx. In what 
follows the nominalistic theory containing the relativised quantifiers is denoted N*.  
 The conservativeness of a theory with respect to another theory is 
differentiated by the order (first, second or higher) and type (semantic or syntactic) 
of the consequence relation they concern, as well as which category of consequences 
they involve. Thus we need to distinguish whether the consequence relation is 
semantic or syntactic since these are not coextensional in higher-order cases. A is 
syntactically conservative over B with respect to some class of formulae if no such 
formulae can be derived logically from A+B that cannot be derived from B alone. A is 
semantically conservative over B if for all logical consequences of a certain class, no 
logical consequences of that class follow from A+B that do not follow from B alone. 
In the first-order case A will be semantically conservative iff it is syntactically 
conservative. However in the second-order case this will not be true, since A might 
well be semantically conservative but will fail to be syntactically conservative, since 
second-order theories are syntactically incomplete.  
Leaving aside for a moment such considerations, it is clear that for platonistic 
mathematics to be legitimately applied by the fictionalist to an empirical situation 
the platonistic mathematics must be conservative with respect to nominalistic 
consequences, that is, nominalistically conservative. A platonistic mathematical 
theory M is nominalistically conservative over a nominalistic theory N iff no 
nominalistic conclusions follow from N+M that do not follow from N alone. 




nominalistic statements/theories that do not refer to abstract mathematical objects, 
even to say there are no such objects: 
 
(C) Let A be any nominalistically statable assertion, and N any body of such  
assertions; and let M be any mathematical theory. Then A* isn’t a consequence 
of N* + M + ∃x ~M(x) unless A is a consequence of N* alone. (Field 1980 p.12). 
 
Just in case philosophers consider conservativeness to be a contentious proposition, 
Field shows that conservativeness is implied by other principles which have more 
intuitive plausibility. For example, the following principle implies C: 
 
(C') Let A be any nominalistically statable assertion and let M be any mathematical 
theory. Then A*  isn’t a consequence of M unless A* is logically true. (Ibid.) 
 
That is, from a theory purely about abstract objects the only statement about 
concrete objects that follows from it will be those logically true statements featuring 
concrete objects. It is evident that this principle must be true since all logical truths 
are logically valid formulae (tautologies), and all logically valid formulae follow from 
every theory. Thus if A* is a tautology then it will follow from every platonistic 
theory, even though all sentences of S will quantify over platonistic objects, and A* 
will not quantify over any such objects. If this philosophical argument were not 
enough to convince the conservativeness sceptic, we can prove formally that a given 
mathematical theory is conservative in the relevant sense. For example, in the case 
of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with urelements Field supplies the following proof:  
 
Theorem: If T is any consistent body of assertions, then ZFUV(T)+T* is also consistent. 
Proof: Suppose T is consistent, then it has a model M of inaccessible cardinality, say with 
domain D.  Pick any entity e not in D. (e is the empty set). Let D0 be D ∪ {e}; Let D1 
consist of all non-empty subsets of D0. Let D2 consist of all non-empty subsets of           
D0 ∪ D1, etc. Let Dω be D0 ∪ D1 ∪ ... Let Dω+1 consist of  all non-empty subsets of Dω etc. 
Continuing in this way until you reach an inaccessible cardinal, you get, if certain initial 
precautions are taken on the choice of D and e, a model of ZFUV(T)+T*. So ZFUV(T)+T* is 
consistent. QED. (Field 1980, pp.17-18) 
 
This argument will not persuade a nominalist conservativeness-sceptic of the 




using set theory. However, the  informal argument given above for the truth of C' 
will hopefully be enough to convince the nominalist that platonistic mathematics is 
conservative over nominalist theories. Indeed, as presented, this view may even 
seem trivial, assuming the mathematics is consistent. Field explains: 
 
This argument isn’t conclusive: standard [i.e. platonistic] mathematics might turn out not 
to be conservative…for it might conceivably turn out to be inconsistent, and if it is 
inconsistent is certainly isn’t conservative. We would however regard a proof that 
standard mathematics wasn’t consistent as extremely surprising, and as showing that 
standard mathematics needed revision. Equally it would be surprising if standard 
mathematics implied that there are at least 106 non-mathematical objects in the 
universe…Good mathematics is conservative; a discovery that accepted mathematics 
isn’t conservative would be a discovery that it isn’t good.  (Field 1980, p.13) 
 
Is platonistic mathematics conservative in the case of mixed mathematical 
statements, e.g. those involving impure sets, functions from empirical objects to 
mathematical objects etc? For in science in general, and physics in particular, the 
relation between N and M is far from obviously arbitrary because platonistic 
mathematics saturates the physical sciences: many concepts are defined with the 
help of such mathematics, some have only a platonistic interpretation or definition, 
and platonistic mathematical methods – operations on differential equations for 
example – are seemingly vital to scientific work. Conservativeness seems to be by no 
means a trivial property in such cases. So how can it be shown that platonistic 
mathematics is conservative here?  
Field’s response is to avoid such questions by explicitly constructing non-
platonistic, that is, nominalistically acceptable, versions of scientific theories, such 
that principle C above will apply trivially to them. It is thus necessary to show that 
there can be nominalist versions of scientific theories, a theory N* that does not 
contain any references to platonistic objects, and that the platonistic versions of 
them obtain if and only if the nominalistic ones also do.  
 
Question 2: Producing Nominalistic Theories. Producing nominalistic scientific 
theories is essential to the fictionalist for several reasons. One reason, as Field 




numbers. He commends Hilbert’s approach to geometry for avoiding arbitrariness 
and wishes to emulate it. (Field 1980 p.46). It has been suggested (e.g. MacBride 
1999, p.434) that “nominalist theories invoke only entities causally relevant to what 
is being explained” but it is doubtful that Field wishes to go this far since it is not 
clear how the fact a set of space-time points with the right properties can model the 
real numbers involves causal relevance.70 The points may perhaps be accessible and 
even have causal powers, but this seems irrelevant to the role that they play in a 
nominalistic version of a platonistic theory. It could also lumber Field with the 
possibility that his nominalisation could collapse if space-time turned out to be 
quantised. There is unfortunately no space to address these fascinating issues here. 
The second reason that fictionalists need nominalised theories is to ensure 
that the conservativeness of mathematics over nominalist science is a clear-cut 
matter, and thus that the fictionalist’s use of platonistic mathematics remains 
legitimate. For if the theories are nominalised (and their quantifiers restricted in the 
manner outlined above) it is clear that platonistic mathematics has to be 
conservative over them. This is exactly what Field sets out to produce in Science 
without Numbers, specifically for the case of Newtonian gravitational theory. I 
discussed this at length in chapter four, so shall say no more about the matter here 
for fear of repeating myself, but request the reader’s continued indulgence 
concerning both the view that nominalising scientific theories in general is a 
plausible and feasible enterprise and the view that Field has successfully 
nominalised Newtonian gravitational theory.  
 
Question 3: Abstract Counterparts and the Usefulness of Platonistic 
Mathematics. So we know, granting the answers to the first two questions, that 
there are nominalistic versions of scientific theories and thus that the platonistic 
mathematics used by the fictionalist is conservative over nominalist theories and 
can therefore be used legitimately. This has not however explained why the 
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platonistic mathematics is useful in the derivation of nominalist consequences of 
nominalistic physical theories rather than merely harmless. Field does have a clear 
line on why this should be the case:  
 
I think the key to using a mathematical system [M] as an aid to drawing conclusions 
from a nominalistic system N lies in proving in N*+ [M] the equivalence of a statement 
in N* alone with some other statement (which I’ll call an abstract counterpart of the 
statement in N*) which quantifies over abstract entities. (Field 1980 p.20) 
 
The reason the abstract counterparts are useful is because  
 
…if we want to determine the validity of an inference in N*…it is unnecessary to 
proceed directly; instead we can if it is convenient ‘ascend’ from one or more 
statements in N* to abstract counterparts of them, then use [M] to prove from these 
abstract counterparts an abstract counterpart of some other statement in N*. (Field 1980 
pp.20-21) 
 
What we need to prove therefore is that for each nominalistic premise ni of N*, ni iff 
mi, where mi contains references to abstract mathematical objects. Thus when we 
get the conclusion involving abstract counterparts (mk) of the derivation from N*+M, 
we can prove that mk iff nk and thus that nk. That in a nutshell is how platonistic 
mathematics can be used – because M is a conservative extension of N we literally 
cannot go wrong with the platonistic mathematics if we do the derivations correctly, 
assuming of course that M is consistent.  
This explains how M can be used to facilitate derivations in N. But why should 
we want to use it? This was addressed in chapter two, but to reiterate, because 
abstracting away from the content of the nominalist statements means that many of 
their details can be ignored. This makes the abstract statements easier to 
understand and grasp than their nominalistic counterparts, even though strictly 
speaking they are false as they quantify over objects that do not exist. The fact that 
they ignore many details relevant to the nominalistic statement means that the 
derivation of an abstract statement is simpler and faster than the derivation of a 
nominalistic one. We can therefore derive empirical predictions that could be 
derived without using platonistic mathematics but which would take much longer in 




clear application of platonistic mathematics insofar as numbers and sets are 
invovled. One way to present cardinality statements nominalistically is to state the 
cardinality logically in the usual way. It is convenient to introduce special 
quantifiers for larger collections of objects e.g. ∃2 x for (∃x)(∃y)(Fx & Fy &           
(z)(Fz ⊃ z = x v z = y)) although here 2 is not a numeral, the name of a number, but 
merely an abbreviation. Suppose says Field, we are told, nominalistically, the 
following:  
 
1.   There are exactly 21 aardvarks (∃21x)Ax  
2.   On each aardvark is three bugs (∀x)(∃3y)(Ax & By & yOx) 
3.   Each bug is on one aardvark (∀y)(By ⊃ (∃1x)(Ax & yOx))  
 
and we want to know how many bugs there are. The answer – (∃63y)By – can be 
derived purely logically but it is extremely unwieldy, and impractical to 
demonstrate here. However with some platonistic mathematics the proof of this is 
extremely simple. (Field 1980 p.22). We can state 1-3 platonistically as follows: 
 
 1*  The cardinality of the set of aardvarks is 21. 
2*  All sets in the range of the function whose domain is the set of aardvarks, and  
which assigns to each entity in its domain the set of bugs on that entity, have  
cardinality 3.  
3*  The function mentioned in 2* is 1-1 and its range forms a partition of the set of 
all  bugs.  
 
And together with the three following platonistic statements: 
 
a. If all members of a partition X of a set X have cardinality a and the cardinality of 
the set of members of the partition is b then the cardinality of X is a ⋅ b 
b. The range and domain of a 1-1 function have the same cardinality 
c. 3 ⋅ 21 = 63 
 





4* The cardinality of the set of all bugs is 63 
 
Because the abstract counterpart holds iff its corresponding nominalistic statement 
holds then 4* iff 4. That is ‘The cardinality of the set of all bugs is 63’ iff (∃63y)By, 
and by simplification and modus ponens, (∃63y)By. The proof that in logic was too 
long to include in this thesis was converted into a few lines with the help of 
platonistic mathematics, although that mathematics was theoretically dispensable 
as it did nothing that the logic could not do, it just did it more quickly. The 
fictionalist has therefore shown, I submit, how platonistic mathematics may be 
useful despite being false.  
This explains how it is that the fictionalist can have his platonistic cake and 
eat it too, but where does this leave the mapping account? The primary use of that 
account is by platonists wishing to explain how platonistic mathematics can be 
usefully applied to the empirical world. Its primary use for fictionalists is to 
convince platonists that the indispensability argument is unsound. This would not of 
course affect those platonists who were not platonists because of that 
indispensability argument, but for other reasons. Indeed they may even be grateful 
to Field for supplying them with an account of applicability, whilst his criticism of 
their platonism bypassed them entirely. The fictionalist of course does not need to 
explain how platonistic mathematics can be applied since he does not believe in the 
existence of abstract mathematical objects, and he can explain the applicability of 
mathematics, despite the non-existence of its supposed subject matter, in terms of 
conservativeness and the simplification of inferences.  
The question is this: does the mapping account have no use for the 
fictionalist apart from the undermining  of the indispensability argument? Insofar at 
the account explains the applicability of something the fictionalist views as a fiction, 
it might be thought that the mapping account is as useful to the fictionalist account 
of the applicability of mathematics as explanations of the technology in the fictional 
Star Trek universe are to the show, i.e. an important part of the show but ultimately 




issue is tricky. We can’t just regard the mapping account as a conservative extension 
of a nominalist theory, since unlike, say, number theory, it involves substantive non-
mathematical claims, about what properties empirical structures have to satisfy to 
be represented, how idealisations are best dealt with and the nature of laws. At best 
the fictionalist can say ‘if there were such a thing as abstract mathematical objects, 
the mapping account would explain how we can apply them’, whilst continuing to 
use the account to the disadvantage those who believe in such objects on the 
grounds of their putative indispensability to the sciences.  
There is however another option for the nominalist who feels that there is 
some truth in the mapping account. This option is to reinterpret platonistic 
mathematics to be about something other than abstract mathematical objects, to 
find nominalistically acceptable surrogates for abstract mathematical objects and 
structures. If this is possible then the mapping account will likely be able to explain 
correctly how and why a nominalistically acceptable version of (parts of) platonistic 
mathematics can be usefully (and truly) applied to the empirical world, still in terms 
of mappings of course. It will be a mapping account of the applicability of 
nominalistically acceptable structures to empirical phenomena, rather than an 
account of the applicability of platonistic structures to empirical phenomena, but it 
will be a mapping account of applicability none the less. Such an account would be 
required by this sort of nominalist, since he cannot appeal to conservativeness to do 
the work: insofar as nominalist reinterpretations of platonistic mathematics are 
about concrete objects, the claims made by a nominalised mathematical theory N 
will not be conservative extensions of a nominalistic scientific theories T, rather T + 
N will have more nominalist consequences than T alone. Of course the fictionalist is 
free to believe that platonistic mathematics is a useful fiction, but agree that the 
form of the mapping account discussed below explains the applicability of 
nominalistically acceptable structures to the empirical world, assuming that those 







6.3.3 Nominalistically Acceptable Surrogates I: Rizza’s Approach   
 
One philosopher, and to my knowledge the only philosopher, who has both drawn 
attention to the fact that the mapping account as usually understood contains 
measurement theory committed to platonistic mathematics and suggested a way to 
avoid this along the lines of a surrogate-nominalist approach, is Davide Rizza, in his 
‘Mathematical Nominalism and Measurement’ (2010), which provides a sketch of 
how it may be possible to nominalise the measurement theory that appears in the 
mapping account and why it would be desirable to do so. Rizza explains that his 
approach differs from that of some other contemporary nominalists:  
 
As a matter of fact, the recent philosophical literature provides many different 
ways of dealing with measurement statements in a nominalistic fashion; so it 
would seem sufficient simply to choose one of them in order to obtain the result I 
am aiming for. However, the particular philosophical project I pursue in this paper 
requires a nominalistic approach which is an alternative to the existing ones. 
(Rizza 2010 pp.56) 
 
Rizza’s strategy is to use the results of some foundational work in the theory of 
measurement carried out by the mathematician Reinhard Niederee.  
 
What needs to be nominalised? Before we march straight into the nominalisation 
suggested by Rizza, I want to spell out exactly what the prima facie platonistic 
commitments of this measurement theory, and a fortiori the mapping account, are. 
For if the mapping account is to be nominalised we need to nominalise not just the 
measurement structures, etc, but also the apparatus involved in proving the 
representation theorems. Take a simple case such as that of extensive measurement 
as explored in chapter two. We have an empirical structure 〈A,÷,◦〉 which contains a 
set A of physical objects each with a certain magnitude of some attribute. We also 
have a platonistic structure 〈R,>,+〉 which contains a set, the real numbers, and 
mathematical relations/operators > and +, the latter taking pairs of real numbers to 
other real numbers. Additionally there is an homomorphism function φ taking 




To turn this into a system of measurement we need to impose further restrictions 
on the empirical structure, along the lines of chapter two. That is, we need the  
following axiom system for any x, y, z ∈ A: 
 
1. Weak order: (empirical relation ÷ is transitive and connected)  
2. Concatenation is associative: (∀x)(∀y)[(x ◦ (y ◦ z)) ~ ((x ◦ y) ◦ z)] 
3. Monotonicity: (∀x)(∀y) (∀z)[(x ÷ y) ≡ ((x ◦ z) ÷ (y ◦ z)) ≡ ((z ◦ x) ÷ (z ◦ y))] 
4. Archimedean axiom: (∀x)(∀y)(∃n)(nx ÷ y).71      
 
We can see that whilst most of these axioms are purely empirical, the Archimedean 
axiom does not appear to be empirical since it quantifies over natural numbers n. 
Thus we have four platonistic elements in even this simple piece of measurement 
theory, namely sets, real numbers, natural numbers, and functions.  
 
Nominalising certain sets. At least one of these references is easy to eliminate, 
namely the set A. It seems to me that the treatment of A as a set is merely a 
convenience, and that nothing hinges on A being a set rather than just a plurality of 
elements (there are no sets in the transitive closure of A) and so we are perfectly at 
liberty to treat A as a plurality that consists of nothing over and above its members, 
which are empirical objects. The other references are not so amenable to such a 
quick treatment. For example, how are we to avoid references to the real numbers 
(and their associated relations and operations of > and +)?   
 
Nominalising values-of-measurement. Rizza (and Niederee) do have a suggestion 
for how to use something other than real numbers as values for measurement. This 
suggestion involves using some entities known as c-types as such values. The types 
in question arise from the fact that when we iterate m times some unit a of a 
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physical property, one of the following will obtain with respect to any magnitude x 
of that physical property which is iterated n times (Rizza 2010, p.66):  
  
(A)(ma ÷ nx) or (B)(ma ~ nx) or (C)(ma  nx) 
 
Each of A, B and C gives rise to A, B and C types, each respectively the collection of 
all atomic formulae such that A, B or C holds when some empirical magnitude b is 
the value of x. Rizza only needs the c-types to motivate his view. The c-type C(a, b) is 
the class of all atomic formulae such that ma  nx where b is substituted for x. What 
this means is that for every possible assignment of a physical magnitude b to x such 
that the inequality is satisfied we will get a c-type C(a, b). We could just as well have 
used a-types or b-types, but they are all equivalent, and as Rizza points out c-types 
have the advantage that “the class [collection] of all inequalities of the form of (C) 
determines all approximations of x in a units from below and thus it can be used as 
the measure of x” (Rizza. 2010 p.66). Of course, so can the other types approximate x, 
but approximating ‘from below’ seems to fit better with our intuitive idea of getting 
more and more refined measurements as we approach up to some given magnitude 
– or at least I take it that this is Rizza’s reasoning. 
 So these are c-types, but what use are they in measuring, or being values of 
measurement? The answer is that “…C(a, b) identifies a converging sequence of 
approximations of b to a: then a positive real as the limit of a sequence of 
approximations, may be identified with…C(a, b) itself…” (Rizza 2010 p.66). So each 
c-type C(a, b) will be a point on a continuous scale, a value of measurement. This 
procedure makes measurement yield c-types rather than real numbers, and the c-
types function like reals do, as continuous values of measurement, which are, Rizza 
contends, not abstract objects in the way that real numbers are as c-types are 
collections of formulae. There is no reason to regard the collections in question as 
abstract objects such as sets rather that just pluralities of formulae, and no prima 
facie reason to regard the formulae themselves as abstract, for they are, as I make 
clear in a few pages, formula tokens. (In the subsection below, ‘are c-types 




idea with respect to the real numbers is that “the positive reals with order and 
addition can be understood as a system of measures generated by [an empirical 
structure]” (Rizza 2010, p.65), since they are identified with c-types, which are 
actually a  system of measures generated by the empirical structure in question. I 
shall discuss whether or not c-types are really nominalistically acceptable below, for 
now I merely want to present Rizza’s views. The idea that there can be other values 
of measurement than just the reals is not an idea that was first developed by Rizza 
or even Niederee, indeed it appears to be reasonably commonplace even as early as 
the nineteen sixties, by the time measurement theory was an acknowledged 
discipline. The measurement theorist Ernest Adams writes: 
 
It seems to me that in characterising measurement as the assignment of numbers to 
objects according to rules, the proponents of the representational theory have fastened 
on to something which is undoubtedly of great importance in modern science, but 
which it not by any means an essential feature of measurement. What is important is 
that the real numbers provide a very sophisticated and convenient conceptual 
framework which can be employed in describing the results of making measurements: 
but what can be conveniently described with numbers can be less conveniently 
described in other ways, and these alternative descriptions no less ‘give the measure’ 
of a thing than do numerical descriptions. Thus, the hardness of a mineral specimen 
may be described as 7 on the Mohs scale, but alternatively as of the same hardness as 
quartz. (Adams 1966, p.129)  
 
 
Nominalising functions. The use of c-types bodes well for the nominalist project of 
eliminating the real numbers from measurement, but it says nothing about the third 
use of platonistic mathematics in our simple measurement theory example, 
concerning functions involved in measurement, e.g. in the mapping of an empirical 
structure into an abstract mathematical structure. Rizza maintains “the function [φ] 
relating an empirical structure…to its measuring structure is itself defined by a 
procedure to compare multiples of physical objects in M; its action is entirely 
determined by empirical facts” (Rizza 2010 p.67). This contention is very plausible, 
because empirical magnitudes are assigned to c-types on the basis of an empirical 
comparison operation, and both the empirical structure and the c-types are 




showed that such an empirical structure has a certain relation to an abstract 
mathematical structure. But by utilising the (arguably nominalistically acceptable) 
c-types we don’t need to have a function from empirical structures to platonistic 
structures, but rather from empirical structures to empirical structures, so there is 
nothing platonistic going on. It might be objected here that although we may have 
empirical structures both sides of the mapping, the mapping itself, as a function, is a 
platonistic object. The cogency of this response depends on whether a function is an 
irredeemably platonistic object. But why should we think this? A function is an 
assignment of an object to another object based on some rule. If I pair up, say, knives 
with forks, so that there is a 1-1 correspondence between knives and forks, there is 
no reason to think this is a platonistic operation. It can of course be described 
platonistically,  but then so can baseball, and no one believe that baseball is an 
example of platonistic mathematics. Because a function can be described 
platonistically does not mean that it is a platonistic function. So Rizza is correct that 
there is nothing irredeemably platonistic going on here, assuming that c-types are 
not abstract objects.  
 
Nominalising the Archimedean axiom. The fourth piece of platonistic 
mathematics in the simple example above was the Archimedean axiom. This axiom 
is prima facie nominalistically troubling as it quantifies over natural numbers in its 
statement (∀x)(∀y)(∃n)(nx ÷ y). It cannot simply be eliminated from the axiom set 
however since it is a necessary axiom. It is suggested by my argument above in 
chapters three and four that no reference to any abstract mathematical object is 
essential for any physical theory. Rizza agrees. But what could the empirical content 
of the axiom be? It must be that ‘all empirical magnitudes are comparable’. It might 
be thought not a straightforward matter that this is an empirical claim, as it 
effectively says that any empirical magnitude can be made greater than another 
empirical magnitude by concatenating it to itself a certain number of times, and 
numbers are not empirical objects. I do not think that this is problematic however, 
given the inductive definition from chapter two for nx, namely  1x = x, 2x = 1x ◦ x, … , 




for iterated concatenations. So it seems what the Archimedean axiom is really 
saying is that for any two empirical magnitudes x and y such that y ÷ x, if you keep 
concatenating x with itself, x1 ◦ x2 ◦ … xk, you will eventually make it the case that for 
the concatenation kx, kx ÷ y. It seems that the platonistic version of the 
Archimedean axiom captures abstractly the empirical content of the axiom, but that 
it would be a mistake to think that numbers are what that axiom (as it concerns 
empirical magnitudes) is really about. The version of the axiom involving natural 
numbers, the abstract version, is a way of stating the empirical content of the axiom, 
not the other way around. Of course the same cannot be said for the version of the 
axiom that is about real numbers – in that version of the axiom, numbers, natural 
and real, are what the axiom is about, although I have contended that such entities 
do not really exist.  
 Would Rizza agree with me regarding the status of the Archimedean axiom? 
Initially it seems that Rizza’s formulation of the content of the axiom is very 
different to mine, since he asserts “Archimedes’ axiom is equivalent to 
discriminability by atomic formulas” (Rizza 2010, p.69), and nowhere do I mention 
discriminability or atomic formulae. However, Rizza explains that this is in fact 
another way of saying “Archimedes’ axiom is equivalent to the adequacy of an 
empirical procedure exclusively based on concatenations of objects” (Rizza 2010, 
p.69) which is how I have characterised the axiom myself, with an inductive 
definition of n. So why does Rizza not straightforwardly accept the inductive 
definition, which surely captures the empirical content of the axiom, rather than 
using his more convoluted formulation  in reaching seemingly the same conclusion?  
 The reason has to be that he does not want a piecemeal approach to 
nominalisation – in linking his statement of the Archimedean axiom to the notion of       
c-types that also provide his surrogate values-of-measurement he avoids having a 
nominalist surrogate for the real numbers here, an unrelated surrogate for the 
natural numbers there, etc, rather he makes the notion of a c-type central and thus 
imposes a certain amount of unity (though not necessarily simplicity) on what could 




consequence of [c-types]…Archimedes’ axiom can be reformulated as a purely 
empirical condition” (Rizza, 2010 p.65). Clearly this empirical condition is that if an 
object exhibits a lesser magnitude of an extensive attribute F than another object 
then that object can always be concatenated to itself enough times that the resulting 
composite object will be greater with respect to F than the other object.  
 
Are c-types nominalistically acceptable? I suggest that, utilising the work of Rizza 
and Niederee, we have seen that four examples of cases where platonistic 
mathematics is used in the mapping account can be in fact understood without any 
platonistic concepts, or at least without reference to any platonistic objects, at all, or 
so I have asserted – so long as c-types are nominalistically acceptable. Are they? 
That question depends on what counts as nominalistically acceptable and what a c-
type actually is. I am going to follow Field and carve the what is nominalistically 
acceptable from what isn’t along the lines of abstractness, rather than along lines of 
cardinality or anything else. So an object x is nominalistically acceptable just in case 
it is not abstract. A c-type as we have said is ‘a class of all atomic formulae such that 
ma  nx where b is substituted for x’, where ‘C(a, b) identifies a converging sequence 
of approximations of b to a…’. Since classes here can be eliminated in favour of 
pluralities we can instead refer to c-types as pluralities of atomic formulae. And 
there  is no way anyone could construe tokens of atomic formulae as anything other 
than concrete, assuming it is formulae tokens rather than formulae types that are 
intended, which does seem to be what is meant, as they are generated by actual 
concrete acts of measurement. But what of the relation of c-types to limits of 
sequences, which are normally viewed as abstract mathematical objects? Again this 
of no matter, for Rizza did not say that c-types had to be identified with limits of 
sequences, i.e. are such limits, merely that they can be so identified, suggesting that 
this identification could take place if such limits existed, if we wanted to talk about 
positive real numbers rather than c-types. If such limits could be nominalised there 
would be even less cause for concern.  
Another more serious issue is that there are clearly not enough actual c-types 




of acts of measurement. To give an entire continuum of possible values of 
measurement something other than actual c-types must be introduced. The obvious 
suggestion is possible c-types, which would yield a scale of measurement consisting 
of both actual and possible c-types. These would be collections of possible formula 
tokens. But are possible c-types nominalistically acceptable? There is nothing 
unacceptable about possibility in general, for instance if I say it is possible that my 
house will be struck by a meteor. But if I were to say my house might be struck by a 
possible meteor that is a different story. And it seems as if using possible c-types as 
values of measurement is an example of the latter, talk of possible objects rather 
than the possibility of objects. There is an extensive literature on the status of 
possibilia and I do not wish to go into the issue here, but if (some) c-types are 
possibilia and possibilia are abstract objects then this poses a serious problem for 
the nominalistic acceptableness of Rizza’s c-type account. Moreover this would 
mean that there is much less to distinguish Rizza’s account from the modal-
structuralist account to be considered now, since both accounts would be 
fundamentally modal, and there would be less to make Rizza’s a sui generis 
nominalistic account of applicability, as he has claimed.  
 
 
6.3.4 Nominalistically Acceptable Surrogates II: Hellman’s Approach   
 
C-types however by no means offer the only surrogates for real numbers which 
could be utilised by a philosopher wishing preserve the mapping account in some 
form but eliminate its reference to abstract objects. At least one other nominalist 
programme provides an alternative. For example, Geoffrey Hellman’s modal 
structuralism suggests replacing both natural and real numbers by positions in 
possible concrete structures.72 With respect to truth claims about natural numbers:  
 
                                                 
72 Charles Chihara also has a nominalist philosophy that can give a nominalist treatment of the real 
numbers. However I intend only to show that the programme of removing commitments to abstracta 
from the mapping account of the mapping account does not stand or fall with acceptableness of c-




on the platonist view, ‘truth’ means ‘truth in the standard model’, either a unique 
model of the natural numbers or a fixed set-theoretical model…[but]…on the modal 
structuralist view, ‘truth’ means roughly ‘true in any possible model [of the natural 
numbers]’ where this is spelled out as truth of the relevant counterfactuals.  (Hellman 
1989 p.34).  
 
Mutatis mutandis for the real numbers. This notion of truth arises naturally out of 
the modal-structuralist interpretation of mathematics, which consists of a 
hypothetical component and a categorical component. The hypothetical component 
consists of the re-interpretation of platonistic statements about a particular theory, 
e.g. number theory or real analysis. These statements are reinterpreted in a schema 
of the following form:  
 
· ∀X ∀R [∧PA2 ⊃ A]X (R/S) [Amsi schema].  
 
That is, necessarily, for all classes X and relations R, the conjunction of the second-
order Peano axioms implies A, where the quantifiers in the Peano axioms and A are 
relativised to class X. Furthermore, R replaces S in the Peano axioms and A, where S 
is the successor relation and R is an arbitrary unary relation. As an example of a 
modal-structuralist interpretation consider the commutativity of addition of the 
natural numbers, a + b = b + a. The modal-structuralist interpretation of this would 
be: · ∀X∀R[∧PA2 ⊃ ∀x∀y(x+y = y+x)]X (R/S), that is, commutativity of + follows 
from the conjunction of the Peano axioms relative to all those possible structures 
which satisfy the axioms. The point of R/S here is of course to get across that it is the 
structure of the sequences we are interested in, not particular elements of 
sequences or particular relations on them. Thus rather than the ‘S’, designating a 
particular successor function, any unary R which yields the intended structure will 
suffice. The background logic is second-order logic plus system S-5 of modal 
predicate logic.73 Incidentally, the notion of necessity used, and denoted by ‘·’,  is ‘A 
                                                 
73 For more information see e.g.  Hughes and Cresswell (1996) chapter 3. One note though – the 
modal logic the modal-structuralist uses must not contain the Barcan formula ‘◊∃xFx ⊃ ∃x◊Fx’ as an 
axiom, for although the modal-structuralist wishes to talk about the possible existence of structures 
he does not want to talk about the existence of possible structures! Such possibilia are 





holds “in any progression [ω-sequence] there might be, logically speaking”’ 
(Hellman 2005 p.553), rather than the more platonistic ‘necessarily, for all ω-
sequences x, A’. Similar sentences exist for real numbers – a consequence follows 
from the conjunction of the axioms of real analysis, relativised to all classes X which 
have a structure that satisfies those axioms. There may well be a variety of such 
classes but that doesn’t matter for the modal structuralist as is clear from the 
hypothetical sentence: any structure in the class of such structures will suffice. 
In order to avoid vacuity arising from the non-existence of ordinal and 
continuous sequences, and nominalistic versions of arithmetic and analysis being 
true of nothing at all, modal-structuralism must take it as an axiom that ordinal and 
continuous sequences are possible, and if they are possible then such-and-such a 
fact about them will be true. Thus modal-structuralism contains a categorical as well 
as hypothetical component, with a categorical axiom for each type of structure being 
studied. The categorical axiom with respect to real analysis is: 
 
◊ ∃X ∃R [∧RA2 ]X (R/<) 
‘it is possible that there is a continuous sequence’ 
 
The X in the above categorical proposition ranges over ‘complete, separable, 
ordered continua’. These continua are structures that satisfy the following three 
axioms: 
 
(1) Order: ‘>’ is a dense linear ordering without endpoints. 
(2) Separability: There exists a denumerable dense subset 
(3) Continuity: Every non-empty bounded subset has a least upper bound 
(Hellman 1989b p.321) 
 
Whereas in the case of progressions, possible concrete marks can be used as a 
model of the Peano axioms, a potential infinity, so Hellman invokes concrete objects 
as a basis for potential continuity. These concrete objects are space-time points. 





…as long as one works within RA2 one can conceive of its entities as physical in the 
sense of space-time physics in its usual formulations. That is, a manifold of space-time 
points can be taken as the ground-level objects (actual or hypothetical) of an RA2 
model (via a coding of R4 into R) 74, with space-time regions as the second-order 
objects (making up the range of the monadic second-order variables) (Hellman 1989 
p.325)  
 
I explained in chapter four that the nominalistic acceptableness of space-time points 
has been queried by some philosophers, but I maintained their nominalistic 
acceptability nonetheless. Thus we see that both Field and Hellman have a shared 
basis for their nominalisations, namely the use of physically real continua, which 
may offer an advantage over Rizza’s theory in terms of parsimony – if you believe in 
space-time points then why invoke c-types if you only need to invoke space-time 
points? Hellman spends some time addressing the issues of the points of his 
continua as values of measurement: take for example, mass. The mass m of an object 
x is usually, as was made clear in chapter two, given in the form of a function whose 
value is a real number r i.e. m(x) = ra. This real number indicates how much of a 
certain unit the mass of x is. Thus the mass of an apple might be measured as 0.35 of 
a kilo. As with the above example of counting, this function has a modal-structural 
interpretation viz: 
 
·∀X ∀R [(∧RA2 )X (R/<) ⊃ ∃F (F “represents mass”  & F(x) = r in X)]. 
 
(i) F takes on (within limits of experimental accuracy) all actually measured values 
experimentally determined as values of mass; 
(ii) F agrees (within experimental limits) with all theoretically predicted values-of-
mass under real world conditions) (Hellman 1989a p.102) 
 
Note the expression ‘F represents mass’ is Hellman’s, not mine, and indicates a given 
unit of mass. Again, in English, this reads something like ‘necessarily for all complete, 
separable, ordered continua X, there is a unit of mass (e.g. the kilogram) and the 
value of the mass of x in that unit is given by some object in the continuum’. Clearly 
the usual axioms have to hold so that the measurement system in is appropriate for 
the extensive measurement of mass, and ensures any continuum forms a suitable 
measurement scale, but this adds no extra conceptual difficulty.  
                                                 




Thus modal-structuralism does appear to have quite plausible and natural 
interpretations of real measurement. Indeed this approach to values of measurement 
seems to me to be at least as natural as Rizza’s, and so we see that there are a variety 
of possible approaches for those philosophers who wish to remove references to 
abstract mathematical objects from the mapping account. In fact, given that it seems 
that c-types involve possible objects (infinite sequences) just as Hellman’s does, 
Hellman’s version may be preferred. For at the very least it has no real ontological 
commitments that Rizza’s does not, gives a uniform treatment of arithmetic and real 
analysis, avoids talking about c-types, and is somewhat simpler in some of its 
essentials. Such an approach is certainly one avenue for the philosopher who is 
convinced that the mapping account is the right way to think about applicability, but 
wants to dispense with references to the nominalistically unacceptable abstract 
objects. I submit then that there it at least one nominalist construal of the mapping 






6.4 The Role of Idealisations. 
 
There have been several opportunities thus far to discuss the place of idealisations 
in a mapping account of applicability. I could have done so in chapter two, when the 
mapping account was developed and the place of partial isomorphisms was 
discussed. Or in chapter three where I considered platonistic explanations of 
empirical phenomena. However I decided to wait until now because I wanted to 
present my views on idealisation in a single place, rather than them being scattered 
throughout this thesis. My first aim in this section is to provide a taxonomy of the 
varieties of idealisation. Following this I shall investigate in some detail Batterman’s 
claim that there are many idealisations to which the mapping account cannot do 
justice. I shall undermine his argument by criticising the consequences he draws 




would have for the mapping account if the example did in fact do the work that 
Batterman feels does. Following this, I shall look at how idealisations can be 
accommodated by the user of the mapping account, and discuss how this applies to 
the idealisations used in the work of both Field and Rizza.   
 
6.4.1 Categorising Idealisations  
 
There are many, many idealisations used in physical science. Penelope Maddy 
names several of them in her monograph Naturalism in Mathematics:  
 
[f]or example, we treat a section of the Earth’s surface as flat, rather than curved, when 
we compute trajectories; we assume the ocean to be infinitely deep when we analyse the 
waves on its surface; we use continuous functions to represent quantities like energy, 
charge and angular momentum, which we know to be quantised; we take liquids to be 
continuous substances in fluid dynamics, despite atomic theory. (Maddy 1997 p.143).  
 
This list provides us with a decent sample of idealisations from which to begin an 
analysis. The most important issue that has to be settled is whether the idealisations 
in question are physical or not. Although I criticise a putative example of a non-
physical idealisation below (which Batterman refers to as a ‘mathematical’ 
idealisation, a term I shall retain since it has entered the literature now) and am not 
especially sympathetic to the concept on some construals of it, it does not follow 
that I can reject such idealisations out of hand. However I do believe that for the 
most part idealisations are physical, for they generally involve simplifying physical 
assumptions. Making a physical idealisation involves deliberately mis-describing a 
physical situation for the purposes of simplifying statements about that situation 
within a given margin of error, and as such may involve a description of the system 
in which certain elements are removed or abstracted away, or a description of the 
situation that has a different structure than that which the descriptandum has in 
reality. It is evident that the majority of Maddy’s examples comprise physical 
idealisations where the structure of the system is changed, for example viewing 
fluids and quantized quantities as continuous, and water as infinitely deep. These 




imagined to be added to the system to make it ideal – the difference between a 
discrete and continuous quantity may be one of cardinality but the former cannot be 
turned into the latter by the successive addition of elements, as anyone familiar with 
basic set theory will know. Rather such idealisations involve a deliberately false 
redescription of the structure of the system itself.  
Instances of idealisations that consist in removing elements from a system to 
make it easier to describe are perhaps simplest. Suppose we want to calculate how 
many people it takes to pull a stone block. To simplify the calculation but still obtain 
a usable result I may try to eliminate some of the forces involved if certain 
conditions are met, even though such forces have some impact on this quantity. For 
example, suppose the block is extremely smooth and being pulled along a smooth 
and lubricated surface such that the friction is not a significant factor in the 
consideration of how many people need to pull the block. I may then decide in my 
calculations to treat the block as if friction is not one of the forces acting upon it, and 
thereby perform a vector calculation with fewer forces, a simpler calculation. Clearly 
this is a physical idealisation as I have given a physical description of a physical 
situation in such a way as to facilitate simplifying that situation.  
One question that will present itself to the reader will surely be ‘do these two 
categories (abstraction/redescription) exhaust all physical idealisations?’. It is not 
necessary to my purposes to digress and consider this question here, though I think 
an affirmative answer is by no means unlikely. Far more pressing question is ‘must 
all idealisations used in physical theory be physical idealisations?’ and if not ‘what is 
the explanatory role of non-physical idealisations?’. In a recent and provocative 
paper ‘On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science’, Robert 
Batterman has defended the existence of non-physical idealisations, which he calls 
mathematical idealisations, and tried “to account for how mathematical 
idealisations can have a role in physical explanation” (Batterman 2010 p.2). It might 
be thought at first that Batterman is simply using the phrase ‘mathematical 
idealisation’ as ellipsis for ‘physical idealisations in applied mathematics’, but this 
cannot be the case since his view, as we will see below, is that the mapping account 




Batterman believes to be realised, of mathematical operations explaining physical 
phenomena, or idealisations based upon mathematical operations playing a 
significant role in physical explanations. If by ‘mathematical idealisation’ he simply 
meant a physical idealisation in applied mathematics then this ambition would be 
redundant, as Batterman admits that mapping account can handle the so-called 
traditional idealisations (also called Galilean idealisations) some of which we saw in 
Maddy’s list and which seem to be coextensive with the physical idealisations I 
described above.  
So Batterman is committed to the existence of sui generis mathematical 
idealisations, idealisations which he believes to be genuinely explanatory parts of 
empirical explanations. Just as I avoided examining how many categories of physical 
idealisation there are I shall also avoid investigating here whether all traditional 
idealisations are what I have called physical idealisations, but this seems to me a 
plausible hypothesis at least as far as the list above is concerned, and so I suggest 
tentatively that ‘abstracting’ and ‘restructuring’ idealisations are all the traditional 
idealisations that there are. I shall divide possible idealisations into two putative 
classes, physical/traditional/Galilean and mathematical/non-traditional/non-
Galilean. This is an adequate framework within which to conduct the enquiry that 
follows, where I argue, inter alia, that we are justified in making many physical 
idealisations because experience shows that the relevant (i.e. result-affecting) 
differences between successfully idealised and non-idealised situations are minimal 
and don’t affect the usefulness of the idealisation. If there are too many important 
differences between the idealised and non-idealised situation then the idealisation 
simply won’t work, a fact that will become apparent when predictions based on the 
idealisation are compared with actual empirical data. It is plausible, I contend, that 
the sort of ‘mathematical’ idealisations Batterman has in mind are simply too 









6.4.2. Mathematical Idealisations, Batterman, and the Mapping Account.  
 
We must now try to answer the question of whether there are what Batterman calls 
mathematical idealisations, and if there are, can they be genuinely explanatory? The 
first question would be decided in the positive if an example of what a mathematical 
idealisation could be found, the second if it could be shown that the example is 
really an explanatory one. Batterman, in the above-mentioned paper does indeed try 
to provide details of such an example. It is not entirely clear in that paper whether 
he is intending the case discussed to be one single extended example, or whether it 
is to be a variety of such examples set in a similar context. He provides a relatively 
scant discussion of the example in question, focussing more on the consequences it 
would have for the mapping account. My knowledge of thermodynamics is 
admittedly somewhat limited, and this part of Batterman’s paper is somewhat dense, 
but I shall first draw out the example I interpret him as seeking to provide and then 
restate the example as clearly and concisely as possible afterwards, in order to 
facilitate my response to it.  
 The general tenor of Batterman’s discussion concerns that fact that to explain 
phase transitions of fluids (from e.g. liquid to gas when we boil a kettle) using 
statistical mechanics, we have to invoke the ‘thermodynamic limit’, which is only 
reached when the number of particles in the system is infinite. This limit is required 
because for a system of “a finite number of particles the statistical-mechanical 
analogues of the thermodynamic functions cannot exhibit the non-analytic 
behaviour necessary to represent the qualitatively distinct behaviours we observe” 
(Batterman, 2010 p.8). So we have to force the functions to exhibit the non-analytic 
behaviour we require them to possess, and this forcing is achieved by invoking the 
thermodynamic limit. When the thermodynamic limit is reached statistical-
mechanical functions do exhibit the non-analytic behaviour required to represent a 
phase transition. Since any particular thermodynamic system will consist of only 
finitely many particles the thermodynamic limit, with its infinity requirement, is 
obviously an idealisation. The nature of this idealisation might well at first seem 




to try to reduce its complexity rather than increase it, since such a reduction would 
have the effect of decreasing the number of variables involved in a calculation of the 
behaviour of the system, and subsequently the idealised system could be 
approximated to the real system within a certain margin of error. Such a thought is 
overly simplistic however, as simplifying the treatment of a system by viewing it as 
containing more objects than it in fact does is fairly common, as Maddy’s water 
wave example shows.  
So the increase in complexity of the system is what enables a scientist to 
make the calculations concerning phase transitions at all. This is because reaching 
the thermodynamic limit of a system, that is, by treating it as if it were infinite, we 
can describe that system’s phase transitions using statistical mechanics rather than 
some sort of continuum thermodynamics precisely because this idealisation permits 
the statistical mechanical functions to exhibit non-analytic behaviour. Specifically, 
once the thermodynamic limit is reached, one of the statistical-mechanical functions, 
the free energy function, returns a singularity for certain values of the system, and 
each singularity corresponds to a phase transition. This is the core of Batterman’s 
example, that we make a false infinite assumption about a system in order to permit 
the taking the thermodynamic limit, a mathematical operation, so that the free energy 
equation can go to a singularity when it takes certain values, namely those 
corresponding to a phase transition and that this is the explanation, or an 
indispensible part of the explanation, of phase transitions – even though according to 
the equations, phase transitions “do not exist at all in finite systems! They appear 
only in the thermodynamic limit” (Styer 2004, p.27) when certain thermodynamic 
statistical-mechanical functions return a singularity. The thermodynamic limit is as 
follows: “the statistical free energy should be identified completely with the 
thermodynamic free energy only in the limit that the system becomes infinitely 
large whilst the density…approaches a finite value” (Fisher 1964 p.377). 
Batterman is somewhat more concerned with the details of the critical 
behaviour of a thermodynamic system, although the discussion of critical behaviour 
is not needed to further Batterman’s point. I will however mention some of the 




point of boiling there is both liquid and gas in the kettle, as not all of the molecules 
will have changed phase. However if the temperature and then the pressure are 
increased beyond the critical point needed for the phase transition (dependent on 
the fluid in question), and then the temperature drops below that needed for the 
transition, according to the equations the fluid changes from gas back into liquid 
without there ever being a gradual state where there is both some liquid and some 
gas, as would happen when we boil the kettle. The liquid-to-gas change is gradual 
and on a particle-by-particle basis, whilst the change from gas to liquid at the critical 
point is instantaneous for the fluid as a whole. This instantaneous change is the 
critical behaviour. Moreover this critical behaviour is universal because all fluids, no 
matter how physically dissimilar (some of the fluid systems concerned even include 
the magnetic) exhibit this critical behaviour with respect to the temperature 
decrease and all the curves of the graphs depicting this critical behaviour in each 
fluid are the same shape. But to reiterate, I think Batterman’s point is served if we 
simply bear in mind what was summarised in the previous paragraph. Too much 
thermodynamic detail in this instance only obscures the philosophy, since the 
concern of this thesis is with philosophy of mathematics not philosophy of physics.  
Why should we think that Batterman’s mathematical idealisation example is 
substantially different from a physical idealisation example given by Maddy, 
whereby in the physics of wave phenomena in fluids it is assumed that the fluids are 
infinitely deep? In both cases a false assumption about the infinity of the system is 
made. The reason is that in the water wave case the infinity assumption only 
simplifies the equations, which would be much longer, and contain a great many 
more terms, without it. In contrast, in the thermodynamic instance the assumption 
is necessary in order to make the statistical mechanical explanation possible, since 
without it the explanation is not just more abstruse but non-existent. I am inclined 
to paraphrase Craig Callender (2001) and assert that to agree with Batterman here 
is to ‘take statistical mechanics too seriously’. This opinion not withstanding I do 
agree with Batterman it is an interesting example. However I believe he jumps far 
too quickly to the conclusion that the example genuinely captures or explains what 




is both finite and singularity free. So how could it be that a false description of a 
system under conditions that cannot actually obtain, yielding phenomena that 
cannot exist, can actually explain phase transitions, a real process we observe, yet 
which the equations indicate we should not, in our finite-particle systems, observe?  
After all, it is not as if Batterman is saying that ‘there really are singularities 
doing explanatory work, and thermodynamic systems really are infinite, only we 
don’t observe either of these’. In the absence of a rigorous account of how the 
thermodynamic limit is genuinely explanatory, or indeed how non-causal 
explanations can be genuinely explanatory in physical systems, we must instead 
conclude simply that statistical mechanics is not adequate for the description of all 
thermodynamic phenomena. It may yield useful results and accurate predictions, 
but it is not explaining the phenomena since it is forced to describe. For how are we 
to escape such a conclusion if the only way to make statistical mechanics work even in 
principle is to make assumptions that are very obviously false, viz. that all 
thermodynamic systems experiencing phase transitions contain an infinity of 
particles?75 Clearly something is going on here, something no scientist can ignore, 
namely that there is some connection between the singularity in the function and 
the phase transition in the fluid, but to conclude that the thermodynamic limit and 
the associated apparatus is genuinely explanatory seems much more absurd than 
concluding that our understanding of the phenomena, and our equations describing 
them, are imperfect and incomplete and that statistical mechanics is only part of the 
story.  
For those unconvinced by the last few paragraphs, I must present this 
demand: explain how this apparatus could be physically explanatory. Clearly an 
                                                 
75 Batterman does explicitly deny that all physical explanations are causal (2010, p.2) for the reason 
that the better explanations may involve eliminating causal details. However he has failed to observe 
that what is a better explanation for a scientist may indeed be a less genuine explanation, a concept 
developed in chapter three, simply because understanding the genuine explanation at a sufficient 
level of detail may be too difficult for the scientist to develop or comprehend, and a non-genuine 
explanation works well enough for predictive or general scientific purposes. In some case the 
scientist will know his explanation is not genuine, as when an engineer uses Newtonian mechanics in 
his work, and in other cases he will be unaware, as Newton was when he developed his mechanics. So 
it is clear that Batterman’s reflection on causal explanation has missed the point here and does not 




explanation of phase transitions is required, but we need to be clear about what we 
are explaining. For instance, we do not need to explain critical behaviour as it was 
outlined above since the actual phase-transition is not in fact instantaneous at all, 
but is rather an idealisation concerning the fact that phase transitions happen very 
fast. But nevertheless this incredible speed of phase transition of a system dropping 
below the critical point does need explaining, though we must accept that we may 
not have the theoretical apparatus required to so currently. The thermodynamic-
limit-based explanation may give the right results but it is quite clearly not doing so 
for the right reasons, or at any rate, if in some sense it is capturing what is going on 
empirically, we need a clear account of why. Either way, without more information 
the thermodynamic-limit explanation as it stands is incomplete, and Batterman’s 
example is left without very much force.     
 I realise I could be seen to have left myself open to a possible counter-
response by Batterman, namely that I am confusing platonistic entities and 
mathematical operations, the very distinction with which he opens his paper, and 
that I am claiming that the thermodynamic limit is not genuinely explanatory 
because it is some sort of abstract object, or even some sort of platonistic concept, a 
view I advocated in chapter three. But this is not the case. My concern is not that the 
thermodynamic limit is abstract or otherwise, but that the conditions for the limit 
(or some possible empirical analogue to it) to be reached are false of any 
thermodynamic system found in nature. I have no objection to the idea that 
platonistic operations (or indeed nominalistic operations, as in the geometric 
concept of primeness given in chapter three) operations can be components of 
physical explanations, so long as those operations are representing empirical 
operations relevant to the phenomenon being explained. As such talk about adding 
lengths, or juxtaposing intervals, can be understood to be representing the 
concatenation of objects.  
Using mathematical operations is a very convenient and natural way of 
talking about possible empirical operations, and enables us to focus on the 
structural properties of systems, but all that is going on is that mathematical 




objection to Batterman’s idea that mathematical operations can be explanatory, 
assuming that the mathematical operations in question are empirically instantiated, 
empirically realised, that they have an empirical content which is actually doing the 
explaining. A good argument will need to be forthcoming to establish that they can 
be explanatory without such analogues, and Batterman’s example does not establish 
such an argument. For Batterman has not shown that the taking of the 
thermodynamic limit has a physical analogue, and neither has he shown that to be 
explanatory it does not require one.  
Batterman, as I said above, does agree that the mapping account is sufficient 
to handle ‘traditional’ idealisations (Batterman 2010 p.17), and he admits “[s]urely 
something is right about the mapping account. In particular, when it comes to 
representing physical structures, mathematical structures often provide useful 
models…” (Batterman 2010 p.11), but he maintains vigorously that it cannot handle 
non-traditional, or mathematical, idealisations which he feels play an explanatory 
role in empirical explanations. He claims “all these [mapping] approaches fail to deal 
with the most difficult features of mathematical explanation…how mathematical 
idealisations can have a role in physical explanations” (Batterman 2010, p.2). That is, 
he believes the mapping account does not explain why the thermodynamic limit 
explains phase transitions. I have obviated this need by arguing that the 
thermodynamic limit does not really explain such transitions, and so there is 
nothing for the mapping account to explain. 
Batterman’s paper is a commendable attempt to challenge the mapping 
account in a non-question-begging fashion, but one that I have argued, ultimately 
fails. To summarise, allow me to answer the earlier questions: the consequences of 
the existence of such idealisations would be catastrophic for the mapping account, 
but since there is no good evidence for such idealisations the mapping account 
theorist is in the clear and can construe all genuine idealisations as physical 
idealisations, although such idealisations are not necessarily exhausted by the two 
categories listed above. We can now turn to the next issue, namely how should the 
mapping account theorist give an account of even physical idealisations?  Indeed is 




6.4.3 The Mapping Account and Physical Idealisations 
 
The issue of idealisations has stirred a lot of debate in the philosophy of science and 
the philosophy of applied mathematics, and no one would want to assert that the 
mapping account is entirely divorced from any considerations of idealisations, for as 
we saw with Batterman, the existence of certain mathematical idealisations would 
have negative consequences for that account. But does this mean that the mapping 
account needs to trouble itself with accommodating physical idealisations, or 
developing a working theory of them? In a physical idealisation we make a false 
assumption about a physical system in order to simplify calculations about it, 
calculations whose effectiveness and applicability are fully explained by the 
mapping account, or so I argued in chapter two. That is, we treat the physical system 
as different from how it actually is – and then we apply the mapping account. We 
don’t apply the mapping account and then make the idealisation.  
So it is not clear that it is the role of the mapping account theorist to say 
anything more about the issue of idealisations, which seem to precede its 
application. That is not to say that physical idealisations are not an interesting 
object of study, and of course the philosopher of science will need to trouble himself 
with how it is that idealisations work. But once we have a working theory of 
physical idealisations the mapping account theorist (and any philosopher of applied 
mathematics of any persuasion whatsoever within reason) can help himself to it. To 
deny this would be tantamount to asserting that the mapping account needs to 
explain everything that the user of such an account also makes use of – so why not 
demand of such an account that it explain mathematical truth, how analysis works 
and the meaning of limit as well? Such a demand would be misguided, for clearly the 
mapping account theorist can help himself to many pre-existing theories of such 
issues, and there is no good reason why the same should not be the case with 
idealisations. Despite this, I shall say a word about physical idealisations and why 
we can analyse some idealisations in terms of partial mappings.  
 The issue is: what exactly is going on when we make a physical idealisation? 




sufficiently similar to a description of another situation such that facts concerning 
the first situation also apply to the second situation, within a certain margin of error 
or a certain degree of approximation. The degree of approximation required 
depends on the situation at hand. For instance, in the example of calculating how 
many people are required to pull a block up a ramp, it is possible to ignore certain 
forces if they are sufficiently small. Say that friction is so minimal that its inclusion 
in the calculation will not result in any extra people being predicted to be required. 
Then the idealisation is acceptable – we have performed a simpler calculation with 
fewer forces, and obtained a result that is sufficient for e.g. the effective allocation of 
the labour force. But the  similar idealisation would not be acceptable in the analysis 
of the behaviour of subatomic particles in a particle accelerator, where no force 
could be insignificant.  
What happens in the example just given is that we describe a situation which 
in fact does not obtain, in this case a situation of a block being pulled up a ramp 
where there is no friction (a fictional situation, you might say) and conclude x 
amount of people are needed (on average) to pull the block up the ramp. Then we 
take a situation that does obtain, namely a situation similar except that here friction 
is a factor, and argue that for such and such an empirical reason the result from the 
fictional case is applicable to the actual case. The example with the water waves is 
similar, although this involves not the removal of an element that should be 
integrated into the calculation but rather a totally false picture of what is going on. 
In this case we perform calculations with the simplifying assumption that the water 
is infinitely deep, and then argue that for various empirical reasons the result of 
such a calculation is applicable to the case where the water is not infinitely deep. As 
I am not a wave mechanic I am not qualified to stipulate what such empirical 
conditions would be, but they must obtain in order for the idealisation to be useful 
at all. For idealisations are judged only by their usefulness and appropriateness to 
describe, approximately, a given system. 
The ability of mathematics (platonistic or otherwise) to represent actual, 
possible and fictional systems makes an idealisation possible, but the mapping 




explanation of the representational power of mathematics, which was already 
achieved in chapter two. The utility of the idealisation consists not in the existence 
of mappings, partial or full, between the idealised system, a mathematical structure, 
and an actual system, but rather in the similarity of the idealisation and the actual 
system within certain independently determined parameters. The mapping theorist 
needs to explain how mathematics can represent what is going on in the idealised 
system in such a way that (counterfactually) accurate, true-in-the-story-of-the-
idealisation results and predictions concerning that idealisation are obtained, and 
he needs to explain how mathematics can represent what is going on in the actual 
system in such a way that accurate results and predictions concerning that system 
are obtained. This was done in chapter two. But there is no reason why he has to 
account for how the idealisation and the actual system relate, for such 
considerations go beyond the purview of the mapping account insofar as the matter 
is not one of the representational power of mathematics but rather the empirical 
properties of empirical and idealised systems and their similarity to each other.  
If there were such a thing as a mathematical idealisation in a genuine 
empirical explanation then it is true the mapping account would have to address 
that but I have already argued that such idealisations do not exist, at least not in any 
pernicious form, and so the mapping account theorist can leave discussions of 
idealisations to the philosopher of science, to whose domain they have traditionally 
belonged. Despite these considerations, some philosophers of mathematics have 
tried to give an account of idealisation within the framework of a mapping account, 
e.g. Bueno and Colyvan and their account of partial mappings which was briefly 
encountered in chapter two. As I said then, and repeat now, if invoking partial 
mappings is of some explanatory value to the mapping theorist, then there is no 
reason why he should not help himself to the notion. But given that I have just 
criticised the need for the mapping account theorist to give a treatment of physical 







6.4.4  Idealisations in Field and Rizza 
 
Idealisations are frequently made in the work of Field and subsequently of Rizza. I 
want to briefly consider these here in order to ascertain if they are merely physical 
idealisations, which I feel have been adequately accounted for, or some other type of 
idealisation which is potentially harmful to the nominalist version of the mapping 
account, which gets off the ground partly due to these idealisations. Rizza, for 
instance, does say “I am interested…in mathematical nominalism rather than 
nominalism tout court. For instance I accept making use of idealized descriptions of 
physical settings when making references to abstract objects” (Rizza 2010 p.53). He 
continues (ibid.) “In this sense my position is in line with the one expressed in Field 
(1980 p.31)”. I do not agree that as it stands this is an acceptable position, since 
surely nominalism tout court is the motivation for mathematical nominalism, at 
least if we want to avoid charges of arbitrariness which could be raised in response.  
So if Rizza – and Field – are to be vindicated it is essential to show that the sort 
of idealisations they use can be treated as involving no reference to such 
nominalistically unacceptable objects. The major ‘idealisation’ made by Field, which 
indeed makes many of his representation theorems possible at all, is the assumption 
that physical space is continuous. This is considered objectionable by philosophers 
believing that “there doesn’t seem to be a very significant difference between 
postulating such a rich physical space and postulating the real numbers” (Field 1980 
p.31). Field’s response is that “postulating uncountably many physical entities is not 
an objection to nominalism; nor does it become any more objectionable when one 
postulates that these physical entities obey structural assumptions analogous to the 
ones platonists postulate for real numbers” (Ibid.), a view consistent with the 
approach to nominalism taken through this thesis, viz. that nominalism is an issue of 
abstractness and not structure or quantity. Thus, Field’s treatment of space-time is 
not really an idealisation but rather an empirical assumption.   
An interesting question is the degree to which Field’s nominalism and indeed 
the nominalised version of the mapping account itself has to depend on such an 




would be workable if space-time points were denumerable or even finite. I do not 
have space to address this issue here. But I do not regard is as an especially 
contentious view that philosophy should depend in some way on what is true 
empirically. In the same way, I presume most physicalists in the philosophy of mind 
would regard the truth of a given version of physicalism as an empirical question, 
one which is nevertheless answerable in part by using the methods of philosophy 
and not just of natural science. So much for Field’s idealisations. What of Rizza’s? 
Rizza seems concerned about one particular use of idealisation, that involved with c-
types. He does mention the abstractions involved in physical idealisation, and 
suggests that “such description has only to do with the idealisation of a concrete 
setting and does not by itself support commitment to a distinctively mathematical 
ontology” (ibid. p.56). This is a view which I argued broadly for above. But with c-
types the issue seems different. We are not idealising our empirical description in 
order to apply the measurement system, rather the measurement system itself 
seems somewhat idealised, since as Rizza admits, 
 
the approach I have presented only involves talk of empirical settings and 
observational reports generated by physical interactions occurring within them. Of 
course a considerable degree of idealization is involved, as only finite fragments of 
C-types are obtained through actual experimental procedures. (Rizza 2010 p.67). 
 
The problem is that we obviously act as though there is a continuous measurement 
scale when only part of the scale has been generated. But I submit this need not be 
especially contentious if we are free to admit that although only some c-types are 
generated, the structural properties that the class of all c-types would have if they 
all existed are clear, and we can speak perfectly easily about possible c-types as 
possible values of measurement, although these may or may not be nominalistically 









6.5 Thesis Conclusion 
 
The primary purpose of this thesis has been to defend a representational conception 
of applied mathematics and to argue for a mapping account of applicability. This is 
an account which has been advocated, in varying degrees of detail, by a variety of 
philosophers, a fact which raises two questions regarding my contribution: firstly, 
why should a discussion of a mapping account receive a thesis-length treatment? 
Secondly, what has my discussion contributed over and above the contributions in 
the rest of the literature that suggest it may have any philosophical value? The first 
question is the easiest to address. For bear in mind the facts of the matter: we do 
apply mathematics to the physical world all the time, and in an extremely useful way. 
Whether we think mathematics is about abstract objects, or about nominalistically 
acceptable structures, this is a fact that clearly stands in need of explanation. The 
task of explaining the applicability of mathematics to the physical world falls to 
neither natural science nor mathematics, but rather philosophy. The reason that 
such an extended treatment of the mapping account is required is simply that for 
such an important question, relatively little attention has been devoted to it, and the 
attention that it has received  is generally both scant (although this situation has 
changed somewhat in recent years) and brief (no treatment is longer than an 
average-sized article) with little or no analysis of many of the philosophical 
consequences of such an account. So a more in-depth treatment was both timely and 
necessary.  
 But what of the second question? What has my discussion contributed to the 
debate beyond what is already contained in the various articles about, and 
occasional book relevant to, the representational conception and mapping account? 
I think the answer to this question lies in several areas, three especially. The first is 
the detailed look in chapter two at the relation of the mapping account to derived 
attributes and natural laws, which I have not observed anywhere else. The second is 
the considerations about what exactly the mapping account has to explain, focused 




three and the attack on Steiner’s position in chapter five. Thirdly, in chapter six I 
uncovered the ontological ramifications of the account and  discovered that the 
mapping account is not bound to include a treatment of physical idealisations.  
My general strategy was to develop the mapping account in detail whilst 
defending a representational conception of applied mathematics in general. Thus in 
chapter four I looked at the ways to avoid formulating scientific theories in 
platonistic terms in some detail because of the indirect support this provided for a 
representational conception of applied mathematics in which platonistic 
mathematics did not play an essential explanatory role in empirical explanations. In 
chapter five I addressed a very serious challenge that has been raised by Mark 
Steiner, which if successful would show, despite the considerations in chapters 
three and four, that the role of mathematics is not purely representational. I 
categorised the types of challenge which Steiner made, and attempted to refute each 
category individually, arguing that the mapping account can meet, or is consistent 
with views that do meet, the issues that make up the descriptive problem.  
For the bulk of the thesis I was keen to keep the mapping account as 
‘ontology neutral’ as possible. Beyond the references to functions, real numbers, and 
other abstract mathematical objects, and some scepticism concerning genuine 
platonistic explanations of empirical phenomena, no explicit mathematical ontology 
was endorsed. This was to avoid getting bogged down in intractable metaphysical 
matters at an early stage, and to assess the mapping account independently of these 
metaphysical concerns, a vital move if the account was to be clearly developed. I 
have made clear that I believe a nominalist approach to mathematical ontology is 
the correct one, and suitably reinterpreted the mapping account will provide an 
excellent account of some nominalistically acceptable mathematics-surrogate to 
empirical phenomena. But if it turned out that platonism is true then the mapping 
account is an excellent explanation of the applicability of mathematics, and still 
avoids commitment to genuine platonistic explanations of empirical phenomena, 





Mathematics is the language with which we both describe the wonders of the 
cosmos and measure the mundane. If we do not understand how mathematics can 
be applied our understanding of the universe will be impoverished. I have argued 
that the mapping account is the simplest and the best explanation we have. Newton 
said “truth is ever to be found in simplicity, and not in the multiplicity and confusion 
of things”, and I have shown that if the mapping account has one virtue it is a 
uniform treatment of the applications of mathematics, and that a representational 
conception of applicability reduces the confusions that result from having a 
piecemeal and gerrymandered theory of the applied mathematics. As I have 
presented it, the mapping account has been defended against the slings and arrows 
of its detractors, providing  a firm and unequivocal understanding of applicability 



















Bibliography: Works Cited and Consulted 
 
Adams, E. (1966) ‘On the Nature and Purpose of Measurement’, Synthese, vol.16, pp. 
125-169. 
Aristotle (2001) The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House: New York.  
Aristotle (2001a) Physics, in Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle. 
 Aristotle (2001b) De Caelo, in Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1978a) Nominalism and Realism (Universals and Scientific Realism 
Vol. 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Armstrong, D. M. (1978b) A Theory of Universals (Universals and Scientific Realism 
Vol. 2), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Armstrong, D. M. (1983) What is a Law of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press 
Baker, A. (2005) ‘Are There Genuine Mathematical Explanations of Physical 
Phenomena?’, Mind, vol. 114, pp. 223-238 
Baker, A. (2009) ‘Mathematical Explanation in Science’, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, vol. 60, pp. 611-633 
Baker, A and M. Colyvan (2011) ‘Indexing and Mathematical Explanations’, 
Philosophia Mathematica, vol. 19, pp. 323-334.  
Balaguer, M. (1996) ‘Towards a Nominalisation of Quantum Mechanics’, Mind, vol. 
105, pp. 209-226 
Bangu, S. (2006) ‘Steiner on the Applicability of Mathematics and Naturalism’, 
Philosophia Mathematica, vol.14, pp. 26-43. 
Bangu, S. (2008) ‘Inference to the Best Explanation and Mathematical Realism’, 
Synthese, vol. 160, pp. 13-20 
Bar-Hillel, Y. (Ed.)(1965) Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings 
of the 1964 International Congress, Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Batterman, R. (2010) ‘On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical 
Science’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 61 pp. 1-25.  
(note pagination in this thesis refers to the version from Batterman’s website).  
Berker, K. (1983) Measurement: Its Concepts, Theories and Problems, Holland: D. 
Reidel. 
Boolos, G. (1984) ‘To Be is To Be the Value of a Variable, or the Value of Some 
Variables’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 81, pp. 430-449.  
Bueno, O, and M Colyvan (2011) ‘An Inferential Conception of the Application of 
Mathematics’, Nous, vo. 45, pp. 345-374.  
Bueno, O, S French & J Ladyman (2002) ‘On Representing the Relationship Between 




Burgess, J. (2004) ‘Quine, Analyticity, and Philosophy of Mathematics’, 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 54, pp. 38-55 
Burgess, J and Rosen, G. (1997) A Subject with no Object: Strategies for 
Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics, Oxford: OUP 
Callender, C. (2001) ‘Taking Thermodynamics Too Seriously’, in Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science Part B, vol. 32, pp. 539-553. 
Chihara, C. (1990) Constructability and Mathematical Existence, Oxford: OUP 
Church, A. (1956) Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Vol.1, Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press 
Clark, R. (2004) Representation and Mathematical Applicability, MPhil Thesis: King’s 
College London 
Colyvan, M. (2000) ‘Review of Steiner ‘Applicability of Mathematics as a 
Philosophical Problem1’’, Mind, vol. 109, pp. 390-394. 
Colyvan, M. (2001) The Indispensability of Mathematics, Oxford: OUP 
Colyvan, M. (2001a) ‘The Miracle of Applied Mathematics’, Synthese, vol. 127, pp. 
265-277 
Colyvan, M. (2002) ‘Mathematics and Aesthetic Considerations in Science’, Mind, vol. 
111, pp. 69-74  
Colyvan, M (2010) ‘There is No Easy Road to Nominalism’, Mind, vol. 119, pp. 287-
306 
Cooley, J & M Marshal (2000) ‘Periodical Cicada Homepage’, http:// 
insects.ummz.lsa.umich.edu/fauna/, University of Michigan, Insect Division. 
Dretske, F. (1977) ‘Laws of Nature’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, pp. 248-268 
Enderton, H. (2009) ‘Second-Order and Higher-Order Logic’, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-higher-order 
Feynmann, R. (1965) The Character of Physical Law’, London: Penguin. 
Field, H. (1980) Science Without Numbers, Oxford: Blackwell 
Field, H. (1981) ‘Realism and Anti-Realism about Mathematics’, in Field, 
Realism, Mathematics and Modality 
Field, H. (1984) ‘Can we Dispense with Space-Time?’, in Proceedings of the 
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1984, vol. 2, pp. 
33-90.  
Field, H. (1985) ‘On Conservativeness and Incompleteness’, in Field, Realism, 
Mathematics and Modality. 
Field, H. (1989) Realism, Mathematics and Modality, Oxford: Blackwell  
Fisher, M. (19 ‘The Free Energy of a Macroscopic System’, Archive for Rational 
Mechanics and Analysis, vol. 17, pp. 377-410 





Frege, G. (1891) ‘Function and Concept’, in Frege, Translations From The 
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. 
Frege, G. (1892) ‘On Concept and Object’, in Frege, Translations From The 
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. 
Frege, G. (1980) Translations From The Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 3rd 
Edn, Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble 
Friedman, M (1981) ‘Review of Science without Numbers’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 
48, pp. 505-506 
Hand, M. (2004) Measurement Theory and Practice, London: Arnold  
Hellman, G. (1989), Mathematics without Numbers, Oxford: OUP 
Hellman (2005) ‘Structuralism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Mathematics and Logic. 
Holman, E.W. (1969) ‘Strong and Weak Extensive Measurement’, Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology, vol. 6, pp. 286-293.  
Hossack, K. (2000) ‘Plurals and Complexes’, British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, vol. 51, pp. 411-443.  
Hughes, G. and Cresswell, M. (1996) A New Introduction to Modal Logic, London: 
Routledge 
Krantz, D.H., R.D Luce, P. Suppes & A. Tversky (1971) Foundations of Measurement, 
Volume One, New York: Dover.  
Kuhn, T.S. (1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (1st edn. 1962), Chicago IL: 
Chicago University Press 
Kyburg Jr., H.E. (1997) ‘Quantities, magnitudes and Numbers’, Philosophy of Science, 
vol. 64, pp. 377-410.  
Lyon, A and M. Colyvan. (2008) ‘The Explanatory Power of Phase Spaces’, 
Philosophia Mathematica, vol. 16, pp. 227-243.  
MacBride, F. (1999) ‘Listening to Fictions: A Study of Fieldian Nominalism’, British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 50, pp. 431-455. 
Maddy, M. (1997) Naturalism in Mathematics, Oxford: OUP 
Malament, D. (1982) ‘Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism, by 
Hartry Field’, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, pp. 523-534.  
Melia, J. (2000) ‘Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument’, Mind, vol. 109, pp. 
455-479  
Melia, J. (2002) ‘Response to Colyvan’, Mind, vol. 111, pp.75-79 
Niederee, R. (1992) ‘What do Numbers Measure?’, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 
24, pp.237-276.  
Ostrom, JH. (1974) ‘Archaeopteryx and the Origin of Flight’, Quarterly Review of 
Biology, vol. 49, pp. 27-47.  




Pincock, C. (2004a) ‘A Revealing Flaw in Colyvan’s Indispensability Argument’, 
Philosophy of Science, vol. 71, pp. 61-79 
Pincock, C. (2004b) ‘A New Perspective on the Problem of Applying Mathematics’, 
Philosophia Mathematica, vol. 12, pp. 135-161. 
Planck, M. (1981) Where is Science Going?, Woodbridge CT: Ox Bow Press.  
Putnam, H. (1979) Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge: CUP 
Resnik, M. (1997) Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, Oxford: OUP 
Rizza, D. (2010) ‘Mathematical Nominalism and Measurement’, Philosophia 
Mathematica, vol. 18, pp. 53-73. 
Rizza, D. (2011) ‘Magicicada, Mathematical Explanation and Mathematical Realism’, 
Erkenntnis, vol. 74, pp. 101-114.  
Roberts, F. (1979) Measurement Theory, Reading MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Roberts, F and D. Luce. (1968) ‘Axiomatic Thermodynamics and Extensive 
Measurement’, Synthese, vol. 18, pp.311-326. 
Saatsi, J. (2007) ‘Living in Harmony: Nominalism and the Explanationist Argument 
for Realism’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, pp. 19-33. 
(However page references in this thesis refer to the preprint at 
http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljts/Juha_Saatsi/Research_files/Living.p
df)  
Shapiro, S. (1997) Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, Oxford: OUP 
Shapiro, S. (2005) The Oxford handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, 
Oxford: OUP 
Simons, P. (2001) ‘Review of Steiner ‘The Applicability of Mathematics as a 
Philosophical Problem’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 52, pp. 
181-184. 
Steiner, M. (1998) The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard 
Styer, D. (2004) ‘What Good is the Thermodynamic Limit?’, American Journal of 
Physics, vol. 72, pp. 25-29. 
Szczerba, L.W & A. Tarski (1964) ‘Metamathematical Properties of Some Affine 
Geometries’, in Bar-Hillel, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, pp.  
166-178 
Tooley, M. (1977) ‘The Nature of Laws’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 7, pp. 
667-98    
van Frassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP 
Weinberg, S. (1986) ‘Lecture on the Applicability of Mathematics’, Notices of the 
American Mathematical Society, Vol. 33 
Wigner, E. (1960) ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural 
Sciences’, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics, Vol. 13, pp. 1–14. 
 
  
220 
 
 
